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CHAPTER ONE 
IN'T'RODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is organised into three main sections. The first outlines the aims of the 
study; the second considers the importance of housing, while the third describes the 
structure of the chapters. Thus, the main sections of this chapter are as follows: 
1. Aims of the Study; 
2. Importance of Housing; 
3. Structure of Chapters 
1.1 AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The study examines the record of the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) in 
providing Saudi citizens with finance for housing over the last twenty years (1975 to 
1994). An attempt is made to analyse REDF activity in the light of its position as a 
governmental institution. Tables and graphs will provide information regarding capital 
development, loan commitments and disbursements, new loan applications, private 
housing loans, investment loans, types of buildings constructed and repayments. 
The question of whether public fimds should be used to finance housing has been an 
issue of debate in many countries. In Saudi Arabia, there seems to be support for 
government involvement through the REDR The housing sector is considered to be one 
of the pillars of the Kingdom's programme to build the necessary social infrastructure for 
economic development and constructive social change. Consequently, it continues to 
receive support from the government, since the development of housing is a major 
objective of government policy. 
It is hoped that it will be possible, on the basis of the study, to suggest methods by which 
the capital of the REDF might be increased. The study investigates the possibilities of 
increasing the capital of the REDF by recovering loans from those with outstanding 
debts, or by participation from the private sector. 
The research also explores whether it may be feasible to reduce the waiting period for 
obtaining an REDF loan, since a major problem facing new applicants for loans is the 
long wait for loan approval. 
An important component of the study will is a review of REDF regulations and policies. 
The organisation still operates with many of the regulations and policies established in 
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1974, and on its reorganisation in 1978 (Nassier, 1991,13 1). Many of these policies 
appear to be out of date, having been designed to meet conditions that may no longer 
exist. It may be noted here that although conditions are changing and government 
expenditure is becoming tighter, the fund's goals and policies remain the same. More 
specifically, there have been a number of important changes in the economic situation of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, one of which is a decrease in the government's budget due 
to slower growth in oil exports since 1983. However, since 1978 the REDF has not 
adequately adapted its policies to cope with these changes. 
The study also puts forward proposals to introduce Islamic housing financing methods in 
order to meet the increased demand for housing. These would involve joint ownership of 
property and the pooling of money into a joint account with the REDF, by institutions 
dealing with Islamic housing financing methods. 
The idea of these new housing financing methods is to create sufficient funds for 
individuals and to offer adequate housing to Saudi families in keeping with the Islamic 
way of life, bearing in mind that Islam requires replacement of the institution of interest 
with institutions whose statutes and rules expressly state their commitment to the 
principles of Islamic law (Shari'ah). 
Such new housing financing methods could be based on the Islamic lending policy of 
partnership. In conformity with this policy, the cost could be repaid on a deferred 
repayment basis according to a pre-agreed schedule. It should also be possible to repay 
part of the amount in cash with the balance being deferred. The cost of deferred payment 
would be higher than the cash price. Individuals would be entitled to occupy their houses 
so long as they continue to make the agreed repayments. As a guarantee for the deferred 
payments, the financier would be entitled to ask the client for collateral, such as the 
deeds of the property. 
Since such housing financing methods are based on the Islamic principle of participation, 
they are expected to meet with wide acceptance among Saudi citizens who are deeply 
attached to their religious beliefs but also want to own their homes (ibid., 136). 
In the light of these considerations, the present study aims specifically to: 
1. analyse the record of the REDF in providing housing finance; 
ascertain the socio-economic status of those who have taken out loans (borrowers) 
and those seeking REDF loans (loan seekers); 
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3. review REDF regulations and policies which appear to be out of date and were 
intended to meet conditions that may no longer exist; 
4. discuss whether the existing loan maximum (SR 300,000) is equal to (or more 
than) 70% of the construction cost of one housing unit; 
5. assess whether the annual repayments (SR 9,600) are ever delayed; 
6. study the reasons why some annual repayments (SR 9,600) might be delayed, in an 
attempt to overcome any difficulties; 
7. identify borrowers' preferences regarding the various methods of loan repayment 
in order to increase the repayments; 
8. ascertain borrowers' views as to whether their prompt or even early repayment 
would reduce the waiting period for those who seek loans; 
9. study the reasons why some people who say they are interested in REDF loans do 
not apply for them; 
10. explore whether it is feasible to reduce the waiting period for obtaining an REDF 
loan; 
11. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing 
money to suit their specific needs; 
12. suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased; 
13. evaluate REDF loan seekers' views on being offered a loan on which interest is 
charged in order to build their houses; 
14. evaluate REDF loan seekers' views on being offered various Islamic housing 
financing facilities in order to meet the increased demand for housing. 
It should be mentioned, in this context, that the study is concerned with the period 1975- 
1995. 
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF HOUSING 
The provision of adequate shelter for people is one of the greatest problems in the world 
today. In many cases, it is the lack of this, combined with the lack of jobs and other 
economic opportunities, that causes the desperation, riots, and general social upheaval 
that are becoming common even in the most advanced countries (Al-Shiha, 1982,12). 
Owning a house or shelter is one of the basic human motives for undertaking economic 
activity. It has several features which make it more prominent than other motives like 
food and clothing. Firstly, the associated expenditure is much greater than that on food 
and clothing. Secondly, housing being a fixed asset, expenditure on it becomes an 
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investment because of its long term nature. Thirdly, and most importantly, this human 
need causes economic development as it generates demand for various basic industries 
like steel, cement, other building materials and fixtures etc (Ahmad, A. 1995,38). One 
cannot expect, in the developing countries, that shelter should be provided on a large 
scale by welfare programmes. Ideally, market forces should be able to take care of this 
aspect of society. But since housing involves a large investment as compared with the 
average household's income, the availability of cheap finance plays an important role in 
its provision (Bendjilali and Khan, 1995,34). Various strategies have been used to solve 
housing problems. An understanding of the economic, social and environmental 
conditions of the concerned households and country is essential in order to design a good 
housing programme. 
Housing is a part of the building and construction sector. In addition, it is an important 
factor in social settlement, and one by which a society's welfare and progress can be 
evaluated. Every modem society should do its best to organise comprehensive housing 
programmes for its citizens, to enable them to obtain houses according to their income 
level and social standing. Adequate housing should be an integral requirement of a 
nation's evolution. The satisfaction of housing needs should be given top priority since it 
creates incentives for balanced growth, improves living standards, and provides 
conditions of security and happiness. 
Housing constitutes a considerable percentage of the cost of a consumer's essential 
needs. Therefore, governments have continued their efforts to mitigate the effect of the 
housing problem by introducing subsidies. 
It should be mentioned in this context that building industries, one of the biggest sectors 
of work today, have been established due to the great demand for housing. In addition, 
each country has a housing ministry or a department for planning and supervision of 
housing. 
Development in the housing sector is a major contribution to the overall development 
process. Housing improvements have a great impact on individuals, who receive 
innumerable direct benefits, as well as improving social welfare, which is less tangible. 
The needs of the construction sector can encourage investment and development in new 
and existing industries, such as cement, plastics, steel and glass. Physical infra-structure, 
such as transport, communications facilities and utilities, must be improved to support 
both the building process and the new residents. Finally, an advanced financial system is 
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required, along with economic stability, to allow a sufficient system of investment and 
borrowing to be developed (Nassier, 1991,7) 
The housing sector, as one of the pillars of the Kingdom's programme to build the social 
infra-structure for economic development and constructive social change, has received 
and continues to receive emphasis in the country's policy framework, as is evident from 
the budgetary allocations for this sector. 
To fulfil its aim of ensuring that Saudi citizens are provided with adequate housing at 
reasonable prices, the government introduced three measures: it imposed regulations on 
private companies importing labour to build housing; it undertook large-scale housing 
projects in urban centres; and it established the REDF, to finance construction by 
individuals (for more details see ibid., 6). The REDF is the product of a policy that is 
aimed at the distribution of national wealth and exists at a time of economic surplus (Al- 
Shiha, 1982,12). 
The government has accorded considerable attention to housing-development 
programmes. Its aim is to provide Saudi citizens adequate houses, at reasonable prices. 
However, there has been a significant change in the direction of the country's housing 
over the period 1975-1985. The housing sector in the Kingdom has witnessed substantial 
expansion due to the high priority accorded by the government to its development (Al- 
Yousef, 1987,25) 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF CHAPTERS 
This study is comprised of ten chapters. The first chapter is an introductory chapter, 
while the second chapter gives an overview of housing in Saudi Arabia. This is presented 
in three sections. The first discusses the establishment and work of the REDF; the second 
considers the role of the MPWH, while the third reports on housing projects undertaken 
by other government institutions. 
Chapter Three discusses a variety of methods, consistent with the teachings of the 
Qur'an and Sunnah, by which housing finance may be provided. 
Chapter Four explains the design of the empirical component of the study. Hence, in this 
chapter, the study sample will be described, and the features of the questionnaires used in 
the study will be discussed. 
Chapters Five and Six present the findings of the survey administered to the REDF 
borrowers and those who seek REDF loans respectively. The aim of these chapters is to 
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build up a profile of the REDF's existing and potential clients and analyse their attitudes 
towards certain financial matters. 
Chapters Seven and Eight address a number of hypotheses related to current borrowers 
and those who seek REDF loans questions respectively. The aims of the hypotheses and 
the statistical methods used to test them are explained, and the results presented. 
In Chapter Nine, selected study variables are examined simultaneously, in an attempt to 
find a summary measurement of these variables. Specifically, this chapter aims to find out 
whether the sample individuals form any kind of groups or whether they are randomly 
scattered. Cluster Analysis is used to achieve this objective. 
Finally, Chapter Ten highlights the most significant outcomes of this research and offers 
policy recommendations for the future, as well as suggestions to improve evaluation 
methods. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HOUSING IN SAUDI ARABIA 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
During the years from 1970 to 1985, Saudi Arabia witnessed accelerated growth in all 
sectors of the economy. There was a rapid expansion in oil income, government 
expenditure, gross national product and personal income. The gross capital formation, 
which is an indicator of growth trends in the economy, also witnessed a substantial 
expansion. The non-oil private sector experienced an upsurge in all aspects of its 
economic activity. Money supply, bank deposits and overall credit increased 
substantially. 
The Saudi Arabian government was determined to take full advantage of the unique 
development opportunities afforded to it by the rise in both its income and reserves 
within the framework of social welfare. Its aim was to build the strong physical and 
social infrastructure necessary to attain self-sustaining and accelerated growth in all 
sectors of the economy, with the ultimate goals of diversifying the economy, bringing 
about an equitable distribution of income and raising the standard of living for all 
sections of the population. 
In pursuit of these goals, the government expanded its programmes in the fields of 
vocational training, rural and urban community development, social care and relief and 
social security. In addition, it also provided free education at all levels and free health 
services. 
The creation and improvement of housing was, and still is, a vital component of the 
government's social welfare plans. Despite the difficulties created by the vast area of the 
country (about 2.25 million square kilometres) and the great distances between the main 
urban centres, it is committed to making the Kingdom's towns and cities better places 
for life and work. Vast sums of money have been spent through the municipalities 
(district authorities) on asphalting, paving, tree-planting, street-cleaning and lighting, 
sewerage systems and rain and storm water drainage. 
One of the objectives of the First Five-Year Development Plan for the country (1970- 
1975) was to raise the standard of living and welfare of Saudi families. With regard to 
housing, the plan stated (MP, 1970,443): 
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"Social and health standards should be raised and in particular raising the standards 
of housing of the lower-income groups, so that improvement in housing will go 
hand-in-hand with government's efforts for improvements in health services, water 
supplies and urban development throughout the Kingdom". 
However, the plan did not define a specific housing policy for the country and did not 
assign to any independent government agency the task of carrying out these general 
housing objectives. 
Subsequently, to accelerate economic development fiuther, the activities of existing 
financial institutions were expanded and new ones were established. The functions of the 
Public Investment Fund (PIF) were widened to include participation with the private 
sector in establishing new industrial plants or expanding existing ones. The Agricultural 
Bank (AB) provided an increasing volume of credit to the private sector, thus helping in 
the process of rural development. The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) was 
established to finance industrial projects. 
Urgent measures were also undertaken to address the housing crisis which had ensued as 
a result of the Kingdom's rapid economic expansion. The large-scale migration of 
expatriate workers and Saudi nationals to urban centres had affected the housing 
situation drastically. The housing stock in such areas was in high demand and most of it 
was rented out to expatriate workers who could pay a higher rent in advance, forcing 
Saudi families (Fadan, 1983,215), especially those of lower income, to move to sub- 
standard homes with safety and sanitary problems. Consequently, the government 
resolved to provide every household with an affordable, decent, safe and sanitary 
dwelling in a reasonably short period of time. Priority was given to low-income families 
who were in more urgent need of better housing (MP, 1995). 
To implement its housing objectives, the government created two agencies. The first was 
the REDF; the second one was the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH). 
The initiatives in housing construction undertaken through these and other government 
institutions form the focus of this chapter, which is organised into three main sections, 
together with a conclusion. The first discusses the establishment and work of the REDF; 
the second considers the role of the MPWH, while the third reports on housing projects 
undertaken by other government institutions. Therefore, the main sections of this chapter 
are as follows: 
1. The Role of the REDF; 
2. The Role of the MPWH; 
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3. The Role of other Government Institutions; 
4. Conclusion. 
2.1 THE ROLE OF THE REDF 
A cornerstone of the government's housing programme is the REDF which provides 
loans for the construction of modem housing units. In the following sub-sections, the 
establishment of the REDF is described and its management structure and goals are 
explained. There follows an explanation of the organisation's financial operation, and 
some indication is given of the scope of the benefits it has provided since its inception. 
2.1.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REDF 
The Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MFNE) put forward a proposal for the 
establishment of the REDF, embodied in the Minister's letter number 2939, dated 
26.06.1974 (REDF, 1981,8). The Council of Ministers (CM) approved the proposal in 
its document number 793, dated 26.06.1974. In response to these letters, the REDF was 
founded under Royal Decree number M/23, dated 01.07.1974, as a specialised financing 
institution (ibid. ). According to this Royal Decree, the REDF is a financial institution 
linked to the MFNE with the aim of disbursing money for building houses and pushing 
forward the vehicle of development in the private sector of the housing field by offering 
long-term soft loans to Saudi citizens (ibid.; REDF, 1992,12; REDF, 1982,8). 
2.1.2 THE REDF MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
The REDF is administered by a committee composed of a president and seven members. 
The president is nominated by the Minister of Finance and National Economy and 
approved by the President of the CM. The seven committee members are as follows 
(REDF, 1981,8; Nassier, 1991,70) : 
1. One representative of the MFNE; 
2. One representative of the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MMRA); 
3. One representative of the Ministry of Planning (MP); 
4. One representative of the MPWH; 
5. Three members selected from among specially-qualified Saudi citizens. 
2.1.3 REDF GOALS 
The REDF was founded for the purpose of achieving several immediate and long-term 
goals (Nassier, 1991,71,127,128; REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995). 
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The first goal is to set up a financial assistance programme to increase the participation 
of private individuals in capital formation. The goal of the REDF was eventually to 
provide a self-sustaining financial institution that would facilitate the transfer of cash into 
capital for private individuals. Hence, the REDF extends interest-free loans to individuals 
and companies for the construction of houses and apartment buildings. Since financing is 
the main problem that the execution of a housing plan faces, a financial policy was 
formulated to look into financing requirements. The REDF was seen as an essential 
instrument for accelerating housing development in the Kingdom. An analysis of the 
REDF's activities shows that it has made a significant contribution to the provision of 
housing stock in Saudi Arabia. Initially, it took less than six months for applicants to 
obtain a loan from the REDF. However, it now takes much longer to get loans, often 
many years, as the decline in oil prices has meant that no new government money can be 
injected into the fund. 
The second goal is to alleviate the severe shortage of housing for both the indigenous 
and the foreign population. The REDF was created as part of an overall plan to 
modernise the country and to offer adequate housing to Saudi families, in keeping with 
the Islamic way of life and to assure the occupants total comfort with privacy and 
security. This would, in turn, encourage expansion and completion of other aspects of 
the physical infrastructure, such as utilities, roads and communications. The REDF is 
contributing effectively to the construction of owner-occupied houses and residential 
buildings through the extension of long and medium-term loans to individuals and 
construction companies. 
The third goal is to improve the standard of living of households who would finance and 
eventually own their homes. This would also have certain psychological and sociological 
effects in terms of meeting the expectations of the rising middle class. 
The fourth goal is to maintain the Islamic traditions and principles that govern finance 
and guarantee the ownership of a private home for the Muslim household. 
The fifth goal is to increase private participation in easing the severe housing shortage 
and induce the private sector to participate in the development of housing construction; 
in other words, to accelerate housing development in the Kingdom by encouraging the 
private sector to build for residential and commercial purposes. 
The sixth goal is to distribute the huge increase in national income in the Saudi society, 
particularly the middle class. The fact that the REDF is an interest-free agency with 
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continual government support has made it a form of welfare programme, in the sense 
that people receive subsidised handouts from the government for capital investment 
(Nassier, 1991,132). Rather than being a financial institution for turning cash into 
capital to make additional cash for additional capital, the REDF has become an 
institutionalised welfare system for rising middle class families (ibid., ). 
The final goal is to improve the living standards and meet the rising expectations of a 
society in the process of modernisation. The REDF participates in improving living 
conditions by providing loans to people to build their own houses and by making loans 
available to investors in housing. 
These goals are in line with the objectives for housing development of Saudi Arabia 
which were adopted in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1975-1980) which 
were to: 
1. enable every household to have a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling appropriate to 
his level of income; 
2. ensure that enough housing, both permanent and temporary, was built during the 
plan period to accommodate additional manpower; 
3. develop housing within orderly urbanisation patterns, in accordance with the 
employment, social and environmental requirements of residential settlements 
(MP, 1975,511). 
The programme has proved to be a success in quantitative terms. It has fmanced more 
than half of all Saudi dwellings built in the last two decades (REDF, 1993). However, it 
has also created a nine-year waiting list for loan seekers. Moreover, its success, in terms 
of the quality of the housing and suitability of foreign design concepts, is still highly 
debatable. 
2.1.4 CAPITAL OF THE REDF 
The REDF's capital is made up of two components, the authorised capital and the paid- 
up capital, each of which is analysed below. 
2.1.4.1 AUTHORISED CAPITAL 
The REDF began its operation with a modest authorised capital of SR 250 million 
(REDF, 1995,11). This was subsequently raised to SR 9,000 million in the first year of 
the REDF's activity (fiscal year of 1975) i. e. a 36-fold increase (see Table 2.1). In the 
fiscal year of 1976, the REDF witnessed another improvement in its capital position. The 
government approved an increase of SR 14,800 million in the authorised capital of the 
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REDF. However, the CM Resolution number 530, dated 13.05.1975, raised the REDF's 
capital from the initial sum of SR 250 million to SR 2,000 million. By 1976, the 
authorised capital reached SR 23,800 million (REDF, 1981,10). This was an increase of 
164% over the previous year and an overwhelming 9,000% increase over the original 
authorised capital. In 1977, the authorised capital increased again to SR 33,800 million. 
This was an increase of 42.02% over the previous year. In the fiscal year of 1979 the 
annual increase was SR 5,000 million. Another SR 5,000 million was also added in 
1980. The total authorised capital reached SR 51,100 million by the end of the 
1981fiscal year. This amount then grew rapidly to SR 59,500 million by the year 1982 
and there were further substantial increases in 1983 and 1984, bringing the total to SR 
69,000 million. However, for the next two years the government contribution to 
authorised capital dropped drastically. In 1987, it was only SR 331 million. This gave 
the REDF an authorised capital of SR 73,769 million, a figure which has remained stable 
to the present time. The following is a presentation of the growth of the REDF 
authorised capital from its foundation (1975) until the fiscal year of 1994. 
Table 2.1 
Authorised Capital of REDF (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Authorised Capital Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1975 9.000 8.750 97.22 
1976 23,800 14,800 164.44 
1977 33,800 10,000 42.02 
1978 33,800 0 0 
1979 38,800 5,000 14.79 
1980 43,800 5,000 12.89 
1981 51,100 7,300 16.67 
1982 59,500 8,400 16.44 
1983 62,400 2,900 4.87 
1984 69,000 6,600 10.58 
1985 70,393 1,393 2.02 
1986 73,438 3,044 4.32 
1987 73,769 331 0.45 
1988 73,769 0 0 
1989 73,769 0 0 
1990 73.769 0 0 
1991 73,769 0 0 
1992 73,769 0 0 
1993 73,769 0 0 
1994 73,769 0 0 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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2.1.4.2 PAID-UP CAPITAL 
The past twenty years have witnessed a more than fourteen-fold increase in the paid-up 
capital of the REDF, which rose from SR 5,000 million in the 1975 fiscal year to SR 
70,840 million in that of 1994. For example, the paid-up capital of the REDF in the 1976 
fiscal year alone increased by 110% as compared with the previous year. In 1977, it 
increased by 89.52% as compared with the previous year (see Table 2.2). Nassier (1991, 
135) stated: 
"New capital can also be raised through the participation of the private sector, 
thus, widening the economic ripple effect benefits of this development institution". 
It should be mentioned in this context that the long-term goal of the REDF is to 
eventually become a self-sustaining programme in which the repayments will be used as 
paid-in capital to continue financing other loans. The following is a presentation of the 
growth of the REDF paid-up capital from its foundation (1975) until the fiscal year of 
1994. 
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Table 2.2 
Paid-up Capital of REDF (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Paid-up Capital Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1975 5,000 5,000 100 
1976 10,500 5,500 110 
1977 19,900 9,400 89.52 
1978 24,900 5,000 25.13 
1979 30,850 5,950 23.9 
1980 38,850 8,000 25.93 
1981 43,850 5,000 12.87 
1982 50,650 6,800 15.51 
1983 57,650 7,000 13.82 
1984 64,250 6,600 11.45 
1985 68,553 4,303 6.7 
1986 68,967 414 0.6 
1987 70,840 1,873 2.72 
1988 70,840 0 0 
1989 70,840 0 0 
1990 70,840 0 0 
1991 70,840 0 0 
1992 70,840 0 0 
1993 70,840 0 0 
1994 70,840 0 0 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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2.1.5 COMMITMENTS AND DISBURSEMENTS 
The following table shows commitments and disbursements during the period 1975- 
1994, while Tables 2.4 and 2.5 clarify the difference (in both absolute and percentage 
terms) year by year, for commitments and disbursements respectively. 
16 
'PTO 'ýýý 
T. 
'Dý5 '9k 'DTJ 'ýZP6 
J. D,, 
D 
J. DýO /'CýJ /'DWG J'DW& J'D'Y /'DdJ J'Dda. J'0f5 J. 9, 
p 
J'ýd, 
D 
% JýJ Jt, Jto Jý 
Table 2.3 
Commitments and Disbursements (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Commitment Disbursement 
1975 7,827 2,645 
1976 13,601 8,513 
1977 1,304 7,511 
1978 9,577 5,775 
1979 8,549 8,579 
1980 7,457 7,557 
1981 8,626 7,165 
1982 10,061 8,307 
1983 8,304 8,897 
1984 7,541 8,606 
1985 5,438 6,783 
1986 3,145 4,116 
1987 3,246 3,973 
1988 3,436 3,384 
1989 2,330 2,979 
1990 2,301 2,444 
1991 1,609 1,741 
1992 2,290 1,537 
1993 6,459 2,677 
1994 3,768 4,761 
TOTAL 116,869 107,950 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 
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Table 2.4 
Commitments (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Commitments Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1975 7,827 - 
II 
- 
1976 13,601 5,774 73.77 
1977 1,304 -12,297 -90.41 
1978 9,577 8,273 634.43 
1979 8,549 -1,028 -10.73 
1980 7,457 -1,092 -12.77 
1981 8,626 1,169 15.68 
1982 10,061 1,435 16.64 
1983 8,304 -1,757 -17.46 
1984 7,541 -763 -9.19 
1985 5,438 -2,103 -27.89 
1986 3,145 -2,293 -42 
1987 3,246 101 3.21 
1988 3,436 190 5.85 
1989 2,330 -1,106 -32.19 
1990 2,301 -29 -1.24 
1991 1,609 -692 -30 
1992 2,290 681 42 
1993 6,459 4,169 182 
1994 3,768 1,478 65 
TOTAL 116,869 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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Table 2.5 
Disbursements (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Disbursements Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1975 2,645 - - 1976 8,513 5,868 221.85 
1977 7,511 -1,002 -11.77 
1978 5,775 -1,736 -23.11 
1979 8,579 2,804 48.55 
1980 7,557 -1,022 -11.91 
1981 7,165 -392 -5.19 
1982 8,307 1,142 15.94 
1983 8,897 590 7.1 
1984 8,606 -291 -3.27 
1985 6,783 -1,823 -21.18 
1986 4,116 -2,667 -39.32 
1987 3,973 -143 -3.47 
1988 3,384 -589 -14.83 
1989 2,979 -405 -11.97 
1990 2,444 -535 -17.96 
1991 1,741 -703 -28.76 
1992 1,537 -204 -11.72 
1993 2,677 1,140 74.17 
1994 4,761 3,224 209.76 
TOTAL 107,950 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
2.1.6 THE REDF REGULATIONS 
The REDF regulations provide for: 
1. granting medium and long-term loans to (REDF, 1974,2; REDF, 1989,18): 
a) a Saudi national in low and medium-income bracket for home construction 
for up to 70% of the estimated cost, up to a maximum of SR 300,000; 
b) both legal and natural entity companies for the construction of residential 
compounds with multi-housing units for rental or hotel purposes. Up to 50% 
of the estimated home construction cost may be borrowed up to a maximum 
of SR 10 million (REDF, 1995,14); 
2. development and improvement of cities and towns by acquisition of old sections 
for the purpose of planning new residential and commercial areas, in agreement 
with the Municipalities concerned; 
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3. granting loans to Saudi establishments for up to 50% of the cost of constructing 
housing compounds for their employees; 
4. granting loans to any other housing project, the feasibility of which can be proved 
to the committee in charge of the REDF. 
In accordance with this programme, any eligible citizen who wishes to build his own 
house can be granted up to 70% of the estimated construction cost, up to a maximum of 
SR 300,000. The loan is payable over a twenty-five year period. Eligibility is determined 
by the borrower's age, marital status, gender and home ownership status. Specifically, 
the REDF can provide loans to (REDF, 1995,14; Al-Saati, 1987,260): 
1. Saudi males of at least twenty-one years of age; 
2. Saudi males of eighteen years provided that they are married; 
3. widowed or divorced Saudi women who are legal custodians of their children; 
4. Saudi women aged forty or above, who are spinsters; 
5. a group of orphans; 
6. an orphan of less than eighteen years old. 
The loan is a once in a lifetime programme. In other words, no loans will be granted to 
an applicant who has already received a loan or who already owns a house. However, 
those who live in old or mud houses and wish to demolish them to build new houses for 
their private occupancy are entitled to an REDF loan. In addition, the potential borrower 
must: (Nassier, 1991,72,76; Al-Saati, 1987,260) 
a) own a site upon which to build; 
b) have a municipal permit; 
c) have a set of building plans that meet REDF specifications. 
Borrowers sign a mortgage contract with the REDF, by which the recipient is prohibited 
from selling, relinquishing, transferring ownership or changing the status of the property 
until the mortgage is redeemed or the last repayment of the loan is made. The contract 
also gives the REDF the right to sell the mortgage in order to collect all or part of the 
remaining repayments in case of failure to repay any instalment on the due date (Al- 
Saati, 1987,260; Nassier, 1991,77). 
A major drawback of these regulations is their tendency to inflate land and housing 
prices. Fadan (1983b, 251) stated: 
'Despite the fact that many individuals seem to have benefited, faults in the 
eligibility terms still prevent many poor and landless individuals from utilising this 
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programme. On the other hand, it has proved a bonanza for speculative land 
developers. " 
Similarly Eshmawi (1983,86) argued: 
"The REDF loan programme has not really contributed to low-income housing 
construction through its lending programme to the private sector. This is largely 
due to the requirement of land ownership for individuals as a condition for loan 
application. The lower-income level households cannot therefore take advantage 
of the credit system available". 
2.1.7 TYPES OF REDF LOAN 
The fund grants two types of loan: private and investment. The former are provided to 
enable citizens to build properties for their own private occupation, while the latter are 
available to individuals and organisations to finance the construction of non-residential 
property, or of residential compounds to be let by their owners. The relevant 
classifications and the development in number of loans granted in each category are 
discussed below. 
2.1.7.1 PRIVATE LOANS 
These are long-term loans, repayable over a period of 25 years. They enable citizens to 
finance the construction of their private houses at the rate of 70% of the total building 
cost of construction according to categories ranging from SR 200,000 to 300,000. 
2.1.7.1.1 CLASSIFICATION OF PRIVATE LOANS 
Originally the maximum limit on loans for private residences was the same (SR 
300,000), whether the house was to be located in a large urban area or in a small village. 
A new policy, however, was introduced early in 1978 by the CM. In its decision number 
101, dated 26.01.1978, villages and towns were grouped by size and population (REDF, 
1981,13). The maximum value of private loans issued for construction in big cities 
remained at SR 300,000, but the limits on loans for residents of smaller towns were 
adjusted to match the lesser growth needs in those areas. These four groups were 
defined, as follows (ibid.; REDF, 1989,19): 
First Group: This included the largest cities. The value of private loans was limited to 
SR 300,000. 
Second Group: This included medium sized towns. The value of private loans was 
limited to SR 240,000. 
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Third Group: This included small towns. The value of private loans was limited to SR 
170,000. 
Fourth Group: This included villages and rural areas. The value of private loans was 
limited to SR 100,000. 
The CM reconsidered this issue on 03.05.1981 and amended their original decision, as 
follows (REDF, 1981,15; REDF, 1982,13-15): 
Group A: loans designated for use in major cities were limited to SR 300,000. 
Group B: loans designated for use in medium-sized towns were limited to SR 250,000. 
Group C: loans designated for use in villages were limited to SR 200,000. 
Nassier (1991,82) stated: 
"The reclassification was intended to simplify the procedure and reward rural areas 
as it was felt that their need for housing construction was much greater, at that 
time, than in urban centres. Construction costs were much less in the rural areas 
and the full loan amount could buy a much larger house than the same amount in 
the urban centres". 
2.1.7.1.2 METHOD OF DISBURSEMENT 
Private loans approved by the REDF are paid in accordance with standard disbursement 
in four payments, in accordance with the applicable regulations, as follows (REDF, 
1987,21; REDF, 1995,14; Al-Saati, 1987,260): 
The first payment represents 10% of the loan value, payable upon signing the contract. 
The second payment represents 40% of the loan value, payable after the completion of 
structural framework. 
The third payment represents 40% of the loan value, payable after the completion of 
exterior finishing, installation of sanitary systems and tiling. 
The last payment represents 10% of the loan value, payable upon completion of the 
finishing work on the whole building. 
Such distribution of payment and specification of percentages are effected to ensure that 
loans are used for their intended purpose and that construction work is satisfactorily 
completed. Periodic inspection visits are made to the construction site by the REDF's 
engineers, who issue disbursement certificates confirming that each constructional phase 
has been completed on time (REDF, 1995,14). 
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2.1.7.1.3 APPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE LOANS 
The total number of private loan applications submitted to the REDF during the period 
1975-1994 was 598,850 (see Table 2.6). 
Table 2.6 
Number of Private Loan Applications Submitted to the REDF 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year 
Number of 
A lications Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1975 34,189 0 - 
1976 46,955 12,766 37.34 
1977 30,700 -16,255 -34.62 
1978 35,308 4 608 15.01 
1979 37,016 1,708 4.84 
1980 36,815 -201 -0.54 
1981 35,572 -1,243 -3.38 
1982 41,735 6163 17.33 
1983 39,541 -2,194 -5.26 
1984 39,280 -261 -0.66 
1985 29,590 -9,690 -24.67 
1986 17,448 -12,142 -41.03 
1987 19,203 1 755 10.06 
1988 17,153 -2,050 -10.68 
1989 15,209 -1,944 -11.33 
1990 13,146 -2 063 -13.56 
1991 18,565 5,419 41.22 
1992 20,467 1,902 10.25 
1993 36,046 15,579 76.12 
1994 34,912 -1,134 -3.15 
TOTAL 598,850 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
2.1.7.1.4 PRIVATE LOANS ISSUED 
The establishment of the REDF has been the most important factor contributing to the 
ample availability of houses and the resultant decline in house rents. During its first ten 
years of operation, the REDF funded the construction of 24,775 rental housing and 
apartment units. Because some private housing loans covered the cost of more than one 
home in a family compound, the total number of private residential units built with 
REDF loans during the same period was 388,700. 
As Table 2.7 shows, the number of private loans issued in the 1977 fiscal year decreased 
by 91.08% as compared with the previous year. Consequently, their value (in SR 
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million) and the number of housing units built with them decreased by 91.59% and 
91.84% respectively, as compared with the previous year (see Tables 2.8 and 2.9). One 
possible explanation for this could be that in 1977 REDF stopped its operations for 
about six months to reorganise (Al-Shiha, 1982,93). 
From its inception in 1975 up to 1994 the REDF granted 425,306 private loans with a 
total value of SR 111,701 million, contributing to the construction of 505,718 housing 
units. Tables 2.7,2.8 and 2.9 respectively, show the number of private loans issued, their 
value (in SR million) and the number of housing units built with them during the years 
1975-1994. 
Table 2.7 
Number of Private Loans Issued 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Number of Loans Annual Difference Percents e Chan 2e 
1975 32,705 - - 
1976 47,063 14,358 43.9 
1977 4,196 -42,867 -91.08 
1978 35,394 31,198 743.52 
1979 32,727 -2 667 -7.54 
1980 28,742 -3,985 -12.18 
1981 31,684 2,942 10.24 
1982 35,727 4,043 12.76 
1983 29,334 -6,393 -17.89 
1984 26,225 -3,109 -10.6 
1985 18,842 -7,383 -28.15 
1986 11,1 2 -7,660 -40.65 
1987 11,633 451 4.03 
1988 12,279 646 5.55 
1989 8,174 -4,105 -33.43 
1990 8,121 -53 -0.65 
1991 5,476 -2,645 -32.57 
1992 8,867 3,391 61.92 
1993 23 340 14,473 163.22 
1994 13,595 4,728 53.32 
TOTAL 425 06 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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Table 2.8 
Value of Private Loans (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Value of Loans Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1975 7,827 - - 
1976 12,694 4,867 62.18 
1977 1,068 -11,626 -91.59 
1978 8 913 7,845 734.55 
1979 8,060 -853 -9.57 
1980 7,058 -1,002 -12.43 
1981 8,185 1,127 15.97 
1982 9,546 1,361 16.63 
1983 7,935 -1,611 -16.88 
1984 7,134 -801 -10.09 
1985 5,158 -1,976 -27.7 
1986 3,059 -2,099 -40.69 
1987 3,193 134 4.38 
1988 3,377 184 5.76 
1989 2,243 -1,134 -33.58 
1990 2,224 -19 -0.85 
1991 1,565 -659 -29.63 
1992 2,276 711 45.43 
1993 6,432 4,156 182.6 
1994 3,754 1,478 64.94 
TOTAL 111,701 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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Table 2.9 
Number of Housing Units Built with Private Loans 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year 
Number of 
Housing Units Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1975 41,017 - - 
1976 56,346 15,329 37.37 
1977 4,598 -51,748 -91.84 
1978 41,288 36,690 797.96 
1979 39,828 -1,460 -3.54 
1980 34,312 -5,516 -13.85 
1981 37,360 3,048 8.88 
1982 42,430 5,070 13.57 
1983 35,280 -7,150 -16.85 
1984 31,458 -3,822 -10.83 
1985 22,613 -8,845 -28.12 
1986 13,450 -9,163 -40.52 
1987 13,978 528 3.93 
1988 14,725 747 5.34 
1989 9,806 -4,919 -33.41 
1990 9,744 -62 -0.63 
1991 6,270 -3,474 -35.65 
1992 6,892 622 9.92 
1993 28,009 21,117 306.4 
1994 16,314 9,422 136.71 
TOTAL 505,718 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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As Table 2.10 shows, private loans comprise 99.42% of all loans provided by the fand 
since 1975 and the value of such loans is 95.58% of the value of all loans (see Table 
2.11). This is to be expected, since the fund's major objective is to support a 
fundamental and essential aspect of the life of citizens by enabling them to obtain 
financial resources to build their own houses. In other words, private loans constitute the 
larger segment of the fund's lending activities, due to the fact that they are related to the 
largest concentration of citizens. This indicates the extent to which citizens have 
benefitted from the financing provided by the REDF for the construction of their houses. 
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Table 2.10 
Number of Private and Total Loans Issued 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Private Loans Issued Total Loans Issued 
Percentage of 
Private Loans Issued 
to 
Total Loans Issued 
1975 32,705 32,705 100 
1976 47,063 47,429 99.23 
1977 4,196 4,327 96.97 
1978 35,394 35,803 98.86 
1979 32,727 33,002 99.17 
1980 28,742 28,947 99.29 
1981 31,684 31,876 99.4 
1982 35,727 35,958 99.36 
1983 29,334 29,497 99.45 
1984 26,225 26,344 99.55 
1985 18,842 18,931 99.53 
1986 11,182 11,219 99.67 
1987 11,633 11,668 99.7 
1988 12,279 12,328 99.6 
1989 8,174 8,241 99.19 
1990 8,121 8,169 99.41 
1991 5,476 5,509 99.4 
1992 8,867 8,876 99.9 
1993 23,340 23,352 99.95 
1994 13,595 13,607 99.91 
TOTAL 425,306 427,788 99.42 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first, second and third columns) 
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Table 2.11 
Value of Private Loans and Total Value of Loans (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year 
Value of Private 
Loans 
Total Value 
of Loans 
Percentage of 
Value of Private 
Loans 
to 
Total Value of Loans 
1975 7,827 7,827 100 
1976 12,694 13,601 93.33 
1977 1,068 1,304 81.9 
1978 8,913 9 577 93.07 
1979 8,060 8,549 94.28 
1980 7,058 7,457 94.65 
1981 8,185 8,626 94.89 
1982 9,546 10906 1 94.88 
1983 7,935 _ 8,304 95.56 
1984 7,134 7,541 94.6 
1985 5,158 
_5438 
94.85 
1986 3,059 3,145 97.27 
1987 3,193 3,246 98.37 
1988 3,377 3,436 98.28 
1989 2 243 2,330 96.27 
1990 2,224 2,301 96.65 
1991 1,565 1,609 97.27 
1992 2,276 2,290 99.39 
1993 6,432 6 459 99.58 
1994 3,754 3,768 99.63 
TOTAL 111 701 116,869 95.58 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first, second and third columns) 
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2.1.7.1.5 ACHIEVEMENT IN RELATION TO PRIVATE LOANS 
As Table 2.12 shows, the number of private loans granted as a percentage of the number 
of applications for such loans during the period 1978-1982 was 78.07%-100.24%, 
whereas this was 29.5%-64.75% during the period 1989-1994. In addition, the average 
number of private loan applications submitted during the period 1978-1982 was more 
than one and a half (1.62) times that for 1989-1994. This indicates that the achievement 
of the REDF has decreased over time. 
Table 2.12 
Number of Private Loan Applications Submitted to 
the REDF and Number of Private Loans Issued 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year 
Number of 
Applications 
Submitted 
Number of 
Loans Issued 
Percentage of 
Number of Private Loans 
Issued to Number of 
Private Loan Applications 
1975 34,189 32,705 95.66 
1976 46,955 47 063 100.23 
1977 30,700 4 196 13.67 
1978 35,308 35,394 100.24 
1979 37,016 32Y727 88.41 
1980 36,815 28 742 78.07 
1981 35,572 31,684 89.07 
1982 41,735 35,727 85.6 
1983 39,541 29 334 74.19 
1984 39,280 26,225 66.76 
1985 29,590 18Y842 63.68 
1986 17,448 11 182 64.09 
1987 19 203 11,633 60.58 
1988 17,153 12,279 71.59 
1989 15,209 8 174 53.74 
1990 13,146 8,121 61.78 
1991 18,565 5,476 29.5 
1992 20,467 8 867 43.32 
1993 36,046 23,340 64.75 
1994 34 912 13,595 38.94 
TOTAL 598. R50 425-306 71.02 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first, second and third columns) 
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2.1.7.2 INVESTMENT LOANS 
Medium-term investment loans are offered to both natural and legal entities (individuals 
and establishments) to help them to build housing compounds, offices, showrooms and 
commercial compounds (REDF, 1984,24). The REDF began to grant investment loans 
in the second fiscal year of its operation (1976) (REDF, 1995,14). 
At first, the amount loaned to investors was not to exceed 50% of the total building 
cost, with the maximum loan value being SR 15 million (REDF, 1981,16). In 1978, a 
new ceiling was introduced at the rate of 50% of the total cost, with a maximum amount 
of SR 10 million (ibid.; REDF, 1992,12; Fadaak, 1984,109). 
2.1.7.2.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF INVESTMENT LOANS 
The main objectives of investment loans are to (REDF, 1981,16): 
1. give Saudi investors the opportunity to participate in the construction of larger 
housing complexes; 
2. make more housing units available; 
3. enable more buildings, suitable for commercial centres, banks, companies, offices 
and business centres, to be built. 
An investment loans guide with preliminary standards has been published. 
2.1.7.2.2 METHOD OF DISBURSEMENT 
Investment loans are issued in five instalments, each of which is paid after completion of 
20% of the construction work (REDF, 1995,14). 
The REDF is keen that standard specifications are observed in the implementation of 
projects financed by the REDF. Two Ministerial Resolutions (MR): number 3/4180, 
dated 29.05.1982 and number 4908, dated 04.07.1983 have been decreed on the matter 
of investment regulations (REDF, 1987,22). Their provisions include stipulations on 
services provision, safety standards and aesthetics in buildings financed by the REDF 
(REDF, 1992,16; REDF, 1989,24; Nassier, 1991,78,79). 
2.1.7.2.3 APPLICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT LOANS 
The total number of investment loan applications submitted to the REDF during the 
period 1976-1994 was 3,345 (see Table 2.13). 
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Table 2.13 
Number of Investment Loan Applications Submitted to the REDF 
During the Period 1976-1994 
Fiscal Year Number of Applications Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1976 436 366 83.94 
1977 311 131 42.12 
1978 310 409 131.94 
1979 242 275 113.64 
1980 296 205 69.26 
1981 239 192 80.33 
1982 178 231 129.8 
1983 291 163 56.01 
1984 595 119 20 
1985 202 89 44.06 
1986 18 37 205.56 
1987 7 35 500 
1988 18 49 272.22 
1989 17 67 394.12 
1990 27 48 177.78 
1991 27 33 122.2 
1992 29 9 31.03 
1993 46 12 26.09 
1994 56 12 21.43 
TOTAL 3,345 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first, second and third columns) 
2.1.7.2.4 INVESTMENT LOANS ISSUED 
From its inception in 1975 up to 1994, the REDF has granted 2,482 investment loans 
with a total value of SR 5,168 million, contributing to the construction of29,338 
housing units. Tables 2.14,2.15 and 2.16 respectively show the number of investment 
loans issued, their value (in SR million) and the number of housing units built with them 
during the years 1976-1994. 
As Table 2.14 shows, the number of investment loans issued in the fiscal year of 1977 
decreased by 64.21% as compared with the previous year. Consequently, their value (in 
SR million) and the number of housing units built with them decreased by 73.98% and 
74.28% respectively as compared with the previous year (see Tables 2.15 and 2.16). One 
possible explanation for this could be the REDF's temporary cessation of operations for 
the purpose of reorganisation (Al-Shiha, 1982,93), referred to in an earlier section. 
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Table 2.14 
Number of Investment Loans Issued 
During the Period 1976-1994 
Fiscal Year Number of Loans Annual Difference Percents e Change 
1976 366 - - 
1977 131 -235 -64.21 
1978 409 278 212.21 
1979 275 -134 -32.76 
1980 205 -70 -25.45 
1981 192 -13 -6.34 
1982 231 39 20.31 
1983 163 -68 -29.44 
1984 119 -44 -26.99 
1985 89 -30 -25.21 
1986 37 -52 -58.43 
1987 35 -2 -5.41 
1988 49 14 40 
1989 67 18 36.73 
1990 48 -19 -28.36 
1991 33 -15 -31.25 
1992 9 -24 -72.73 
1993 12 3 33.33 
1994 12 0 0 
_TOTAL 
2482 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
Figure 2.14.1 
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Table 2.15 
Value of Investment Loans (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1976-1994 
Fiscal Year Loan Value Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1976 907 - - 
1977 236 -671 -73.98 
1978 664 428 181.36 
1979 489 -175 -26.36 
1980 399 -90 -18.4 
1981 441 42 10.53 
1982 515 74 16.78 
1983 369 -146 -28.35 
1984 407 38 10.3 
1985 280 -127 -31.2 
1986 86 -194 -69.29 
1987 53 -33 -38.37 
1988 59 6 11.32 
1989 87 28 47.46 
1990 77 -10 -11.49 
1991 44 -33 -42.86 
1992 14 -30 -68.18 
1993 27 13 92.86 
1994 14 -13 -48.15 
TOTAL 5168 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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Value of Investment Loans 
Daring the Period 1976-1994 
900 
N 
O 
'9 450 
tl 
0 
Year 
38 
o 
ý9T0 <vTi ývTj <cTs ýnýv <cýs ß°8c ýv8ý fýý8 fýeý ýi "s zß'ß 
Figure 2.15.2 
Annual Difference In Value of Investment Loans 
During the Period 1977-1994 
500 
250 ä 
H 
:a 
0 
.9 
-250 
. 500 
428 
74 
42 38 28 6 13 
10 -13 33 . 33 "30 
V90 
-127 
-173 , 
146 
. 671 
. 194 
Year 
Figure 7.13.3 
Percentage Change In Value of Investment Loans 
During the Period 1977-1994 
196 
sa 
0 
92.96 
47.46 
10.33 16.78 10.3 11. 
A-18.4 
11. 
-26.36 -28.33 31 8.37 
-12. 49.15 
-69.29 ä8. l8 
lyýý Jyýý tyýý IDýa ! yam! Jyýr lýýý ! yam lpBJ lyý6 lDý, "Odd" 
Year 
39 
Table 2.16 
Number of Housing Units Built with Investment Loans 
During the Period 1976-1994 
Fiscal Year Number of Housing Units Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1976 7,854 - - 
1977 2,020 -5,834 -74.28 
1978 4,740 2,720 134.65 
1979 2,559 -2,181 -46.01 
1980 1,774 -785 -30.68 
1981 1,582 -192 -10.82 
1982 1,950 368 23.26 
1983 1,423 -527 -27.03 
1984 1,580 157 11.03 
1985 1,062 -518 -32.78 
1986 400 -662 -62.34 
1987 312 -88 -22 
1988 407 95 30.45 
1989 562 155 38.08 
1990 454 -108 -19.22 
1991 286 -168 -37 
1992 93 -193 -67.48 
1993 169 76 81.72 
1994 111 -58 -34.32 
TOTAL 29,338 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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As Tables 2.14 and 2.15 show, the number and value of investment loans reached a peak 
in 1982, after which they continued to decline until 1992, when a slight increase 
occurred. For example: 
1. the number of investment loans issued in the fiscal year of 1982 is more than 
nineteen (19.25) times the number of those for 1994 (see Table 2.14); 
2. the value of investment loans issued in the fiscal year of 1982 is more than thirty 
six and a half (36.79) times the value of those for 1994 (see Table 2.15). 
41 
One possible explanation for this could be that the REDF considered that the supply of 
housing complexes was becoming sufficient to warrant a reduction. 
At this point, it may be important to stress that such loans did not exceed about 0.59% 
of the total number of loans issued by the fund during the period 1975-1994 (see Table 
2.17) and 4.43% of the total value of annual lending (see Table 2.18). 
Table 2.17 
Number of Investment and Total Loans Issued 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year 
Investment Loans 
Issued 
Total Loans 
Issued 
Percentage of 
Investment Loans Issued 
to 
Total Loans Issued 
1975 0 32,705 0 
1976 366 47,429 0.77 
1977 131 4,327 3.03 
1978 409 35,803 1.14 
1979 275 33,002 0.83 
1980 205 28,947 0.71 
1981 192 31,876 0.6 
1982 231 35,958 0.64 
1983 163 29,497 0.55 
1984 119 26,344 0.45 
1985 89 18,931 0.47 
1986 37 11,219 0.33 
1987 35 11,668 0.3 
1988 49 12,328 0.4 
1989 67 8,241 0.81 
1990 48 8,169 0.59 
1991 33 5,509 0.6 
1992 9 8,876 0.1 
1993 12 23,352 0.05 
1994 12 13,607 0.09 
TOTAL 2,482 427 788 0.58 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first, second and third columns) 
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Table 2.18 
Value of Investment and Total Value of Loans (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year 
Value of 
Investment Loans 
Total Value 
of Loans 
Percentage of Value 
of Investment Loans 
to 
Total Value of Loans 
1975 0 7,827 0 
1976 907 13,601 6.67 
1977 236 1,304 18.1 
1978 664 9,577 6.93 
1979 489 8,549 5.72 
1980 399 7,457 5.35 
1981 441 8,626 5.11 
1982 515 10,061 5.12 
1983 369 8,304 4.44 
1984 407 7,541 5.4 
1985 280 5,438 5.15 
1986 86 3,145 2.73 
1987 53 3,246 1.63 
1988 59 3,436 1.72 
1989 87 2,330 3.73 
1990 77 2,301 3.35 
1991 44 1 609 2.73 
1992 14 2,290 0.61 
1993 27 6,459 0.42 
1994 14 3,768 0.37 
TOTAL 5,168 116,869 4.42 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first, second and third columns) 
2.1.7.2.5 ACHIEVEMENT IN RELATION TO INVESTMENT LOANS 
As Table 2.19 shows, the number of investment loans granted as a percentage of the 
number of applications for such loans during the period 1978-1980 was 69.26%- 
131.94%, whereas this was 21.43%-31.03% during the period 1992-1994. In addition, 
the average number of investment loan applications submitted during the period 1978- 
1980 was more than six times (6.47) the average of that for 1992-1994 (see Table 2.13). 
This means that the achievement of the REDF has decreased over time. 
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Table 2.19 
Number of Investment Loan Applications Submitted to the REDF 
and Number of Investment Loans Issued 
During the Period 1976-1994 
Fiscal Year 
Number of 
Applications 
Submitted 
Number 
of Loans 
Issued 
Percentage of 
Number of Investment Loans Issued 
to 
Number of Investment Loan 
Applications Submitted 
1976 436 366 83.94 
1977 311 131 42.12 
1978 310 409 131.94 
1979 242 275 113.64 
1980 296 205 69.26 
1981 239 192 80.33 
1982 178 231 129.8 
1983 291 163 56.01 
1984 595 119 20 
1985 202 89 44.06 
1986 18 37 205.56 
1987 7 35 500 
1988 18 49 272.22 
1989 17 67 394.12 
1990 27 48 177.78 
1991 27 33 122.2 
1992 29 9 31.03 
1993 46 12 26.09 
1994 56 12 21.43 
TOTAL 3,345 2482 74.2 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first, second and third columns) 
2.1.8 EXEMPTIONS 
To encourage borrowers to repay their loans, the REDF has initiated a policy under 
which the repayments are made over a 25 year period. Repayment of interest free loans 
is done in instalments with the first repayment due two years after the loan is disbursed. 
Incentives are offered, such as 20% discounts on each annual repayment and an 
additional 10% discount for settling the total loan balance if the repayments are made 
before the due date (REDF, 1995,14,16; Nassier, 1991,76; A1-Saati, 1987,260). In 
other words, if the loan is totally repaid before the due date, 30% of the unpaid balance 
will be discounted. 
To summarise, borrowers are granted exemptions that are applicable if the repayments 
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are settled as follows (REDF, 1995,16; REDF, 1992,24): 
1) An exemption of 20% deductible from the value of each annual repayment (i. e. 
12,000 x 0.2 = 2,400 SR) is granted if repaid within sixty days of the due date. 
Hence, the annual repayment would be (12,000 - 2,400 = 9,600 SR). 
2) An exemption of 30% deductible from the value of each annual repayment (i. e. 
12,000 x 0.3 = 3,600 SR) is granted if repaid prior to the due date, provided that 
repayments are settled regularly, in which case, the annual repayment would be 
(12,000 -3,600 = 8,400 SR). 
3) An exemption of 30% deductible from the total loan-value (i. e. 300,000 x 0.3 = 
90,000 SR) is granted to those who settle the whole loan in one repayment, in 
which case, the total repayments would be (300,000 - 90,000 = 210,000 SR); 
4) An exemption of 30% deductible from the loan's outstanding balance is granted if 
repaid in full within 24 years. 
2.1.9 REPAYMENTS 
The REDF's private loans are extended without bearing costs or charges and are 
repayable in 25 annual instalments. The amount paid annually to cover the cost of 
building a house is less than the cost of renting a similar property. 
The repayment period for investment loans was originally specified as five years. In 
1980, the repayment period was extended to ten years (REDF, 1982,16). 
Loan repayments are increasing yearly. This can be attributed to: 
1. many loan repayments becoming due for settlement as a result of increasing loans; 
2. the maturity of previous loans; 
3. the response of some borrowers and their regularity in repaying their debts; 
4. the efforts exerted by the fund in following up collection. 
The fund directs these repayments towards offering more loans. In addition, the annual 
extra appropriation in the general budget has added to the fund's capital. However, at 
this point it may be important to stress that there is no serious effort on the part of the 
fund to collect overdue repayments (Nassier, 1991,85). Repayment is left up to the 
integrity of the borrower, who may have provided a false address or mysteriously moved 
since applying for the loan. It is also good politics not to insist on repayments (ibid. ). 
The prevailing attitude among some borrowers has been, as. long as there is enough 
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money, why worry about repayment? (ibid. ) Moreover, the loss is less to the delinquent 
borrower than to the fund. Had the borrower kept up with loan repayment, he would 
have benefited from a 20% discount. However, default involves no penalty. It is the 
fund's hope and intention that, given continuing improvements in the rate of loan 
repayments, the fund in the future will reach a position of self- sufficiency wherein 
financing requirements will be met by moneys generated through repayments, as 
opposed to further capital contributions from the government. The point of self- 
sufficiency, however, remains somewhat distant, since private housing loans have a long 
term of 27 years from the date of signing the contract. 
The following table (2.20) shows loan repayments (in millions SR) during the period 
1975-1994, while Tables 2.21,2.22 and 2.23 clarify the difference (in both absolute and 
percentage terms) year by year, for private loan repayments, investment loan repayments 
and total repayments respectively. 
Table 2.20 
Loan Repayments (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year 
Repayments of 
Private Loans 
Repayments of 
Investment Loans 
Total 
Repayments 
1975 14 - 14 
1976 52 0.95 52.95 
1977 210 10 220 
1978 434 55 489 
1979 915 89 1,004 
1980 821 112 933 
1981 1,153 177 1,330 
1982 1,318 213 1,531 
1983 1,519 268 1,787 
1984 1,763 260 2,023 
1985 1,970 227 2,197 
1986 1,684 179 1,863 
1987 2 246 238 2,484 
'1988 2,298 275 2,573 
1989 2,321 229 2,550 
1990 2,240 214 2,454 
1991 454 187 641 
1992 589 218 807 
1993 1,883 186 2,069 
1994 1,851 141 1,992 
TOTAL 25,721 3,279 29,00 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first, second and third columns) 
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Table 2.21 
Private Loan Repayments (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Repayments Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1975 14 - - 
1976 52 38 271.43 
1977 210 158 303.85 
1978 434 224 106.67 
1979 915 481 110.83 
1980 821 -94 -10.27 
1981 1,153 332 40.44 
1982 1,318 165 14.31 
1983 1,519 201 15.25 
1984 11.763 244 16.06 
1985 1,970 207 11.74 
1986 1,684 -286 -14.52 
1987 2,246 562 33.4 
1988 2 298 52 2.32 
1989 2,321 23 1 
1990 2,240 -81 -3.5 
1991 454 -1,786 -79.73 
1992 589 135 29.74 
1993 1 883 1294 219.69 
1994 1,851 -32 -5.43 
TOTAL 25,721 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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Table 2.22 
Investment Loan Repayments (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Rea ents Annual Difference Percentage Chan e 
1975 - - - 
1976 0.95 - - 
1977 10 9.05 952.63 
1978 55 45 450 
1979 89 34 61.82 
1980 112 23 25.84 
1981 177 65 58.04 
1982 213 36 20.34 
1983 268 55 25.82 
1984 260 -8 -2.99 
1985 227 -33 -12.69 
1986 179 -48 -21.15 
1987 238 59 32.96 
1988 275 37 15.55 
1989 229 -46 -16.73 
1990 214 -15 -6.55 
1991 187 -27 -12.62 
1992 218 31 16.58 
1993 186 -32 -14.68 
1994 141 -77 -35.32 
TOTAL 3 279 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
Figur. 2.22.1 
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Figure 2.22.3 
Percentage Change in Value of Investment Loan Repayments 
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Table 2.23 
Total Repayments (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year Total-Repayments Annual Difference Percentage Change 
1975 14 - 
1976 52.95 38.95 278.21 
1977 220 167.05 315.49 
1978 489 269 122.27 
1979 1,004 515 105.32 
1980 933 -71 -7.07 
1981 1,330 397 42.55 
1982 1,531 201 15.11 
1983 1,787 256 16.72 
1984 2,023 236 13.21 
1985 2,197 174 8.6 
1986 1,863 -334 -15.2 
1987 2,484 621 33.33 
1988 2,573 89 3.58 
1989 2,550 -23 -0.89 
1990 2,454 -96 -3.76 
1991 641 -1813 -73.88 
1992 807 166 25.9 
1993 2,069 1262 156.38 
1994 1,992 -77 -3.72 
TOTAL 28,999.95 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first and second columns) 
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Figure 2.23.3 
Percentage Change in Value of Total Loan Repayments 
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As Table 2.23 shows, the total repayments in the fiscal year of 1979 were more than 
twice those of 1978. One possible explanation for this could be that, on 12.12.1979 the 
minister of MFNE issued decision number 3/343, based on the CM's decision number 
554, dated 04.04.1977, and Royal Decree number 3/F/1182, dated 03.12.1979 (REDF, 
1981,20). This stated that borrowers were to be granted exemptions, applicable on 
settlement of repayments, as follows (ibid. ): 
1) An exemption of 20% deductible from the value of each annual repayment (i. e. 
12,000 x 0.2 = 2,400 SR) is granted if the annual repayment is made within thirty 
days of its due date. Hence, the repayment would be (12,000 - 2,400 = 9,600 SR). 
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2) An exemption of 30% deductible from the value of the total loan (i. e. 300,000 x 0.3 
= 90,000 SR) is granted to those who settle the whole loan in one repayment, in 
which case, the total repayments would be (300,000 - 90,000 = 210,000 SR). 
In contrast, as Table 2.21 shows, the repayments of private loans in the fiscal year of 
1990 were almost five times those of fiscal year of 1991. This is probably the result of 
the Royal Decree number 11799 issued on 11.01.1991 which exempted the borrowers of 
private loans from two due instalments for a period of two consecutive years. The total 
amount of exemptions was more than SR 6,886 million (REDF, 1992,19). Hence, the 
repayments of private loans in the fiscal year of 1991 decreased by 79.73% as compared 
with the previous year (see Table 2.21). Consequently, the total repayments in the fiscal 
year of 1991 decreased by 73.88% as compared with the previous year (see Table 2.23). 
2.1.9.1 CONTRIBUTIONS OF FUND'S RESOURCES 
The following table (2.24) shows loan repayments (fund's resources) and loan values (in 
millions SR) during the period 1975-1994. It shows that the total loan repayments 
comprise only 24.81% of all loans provided by the fund. This is to be expected, since 
there is no serious effort on the part of the fund to collect overdue repayments, as 
previously mentioned. Hence, the goal of becoming self-financing through loan 
repayments has not been achieved, and there is a long waiting period for obtaining a 
REDF loan. 
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Table 2.24 
Total Loan Values and Total Repayments (in Millions SR) 
During the Period 1975-1994 
Fiscal Year 
Total Loan 
Values 
Total 
Repayments 
Percentage of 
the Total Repayment 
to 
Total Loan Values 
1975 7.827 14 0.18 
1976 13,601 52.95 0.39 
1977 1,304 220 16.87 
1978 9.577 489 5.11 
1979 8,549 1,004 11.74 
1980 7,457 933 12.51 
1981 8,626 1,330 15.42 
1982 10.061 1.531 15.22 
1983 8.304 1 787 21.52 
1984 7,541 2,023 26.83 
1985 5.438 2,197 40.40 
1986 3,145 1,863 59.24 
1987 3,246 2 484 76.52 
1988 3.43 6 2,573 74.88 
1989 2,330 2,550 109.44 
1990 2.301 2,454 106.65 
1991 1609 641 39.84 
1992 2,290 807 35.24 
1993 6,459 2,069 32.03 
1994 3,768 1,992 52.87 
TOTAL 11 6. R69 1 28.999.95 1 24. Rj 
Source: REDF, Annual Reports, 1984-1995 (the first, second and third columns) 
2.1.10 REDF BRANCHES 
There were 25 branches at the end of 1994 in various areas of the Kingdom, namely: 
Abha, Al-Ahsa, Al-Baha, Al-Dammam, Al-Dawadmi, Al-Jawf, Al-Kharj, Al-Madinah, 
Al-Majma'a, Al-Namas, Al-Riyadh, Al-Taff, Al-Zulfi, Ar'ar, Bishah, Buraydah, Ha'il, 
Hafr Al-Batin, Jeddah, Jizan, Makkah, Najran, Tabuk, Wadi Al-Dawasser and Yanbu 
(REDF, 1995,22). 
These branches have been vested with appropriate powers and have also been entrusted 
with several duties towards projects in their local areas, such as (ibid. ): 
1. accepting, reviewing and auditing new loan applications prior to submitting them to 
headquarters; 
2. the supervision of buildings under construction; 
3. the issue of performance certificates; 
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4. the follow-up of repayments. 
Most of these offices have been linked to the central computer system at the REDF's 
headquarters (ibid. ). 
2.1.11 THE NUMBER OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES BENEFITING FROM 
REDF SERVICES 
So far, some 3,297 cities, towns and villages have benefited from REDF services 
(REDF, 1995,23). This figure reflects the REDF's coverage of all parts of the Kingdom 
and is indicative of the extent of service extended by the fund to the various sectors in 
the Kingdom. Such services have not been confined to cities, but have also extended to 
cover remote areas via the organisation's branches, which are distributed throughout the 
Kingdom. This has contributed significantly to urban and rural development and the 
provision of proper, healthy housing for all citizens, which is one of the main targets of 
the development policy adopted by the government and one of its main purposes in 
establishing the REDF, bearing in mind the housing objectives adopted by the 
government in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1975-1980), referred to earlier 
(see Section 2.1.3). 
An important policy objective of the Saudi government is to increase the quality of 
services provided for its people. As a result of the incentives provided by the 
government, the private sector has become increasingly active in the development of the 
country. 
2.1.12 THE REDF'S ROLE IN FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
In 1968, the MP, assisted by advisors from the Stanford Research Institute, set up the 
First Five-Year Development Plan for the country (1970-1975) (Al-Dakheel, 1995,8). 
One of the plan's objectives was to raise the living standards and welfare of Saudi 
families. General housing objectives were incorporated into the plan, the pursuit of which 
was given renewed impetus and direction by the subsequent founding of the REDF (ibid. 
8,9). 
The first ten years of the REDF (1975-1984) coincided with the Second and Third Five- 
Year Development Plans. This helped the REDF to participate effectively in achieving 
the targets of the two plans in developing the housing sector. The REDF even exceeded 
its established targets. 
In its first five years (1975-1980) the REDF, under the Second Five-Year Development 
Plan, was entrusted with financing the construction of 122,100 housing units (REDF, 
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1984,16). In fact, the REDF gave out 153,857 loans which helped in the construction of 
200,163 housing units (ibid. ). This exceeded the target by 63.93%. Private housing loans 
accounted for the greatest share in this achievement, resulting in the construction of 
183,087 housing units whose value amounted to SR 39,563 million (ibid. ). 
The Third Five-Year Development Plan (1980-1985) witnessed remarkable 
infrastructure development and the expansion of social services which resulted in the 
development of many previously uninhabitable areas (ibid. ). This caused an increase in 
the demand for REDF loans. There were 193,000 applications during the period (1980- 
1984), an increase of 5% on the total number of applications submitted during the period 
(1975-1979) (ibid. ). By the end of the fiscal year of 1984 the REDF had given 151,617 
loans to a value of SR 41,623 million, which resulted in the construction of 195,000 
housing units, thus, exceeding its specified target in the Third Five-Year Development 
Plan (1980-1985) by 89% (ibid., 17). The REDF programme was, in fact, responsible 
for 44% of all housing units completed during this plan (MP, 1985b, 411). 
This achievement was possible due to the State's support for the REDF, as exemplified 
in the increasing appropriations for this sector in the State's general budget which, by the 
end of the last year of the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1975-1980), amounted 
to SR 38,850 million (see Table 2.2). This was in addition to the REDF's own 
resources, which witnessed a continuous yearly increase, reaching more than SR 11 
billion by the end of the financial year of 1984, thus, constituting a participation of 
almost 15% of the total value of loans offered during this period (ibid. ). 
In general, considerable progress was made in increasing the number of houses built with 
REDF loans during the Second and the Third Five-Year Development Plans. However, 
in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1985 - 1990), the growth in housing 
construction financed by REDF loans fell sharply against both past performance and 
planned target since the target was 150,000 housing units, whereas the actual was 87,000 
(MP, 1990a, 385). This means a deviation of actual from the target by -42%. 
The situation improved in the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1990-1995), when the 
target number of housing units to be built with REDF loans was 78,792, whereas the 
number of housing units actually built with such loans was 79,120. This means a 
deviation of actual from the target by 0.42%. The total housing stock built with REDF 
loans at the end of the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1995) amounted to 545,820, 
equal to 19.1% of the total housing stock (MP, 1990a, 388 and MP, 1996,389). 
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2.2 THE ROLE OF THE MPWH 
The government, under pressure to increase the scope and magnitude of its housing 
services, established the General Housing Department under the MFNE in May 1975 
(AI-Dakheel, 1995,2,11), as the second agency through which it would implement its 
housing programme. Within a year, due to the increased urgency of the housing crisis 
and the government's ambitious plans to remedy the problem, the Department was 
expanded and became the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, as an independent 
agency (ibid. ). That is to say, the MPWH was established at the beginning of the Second 
Five-year Development Plan (1976). Its goals were to implement the government's 
housing programmes and policies as presented in the development plans. 
Although its achievements have been less than was anticipated at the time of its 
inception, the Housing Affairs Division of the MPWH has completed a number of 
housing projects in various parts of the Kingdom, and with varying degrees of success 
(ibid., 11,13). These projects, under the Rush Campaign and General Housing 
Programme, are outlined in the next two sub-sections, after which the MPWH's 
contribution to the five-year development plans is evaluated. 
2.2.1 THE RUSH HOUSING CAMPAIGN 
The Rush Housing Campaign was hastily planned and used foreign design concepts and 
new construction materials and techniques to meet the desperate demand for housing at 
that time. The campaign produced three public housing projects located in urban areas 
throughout the country (see Table 2.25) (Al-Dakheel, 1995,3,11). Each project had 
several multilevel buildings, ranging from 4 to 18 stories, with apartment-type units. For 
example, the Jeddah housing project is made up of 32 buildings comprising 1,936 
apartments, each of which is 241 square metres and consists of six large rooms. These 
three projects incurred a variety of problems regarding distribution and management 
(ibid. ). 
The design of these projects clashed badly with the cultural traditions and religious 
beliefs of their potential occupants. For instance, entrances and communal areas were 
designed for mixed use, whereas the end-users' religious beliefs required gender 
separation in public areas (ibid. ). Consequently, the three projects stood empty for about 
thirteen years, except for a brief period during the Gulf War of 1990, when they were 
used to house refugees. In addition to the initial design and construction costs, the vacant 
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projects are still draining public funds for the cost of maintenance and security services 
(ibid. 3,11,14). 
Table 2.25 
The Rush Housing Project 
No. The City Number of Housing Units Type of Housing Units 
1 Al-Dammam 1 664 a artments 
2 Al- ' adh 1,152 apartments 
3 Jeddah 1,936 apartments 
TOTAL 4,752 apartments 
Source: SAMA, Annual Report, 1992 
2.2.2 THE GENERAL HOUSING PROGRAMME 
The general housing programme is the larger of the two programmes undertaken by the 
MPWH. The programme consisted not only of housing facilities as such, but included a 
wide variety of religious, social and educational buildings, which complete a community 
and make it a worthwhile place to live in. The main objectives of the general housing 
programme were to: 
1. offer adequate housing to Saudi families in keeping with the Islamic way of life; 
2. assure their occupants' total comfort with privacy and security. 
In 1979, a ministerial decision was issued regulating the distribution of housing units 
constructed by the MPWH to persons whose houses had either been demolished by the 
government to create room for government projects, or had become dilapidated and 
unsafe for further occupancy. 
The CM Resolution number 130, dated 06.04.1989 provided for housing built under 
these projects to be assigned to the REDF for allocation to loan applicants (REDF, 
1995,120; A1-Dakheel, 1995,14). This made possible a decrease in the waiting period 
to obtain a loan from the fund, in particular in the cities where the housing projects were 
already under way: Al-Ahsa, Al-Dammam, Al-Khobar, Al-Madinah, Al-Qatif, Al- 
Riyadh, Buraydah, Jeddah and Makkah. 
The general housing programme involved the construction of villas and apartments. 
2.2.2.1 THE VILLA PROTOTYPE CAMPAIGN 
Along with the basic infrastructure, the prototype was replicated in seven different 
developments ranging from 400 to 2,633 dwellings (ibid., 4,15). Eventually, the seven 
sites will house 11,016 families by their projected completion date in 1997 (ibid. ). These 
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developments are located in suburban areas near the cities of Al-Ahsa, Al-Madinah, Al- 
Qatif, Al-Riyadh, Buraydah and Makkah (see Table 2.26). Details of some of these 
projects are as follows (REDF, 1992,23) 
1. Al-Ahsa Housing Project consists of 400 villas. Each villa is approximately 216 
square metres and is built on a plot of about 400 square metres. 
2. A1-Riyadh Housing Project (on Khurays Road) consists of 1,258 villas, each of 
which is 220 square metres and is built on a plot of 484 square metres. 
3. Buraydah Housing Project consists of 949 one-story villas. Each villa is 227 square 
metres and is built on a plot of 400 square metres. 
Table 2.26 
The General Housing Project (villas only) 
No. city Number of villas 
1 Al-Ahsa 400 
2 
Al-Ahsa (Low Cost 
Housing i 
500 
3 Al- Madinah 2,084 
4 Al- atif 600 
5 (on 
AAl-Khari I-Riyadh 
R 
2,633 
6 
A1-Riyadh 
n Khuravg Road) 
1,258 
7 Buraydah 949 
8 Makkah 2,592 
TOTAL 11,016 
Source: SAMA, Annual Report, 1989 
The ownership of each of these seven developments is transferred upon its completion to 
the REDF Housing Programme. Under the CM's Resolution number 130, the housing 
units will be privately owned by individuals on the REDF waiting list through a twenty- 
five year interest-free home loan. 
2.2.2.2 APARTMENT BLOCKS 
The general housing programme also involved the construction of 9,943 apartments. 
Table 2.27 summarises the number of housing units built. 
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Table 2.27 
The General Housing Project (apartments only) 
No. city Number of apartments 
1 A1-Khubar 4,106 
2 AI-Riyadh (on Al-Kh ' Road) 2,408 
3 Jeddah 3,420 
TOTAL 9,934 
Source: SAMA, Annual Report, 1995 
2.2.3 MPWH'S ROLE IN FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
The number of housing units built by the MPWH during the Third Five-Year 
Development Plan (1980-1985) was 17,800, whereas the target was 32,900. This means 
a deviation of actual from the target by -45.89%. Hence, the number of housing units 
built by the MPWH during the Third Five-Year Development Plan was equal to only 4% 
of the plan supply (MP, 1985b, 411). 
The target number of housing units to be built by the MPWH during the Fourth Five- 
Year Development Plan was 7,800. In fact, the MPWH only managed to build 2,207 
during this period (MP, 1990a, 385). This means a deviation from the target by -71.71%. 
The target number of housing units to be built by the MPWH during the Fifth Five-Year 
Development Plan was 5,676, whereas the number of housing units actually built was 
4,570 (MP, 1990a, 385 and MP 1996,389). This means a deviation of actual from the 
target by -19.49%. 
2.3 THE ROLE OF OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
In addition to the MPWH, many other government institutions such as the Ministry of 
Defence and Aviation (MDA), the Ministry of the Interior (MI), the National Guard 
(NG), public hospitals and universities, have constructed large housing complexes for 
their employees. Some examples are given below, after which the contribution of these 
institutions under the five-year development plans is highlighted. 
The Military Works Department of the MDA has constructed several extensive housing 
projects for officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers with their families all over 
the Kingdom. The projects offer full living facilities and public services have been 
considered in the design and construction. Entertainment and recreation areas have been 
provided for the comfort and enjoyment of the ministry staff in order to encourage them 
to perform their duties efficiently and actively. 
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The MFNE initiated its housing programme for the benefit of low-income Saudi 
nationals, building 1,000 and 750 housing units in A1-Riyadh and Jeddah respectively. 
The target was to provide housing, over a reasonable number of years, to Saudi citizens 
with a monthly income of less than SR 1,000 on an easy instalments plan. 
2.3.1 GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS' ROLE IN FIVE-YEAR 
DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
The target number of housing units built by government institutions during the Third 
Five-Year Development Plan (1980-1985) was 53,300, whereas the number of housing 
units actually built by them during this period was 121,600, which means a deviation of 
actual from the target by 128.14%. These units accounted for 28% of all housing units 
built during the Third Five-Year Development Plan (MP, 1985b, 411). 
The target number of housing units built by government institutions during the Fourth 
Five-Year Development Plan (1985-1990) was 67,200, whereas the actual number of 
housing units built by them during this period was 46,400 (MP, 1990a, 385). This means 
a deviation of actual from the target by -30.95%. 
During the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1990-1995), government institutions did 
not build any housing units (MP, 1996a, 389). 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
The economic boom which began in Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s led to urban 
migration on a large scale, a serious housing shortage and an escalation in the cost of 
rented accommodation. Thus, housing became an urgent priority to be addressed by the 
Saudi government's development plans. 
Two main institutions have been created with the aim of providing affordable housing for 
Saudi citizens: the REDF and the MPWH. The REDF provides long-term soft loans for 
the construction of houses and apartment blocks. In addition to alleviating the housing 
shortage, this is intended to serve capital formation and wealth redistribution objectives. 
Over 3,000 cities, towns and villages have benefited from REDF loans since its inception 
in 1975. The second and the third five-year development plans (1975-1985), in 
particular, witnessed considerable progress, exceeding the plan targets. In later plan 
periods, however, the number of housing units built with REDF assistance has been 
below planned levels. Government funding for the REDF has declined, the goal of 
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becoming self-financing through loan repayments has not been achieved, and there is a 
long waiting period for loans. 
The MPWH, founded in 1975, has failed to accomplish its original goals, which were to 
co-ordinate the government's housing programmes among the different public agencies 
and to build a significant number of housing units. Its only two campaigns, the Rush 
Housing Campaign of the mid 1970s and the General Housing Campaign of the early 
1990s, contributed less than 2% of the housing stock in the country. The former project, 
in particular, proved to be a costly mistake. Because the design of the housing units 
conflicted with cultural requirements, they have for the most part stood empty, while the 
cost of their maintenance remains a drain on the public purse. 
Other government institutions play a limited role in housing provision, usually by 
constructing housing for their own employees. Some of these have been very successful 
on their own terms; nevertheless their contribution to the housing stock in the Kingdom 
as a whole is small. 
Thus, it can be seen that housing provision in the Kingdom has witnessed some notable 
successes, but there have also been some unfortunate failures. The possibility of 
improving the situation by enhancing the effectiveness of the REDF is considered in the 
remaining chapters of this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ISLAMIC MODES OF FINANCING 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Owning a house is one of the fundamental human motives for undertaking economic 
activity. However, the cost of building a house, in general, is very high. In developing 
countries one cannot expect shelter to be provided on a large scale by welfare 
programmes. Ideally, market forces should be able to take care of this aspect of society, 
but housing involves a large investment in relation to the average household's income. 
Therefore, the availability of cheap finance plays an important role in the provision of 
housing. 
Governments capable of providing housing finance undertake construction of houses 
which can be sold on a deferred payment basis or by instalments. Investors, both 
individual and corporate, may undertake the construction of houses to be sold on a 
deferred payment basis. 
As Islam prohibits the hiring of money (i. e. borrowing on interest), this chapter focuses 
on the economic issues related to its basis in the Qur'an and Sunnah (teachings of the 
Prophet Mohammad). This will help to provide a better idea of the nature, scope and 
potentialities of profit or loss sharing (PLS) in contemporary circumstances. The chapter 
then considers a variety of methods, consistent with the teachings of the Qur'an and 
Sunnah, by which housing finance may be provided. 
The chapter is set out as follows: Section One outlines some general background issues 
relevant to Islamic economic thought. It looks at the nature and rationale of the 
prohibition of interest (usury) in Islam. Section Two considers alternative techniques. 
Section Three presents a comparative discussion of the alternative techniques described 
in Section Two, in terms of their implications for the provider and the beneficiary, their 
suitability for use and their macroeconomic implications. Section Four presents a 
conclusion. 
3.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND ISSUES 
Islamic finance draws a clear distinction between trade and Riba (interest or usury). The 
former is permitted, but the latter is not, as is stated in the Qur'an: 
Those who devour usury 
Will not stand except 
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As stands one whom 
The Satan by his touch 
Hath driven to madness. 
That is because they say: 
"Trade is like usury, " 
But Allah hath permitted trade 
And forbidden usury. 
Those who after receiving 
Admonition from their Lord, 
Desist, shall be pardoned 
For the past; their case 
Is for Allah (to judge); 
But those who repeat 
(The offence) are Companions 
Of the Fire: they will 
Abide therein (for ever). (2: 275) 
O ye who believe! 
Fear Allah, and give up 
What remains of your demand 
For usury, if ye are indeed believers (2: 278). 
If ye do it not, 
Take notice of war 
from Allah and His Messenger: 
But if ye repent 
Ye shall have 
your capital sums: 
Deal not unjustly, 
And ye shall not 
Be dealt with unjustly (2: 279). 
Another clear prohibition against usury from the Sunnah is the following: 
"Abd Allah bin Mas'ud said that the Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) cursed 
the one who accepted usury, the one who paid it, the witness to it, and the one 
who recorded it"(Hasan, 1985 vol. 2, p. 946). 
For more details see: Khan, M. 1985, vol. 3, p. 168 - 170. 
The Qur'an does not spell out in detail why usury receives such a universal ban. 
However, various scholars have highlighted the reasons for it. The injustice of usury is 
clear in consumption loans. However, its injustice in other types of loans, such as 
production loans, can also be seen (Ali, M. 1992,343-344). 
A borrower whose project makes very little profit or actually makes a loss still has to 
repay the principal plus the interest. This is perceived as clearly unfair to the borrower. 
However, if huge profit results from the enterprise, then the amount of interest to be 
repaid is still the same. This is perceived as unfair to the lender (ibid., 344). 
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The interest system is prohibited because it is inequitable, since the financier is assured a 
definite return while the risk is borne by the borrower. It is not conducive to the efficient 
and equitable use of resources (for further details see Khan and Mirakhor, 1987,4-5). In 
addition, the interest permits the lender to augment his capital without effort, which is 
regarded as objectionable, "as money does not create a surplus value by itself' (Presley 
and Sessions, 1994,586). Presley and Sessions further said: 
"The lender has no right to an automatic reward for supplying money unless he 
shares in the provision of enterprise; even the reward is not fixed or guaranteed, 
but dictated by the proportion of his contribution. This, in turn, determines his 
justifiable share of profits (or losses)" (p. 586). 
Today, interest plays a key role in most financial transactions. However, modem Muslim 
scholars have found that, in theory, it is possible to run an economy without interest. 
This idea has received a great deal of attention, following different modalities aimed at 
the elimination of interest. In order to find practical solutions to modem-day problems, 
Shari'ah experts have tried to follow, as closely as possible, the precepts of the highly 
respected Muslim jurists. 
In recent years, conscious efforts have been made to re-orient the activities of Islamic 
banks to achieve Islamic socio-economic objectives and to seek to establish a just and 
humane socio-economic order, which should be free from all forms of exploitation. 
However, in matters on which the Qur'an and Sunnah provide no specific injunctions, 
Islamic banks have now devised various modes of financing which are in compliance 
with general Islamic principles. In such modes, depositors are not guaranteed a 
predetermined return on their savings but they are entitled to a share in the actual profits 
earned by the bank. The financier should share the risk with the entrepreneur if he wishes 
to earn profit. These techniques have the ability to fulfil the financial needs of both the 
private and the public sectors (Chapra, 1985,69). 
As the financier cannot earn interest by lending money, Islamic banks have to undertake 
investment to earn profit, not only for the financier but also for those who deposit funds 
in investment accounts. The shares of joint stock companies may also serve as an 
alternative to interest-bearing government and corporate bonds (ibid., 164). 
Money can be obtained as an interest-free loan or on the basis of PLS. This does not 
apply, however, to the other factors of production, e. g., labour, land and physical capital. 
Their services can either be hired or acquired on a PLS basis. In other words, a labourer, 
an owner of land or an owner of capital goods can either obtain wages or rentals by 
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hiring out their services or assets, or by exposing themselves to some risk, and entering 
into a PLS arrangement. 
Under an Islamic system the risks and the gains of enterprises are equitably distributed 
between the two partners. The provision of capital carries with it the risk of sharing any 
loss with the partner. Hence, the lender has the right to expect to share with the partner 
any gain. All monies used to gain a return may be viewed as risk capital. Therefore, there 
can be no guarantee of either return of principal or profit. Any guaranteed return of 
principal which carries with it an additional return or gain is a case of usury. Under an 
Islamic system, loans ought not to be provided as a means of receiving a guaranteed 
return, but rather as a deed of kindness, without seeking a reward. 
The phraseology of the verses of the Holy Qur'an, as well as the Sunnah, which 
condemn the institution of interest, clearly portray the Islamic viewpoint in this regard. 
Therefore, countries seeking to introduce an Islamic economic system must organise 
financial practices on a basis other than interest. 
There is a basic difference between Islam and capitalism with regard to the treatment of 
money capital as a factor of production. In the capitalist system, money capital is treated 
on a par with labour and land, each being entitled to a return irrespective of profit or 
loss. This is not so in an Islamic system which treats money on a par with enterprise. 
Research on the subject has suggested that the ideal alternatives to interest in an Islamic 
economic system are PLS and interest-free loans. 
The modalities of the conversion of interest-based banking to an interest-free basis have 
to be derived from the principles of Shari 'ah. Hence, there would be no objection to 
getting a return on capital if the provider of capital enters into a partnership with a 
worker or entrepreneur and is prepared to share in the risks of business. Similarly, a bank 
cannot be guaranteed a predetermined return on capital provided by it to the business 
undertaking, but can enter into a PLS arrangement with it. 
In summary, the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah make it clear that usury is incompatible 
with the Islamic way of life. 
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3.2 ALTERNATIVE FINANCING TECHNIQUES 
This section is mostly concerned with the modalities of the conversion of interest-based 
banking to Islamic banking. 
The elimination of interest occupies a key position in the establishment of the Islamic 
order. However, there are several possible financing techniques conforming to Islamic 
principles, some of which have been discussed in traditional Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) 
literature. The others have emerged recently to meet contemporary needs in a manner 
consistent with the teaching of Islam. These financing techniques could be divided into 
four basic modes of finance, namely: the sale-based modes, the participatory modes, the 
rent-based modes and the interest-free loan (Qard Hasan). The following is a description 
of the four modes. 
3.2.1 THE SALE-BASED MODES 
There are four sale-based modes, namely: Instalment Sale, Murabahah, Bay' Al-Salam 
and Istisna'. 
3.2.1.1 INSTALMENT SALE 
Instalment sale may be defined as sale under which the price of the item involved is 
payable on a deferred basis. 
On this basis, financial institutions could build low cost housing units and supply them to 
the public. This would mean that institutions would be required to declare the cost of 
acquiring such houses and their own profit margin in advance. The total price could then 
be deferred to be paid in instalments in accordance with an agreed schedule (ibid. ). In 
this respect, the institution should exert every effort to make the deal such that the cost 
of the purchased materials becomes less than or equal to their cost in the retail market 
(Abdallah, A. 1995,47). To reach this end, the institution may need to establish 
relationships with wholesale merchants and purchase the materials at wholesale prices, 
so that when the margin of profit is added to these prices, the final price will still 
competitive. 
Instalment sale can be applied through the construction of houses by government-owned 
institutions, private investment institutions (e. g. banks and companies), or individuals, 
the property then being offered for sale to the public through instalment sale techniques. 
In such cases, the client may provide part of the cost of the house and the financier 
provide the remaining. This is the prevalent situation nowadays. The property would be 
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jointly owned. The financier would sell the house to the client on a deferred payment 
basis, for a price exceeding his cost (Al-Othmani, 1995,63). 
If the intention is to build a house on a plot of land, the same procedure can be followed 
as regards the purchase of the land. The financier and the client can jointly purchase the 
plot of land. Then, the financier sells his share to the client according to deferred 
payment arrangements (ibid., 64). 
If the land is the property of the client, or has become his through this arrangement, then 
the financier and the client can build the house jointly. The house would become their 
joint property. Once construction is completed, the financier sells his share to the client 
on a deferred payment basis. However, some Islamic banks also finance the purchase 
and sale of ready-built houses on this basis (ibid. ). 
In applying this technique, Resolution No. 52/1/6 of the Islamic Jurisprudence Academy, 
should be taken into account. This includes the following: (Abu Ghuddah, 1995,56-57). 
1. The two prices should be indicated together. However, the sale is not rendered valid 
unless the parties have decided whether the sale will be by immediate payment or by 
instalments. 
2. It is prohibited to separate the return for accepting deferred payment from the cash 
price in such a way that it becomes directly linked to the duration of the transaction. 
3. If the debtor fails to pay the agreed instalments, it is not permissible to charge him an 
additional amount, whether or not an advance condition was made to that effect, 
since such an additional amount constitutes prohibited usury. 
4. It is prohibited for a solvent debtor to delay the repayment. However, it is not 
permissible to provide in the agreement for compensation to be paid in such a case. 
5. It is permissible for the seller to impose earlier payment of instalments if the debtor 
delays the payment of some instalments, despite his agreement to that condition at the 
time of concluding the contract. 
6. The seller has no right to maintain ownership of the sold property after the sale has 
been effected. However, he may make a condition requiring the purchaser to 
mortgage the property as a collateral for payment of a deferred instalment. 
The financier, in this case, owns a house which he sells to the client at a profit on a 
deferred payment basis and will accept payments by instalments specified in the contract. 
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3.2.1.2 MURABAHAH 
Murabahah is a contract which involves a sale with a profit mark-up on the cost. The 
seller purchases the goods which have been ordered by a client. Then, he sells it to the 
client at a higher price than the purchase price, with the payment, which is generally in 
instalments, being made in the future (Ahmad, A. 1993,10). The seller undertakes all the 
management needed for the purchase and also bears the risk for the goods until they 
have been delivered to the client (Chapra, 1985,171,262). The risk remains with the 
seller, which justifies his profit. A condition of this practice of financing is that the client 
is bound to buy the goods. 
Murabahah is the most common Islamic financing technique. It has been estimated that 
70-80% of the total finance provided by Islamic banks is through Murabahah (Ahmad, 
A. 1993,38,59). In addition, it was the most common financing technique in the early 
stages of the development of Islamic banks. The main reason is that it is simple in 
application compared with the other Islamic methods which require more elaborate 
arrangements (ibid., 60). 
One of the main uses ofMurabahah is in housing finance. In such a case, the financier 
authorises the client to build the house, which would then be the property of the 
financier. The client would supervise the construction of the house, as his representative. 
Once construction is completed, the financier would sell the house to the client on a 
deferred payment basis. This is used in cases where the client is completely unable to use 
his own resources to buy or build the house (Al-Othmani, 1995,63; Mahdi, 1995,272). 
Islamic rules state that a Murabahah contract will be invalid unless the asset sold comes 
under the ownership of the financier. It is common knowledge that Muslims are 
forbidden to sell anything which they do not own. Accordance with the rules, therefore, 
requires double registration of the house, in the name of the financier initially, then in the 
name of the client when the sale between the financier and the client is signed. 
In view of the high property prices which prevail in inflationary conditions, and the high 
rate of the registration fee (usually a fixed percentage of the declared value of the 
house), double registration may be a considerable financial burden (Ahmad, A. 1995, 
40). 
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3.2.1.3 BAY' AUSALAM 
This is a contract of forward sale in which the price is to be paid immediately while the 
goods sold are to be delivered after a specific period of time. The goods sold are well 
defined, though not available when the contract is signed (Ahmad and Awan, 1992,432). 
3.2.1.4 ISTISNA' 
Istisna' is a contractual arrangement whereby one party (purchaser) orders a specifically 
defined product to be produced for him by the other party (producer, seller) in the 
future, at a specific price, the raw materials to be supplied by the producer (Al-Baberti, 
vol. 5,356; Mahdi, 1995,12). In other words, "Istisna' is defined as a contract to 
purchase now, for a definite price, something that may be manufactured or constructed 
later according to agreed specifications" (Zarqa, 1997,68). The target of Istisna' is 
"often not available now, but will be made later by the manufacturer or contractor" 
(ibid. ). 
Istisna' may be practised by institutions dealing in housing finance. Either the purchaser 
chooses a contractor acceptable to the institution or the institution chooses such a 
contractor. In either case, it is the responsibility of the institution to see that the house is 
built according to the specifications. In other words, it has to be built in a way that is 
suited to the purchaser's choice and his ability to repay. The institution will sign two 
contracts, one with the contractor, and the other with the purchaser (Salama, 1995,30). 
This technique is used when an individual who owns a piece of land wants to enter into 
an agreement with a contractor to build a house according to certain specifications in 
return for an agreed price. The price may be repaid by instalments upon completion of 
the house. The building materials are provided by the contractor. 
This technique is suitable for low- and middle-income groups who own land but cannot 
afford to provide the materials and pay the construction cost in advance (Ahmad, A, 
1995,41). For more details see Zarqa, 1997,67-74. 
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3.2.2 THE PARTICIPATORY MODES 
The participatory modes consist of Mudarabah, Partnership (Musharakah) and 
Decreasing Partnership (Diminishing Musharakah). 
3.2.2.1 MUDARABAH 
Mudarabah is a contract in which one side provides capital (capital-owner) and the other 
provides work (working partner or mudarib). Profits are to be shared in a proportion 
agreed in advance. In the case of loss, the capital-owner bears all of the loss incurred, 
provided that there has been no violation of the stipulated contract or neglect on the part 
of the working partner (Ahmad, A. 1993,44; Mahdi, 1995,12; Chapra, 1985,262). The 
working partner is required to work with honesty and sincerity and to exercise the 
maximum possible care and precaution in the discharge of his functions (Chapra, 1985, 
250). 
Mudarabah is an agreement between two or more persons whereby one or more of them 
provides finance, while the others provide entrepreneurship and management. Under this 
method, the bank provides the capital and the client is fully responsible for management, 
in consideration of which the partner gets an agreed proportion of the net profits. Presley 
and Sessions (1994,588) stated: 
"A Mudarabah contract ....... creates an explicit mapping 
between the 
remuneration of capital and the outcome of the project, the prohibition of interest 
implying that compensation cannot be tied directly to the level of capital 
investment". 
Mudarabah is traditionally applied to commercial activities of a short duration. 
Classical Mudarabah is based on a one to one relationship between the capital-owner 
and the working partner (entrepreneur). However, most contemporary Muslim scholars 
clearly state that it is possible to have numerous capital-owners and only one working 
partner (Kahf and Khan. 1992,23). Mudarabah may also be consummated between 
several capital-owners and working partners (entrepreneurs) (Chapra, 1985,248). 
A two-tier Mudarabah is possible. This is generally taken as a model for Islamic banks 
in their dealings with members of the public and businesses (ibid., 165). In the two-tier 
Mudarabah, the first agreement is between the depositors and the bank, while the second 
one is between the bank and the parties to whom finance is provided. 
Mudarabah deposits and shareholders' equity are deemed to be the two remunerable 
liabilities of an Islamic bank. The holders of Mudarabah deposits are treated as one 
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homogeneous group. However, the profit earned will be distributed between the capital- 
owner and the working partners on the basis of proportions agreed. No fixed amount can 
be settled for any party. 
If there is more than one capital-owner, profit or loss are distributed between them 
strictly in proportion to their capital contribution. 
Commercial banks providing funds to business enterprises would be entitled to receive a 
part of the profits earned by the enterprise in accordance with the agreed proportions. 
For the purpose of profit distribution, the respective capital contributions of the parties, 
utilised for varying periods, would be brought to a common denominator by multiplying 
the amounts by the number of days during which each item (such as equity capital for 
the firm, its current cash surpluses, suppliers' credit as well as the finance provided by 
the bank) was actually deployed in the business. 
Under this method, the financier provides all the capital and the beneficiary is fully 
responsible for management. The financier bears the financial risk, which justifies his 
claim to a share in the profit. The beneficiary is, however, held responsible for the loss of 
capital, should this occur as a result of his negligence or wilful act. To guard against this, 
the financier may require security from the beneficiary. Presley and Sessions argued: 
"Mudarabah therefore, allows the contract to control directly the manager's 
incentive to exert effort since the effort affects the relationship between capital 
investment and the outcome of the project" (p. 588). 
It will, "under certain conditions, lead to an enhanced level of capital investment on 
account of the ability ofMudarabah to act as an efficient revelation device" (ibid., 595). 
3.2.2.2 PARTNERSHIP (MUSHARAKAII) 
The word Musharakah is derived from the Arabic word Sharikah meaning 
"partnership". Murharakah is a form of business arrangement in which the financiers and 
their clients agree to join in a temporary participation (not different from the joint 
venture concept) to effect a certain operation within an agreed period of time. Both 
parties contribute to the capital of the operation (taken to mean assets both fixed and 
working, technical and managerial effort, etc. ) in varying degrees. They agree to divide 
the profit in proportions agreed upon in advance (Mahdi, 1995,12; Ahmad, A. 1993, 
10). 
72 
One of the partners can, if he wishes, dispose of his share either immediately or 
gradually, by selling to the other partner. This is usually the case in joint ownership of a 
lodging or the tools of a profession. 
Musharakah can take many forms. It could be a joint venture between two parties, in 
which case the property may be jointly owned by both according to the percentage of 
finance. However, in all cases, a rent will be determined and the beneficiary can either 
pay a share of the rent, or the premises can be let out to a third party and the rent shared 
between the two parties: 
In partnership forms, the financier makes the funds available, not as a lender but as an 
investor. The financier is not assured, in advance, of a positive rate of return; rather, his 
profit or loss depends on the ultimate outcome of the business. 
Application of partnership in house financing could take one of two forms: 
1. The beneficiary may provide either the land or part of the finance, or both, while the 
financier provides the remainder. The house will be jointly owned according to the 
percentage of finance. The house can either be occupied by the beneficiary or let to 
a third party. A rent will be determined and the beneficiary can either pay the share 
of the rent due to the financier, or the house can be let and the rent shared between 
the financier and the beneficiary. The beneficiary pays a regular rent and a regular 
instalment simultaneously. As he continues to do so, he will increase his share in the 
partnership and reduce that of the financier. Accordingly, the rent will decrease as 
the beneficiary continuously pays instalments. When the last instalment is paid, the 
rent will be zero. 
2. The financier may provide financing for such purchases on the basis of Musharakah. 
The financier will assess the rent and will share it according to the extent to which 
he is financing the purchase and according to pre-agreed terms. As the beneficiary 
pays off the instalments, the financier's share in the income will be reduced 
gradually until the whole property is transferred to the beneficiary (Mahdi, 1995, 
273). 
Partnership can be effected with regard to ownership of the building only, while the land 
is owned by the beneficiary. Both the financier and the beneficiary shoulder part of the 
cost of the building which will be jointly owned by them according to their shares. The 
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financier then sells his share to the beneficiary against a lump sum or on deferred 
payment (ibid. ). 
For the purpose of profit/loss distribution, the respective capital contributions of the 
parties, utilised for varying periods, would be brought to a common denominator by 
multiplying the amounts by the number of days during which each item (such as equity 
capital of the firm, its current cash surpluses, supplier's credit, as well as the finance 
provided by the bank) was actually deployed in the business. 
The calculation of the respective capital contributions of the parties may be made on a 
daily product basis. However, in no case can the highest multiple used for calculating the 
daily product exceed the total number of days covered by the accounting period (ibid., 
123). The holder will take a percentage of the profits of the project that the bonds are 
financing. The basis of this bond is a participation contract through which one or more 
partners with their money (the beneficial owners), and another with his efforts 
(participant), get together to earn profit in a permissible trade. Profits will be divided 
between them in an agreed proportion. 
The profit-sharing ratio between the partners cannot fluctuate from month to month or 
day to day like the rate of interest. This is because it is determined by custom and 
considerations of justice and remains contractually stable throughout the duration of the 
partnership agreement. Since the ultimate outcome of business depends on a number of 
factors which do not change erratically, an equity-based economy would tend to be 
more stable than a loan-based economy. The financier's liability remains limited to the 
extent of the financing provided by him. 
3.2.2.3 DECREASING PARTNERSHIP (DIMINISHING MUSIHARAKAH) 
Decreasing partnership may proceed as follows: on the basis of a partnership agreement, 
the financier and the beneficiary buy the house as a joint property in proportion to the 
sum paid by each. The financier leases his portion to the beneficiary for a specified 
periodic rent. The financier's portion is divided into shares. As the beneficiary, according 
to the agreed schedule, buys these shares at a specified price, the total number of shares 
of the financier decreases. Hence, the rental amount is reduced proportionately and the 
beneficiary's share in the ownership of the house increases until he has the full 
ownership. At this point both the partnership agreement and the lease contract come to 
an end (Ahmad, A. 1995,41). 
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Decreasing partnership has been successfully applied by the Jordan Islamic Bank to 
finance real estate projects and construction of commercial buildings (ibid. ). The two 
parties should agree on that: 
1) The financier sells his portion lump sum or by instalments; 
2) Priority of the purchase be given to the beneficiary; 
3) Shares should be regularly transferred from financier to beneficiary, so that shares of 
the former continuously decrease while shares of the latter increase, to the effect that 
all shares will eventually be owned by the latter; 
4) Titles and obligations, during this process, are determined according to the share of 
each party in the jointly owned property (Abdallah, 1995,48,49). 
The above method (decreasing partnership) requires three contracts: 
1) To establish joint ownership; 
2) To lease the share of the financier to the beneficiary; 
3) To sell the shares of the financier to the beneficiary (Al-Othmani, 1995,67,68). 
A decreasing partnership contract is in the best interests of the financial institution as 
decreasing partnership enables the financial institution systematically to liquidate itself 
from maturing projects, thus, diverting financial institution funds toward new projects 
(Bendjilali and Khan, 1995,19). In addition, the financier does not require guarantees 
for this type of financing, except that the initial mortgage for the building be in its 
favour. 
Important features of a decreasing partnership contract are as follows: 
1) Financier and beneficiary develop a joint project on the basis of Musharakah. 
2) Profits are shared in accordance with an agreed ratio and losses in proportion to initial 
contribution. 
3) The financier makes a binding promise to sell his shares to the beneficiary by 
instalments. 
4) The beneficiary voluntarily purchases the shares of the financier. 
5) The beneficiary, on completion of the contract, becomes the sole owner of the 
project. However, since stock markets are not efficient in Muslim countries, the 
parties agree in advance to accept the share prices yearly indicated by their auditors. 
6) The project may also be developed on the orders of the beneficiary and then sold to 
the beneficiary who buys the shares with the revenues generated by the project. 
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7) The financier is only bound by the sale component of a decreasing partnership 
contract (ibid., pp. 19-20). 
3.2.2.3.1 THE CASE OF AL-BARAKA ISLAMIC BANK 
A London-based subsidiary of Al-Baraka Islamic Bank provided finance for the purchase 
of residential and non-residential buildings during the 1989-1992 period. The contractual 
relationship rested on the basis of the participation between the client and Al-Baraka in 
purchasing real estate according to agreed proportions. The portion of Al-Baraka was 
not to exceed 80% in the case of residents and 70% in the case of non-residents. The 
price of the real estate was divided into shares, the value of each share being one pound. 
This value remains fixed throughout the contractual period. If the price of the purchased 
house was £100,000, Al-Baraka's portion of shares would be £70,000 and that of the 
client would be £30,000 (Shaltut, 1995,128). 
It was incumbent on the client to purchase Al-Baraka's shares within an agreed period, 
which should not exceed twenty years for residents and seven years for non-residents 
(Abdallah, A. 1995,50). Al-Baraka's shares would decreased gradually until the real 
estate was wholly owned by the client. 
The real estate was registered in the name of the client. It was mortgaged to the benefit 
of Al-Baraka as a guarantee for payment. The two parties agreed to the selling of the 
real estate if the client failed to purchase Al-Baraka's portion of shares (ibid., 49,50; 
Shaltut, 1995,128-133). 
The bank has faced many problems from legal and Shari 'ah points of view, due to its 
being newly established and to the fact that it operates in a country which does not 
recognise Islamic Shari 'ah. The obstacles include the following: 
1) Non-compliance with prompt payments; 
2) Registration fees; 
3) Cost of assessment, insurance and legal fees; 
4) Acceptance of dealings with insurance companies; (Shaltut, 1995,133-135). 
In the end, the scheme was wound up, as Al-Barakah was advised by the Bank of 
England to operate as an investment company rather than a bank. Al-Baraka did not wish 
to change its ownership structure to comply with the 1987 Financial Scheme Act. 
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3.2.3 LEASING AND LEASE ENDING WITH OWNERSHIP 
Leasing is a relatively new type of long-term financing which is progressively gaining 
ground in industrialised countries. Finance leasing is based on a contract between the 
lessor and the lessee for the hire of a specific asset selected from a manufacturer or 
vendor of such assets by the lessee. The lessor retains the ownership of the asset and the 
lessee has the possession and the right to use the asset on payment of specified rentals 
over a given period. The use of this method enables financial institutions to provide 
medium and long-term finance, either directly or through their leasing subsidiaries, 
without having to look into the accounts of the firms. 
The Jordan Islamic Bank uses this method in leasing residential units to clients for a 
monthly rent for thirty years. The maximum period of repayment varies from person to 
person. At the end of this period the bank assigns the ownership of the unit to the lessee 
(Yahya, 1995,91). This method involves housing investment for rental purposes with 
profit as the motive. 
3.2.4 INTEREST-FREE LOAN (QARD HASAM) 
Qard Hasan is a loan extended without interest or profit-sharing. It is extended to the 
borrower in order to help him, rather than to benefit from his situation (Ahmad, A. 1993, 
10; Ahmad and Awan, 1992,440). This is permissible by Islamic Shari'ah, as stated in 
the following verse: 
Who is he 
That will loan to Allah 
A beautiful loan, which Allah 
Will double unto his credit 
And multiply many times? 
It is Allah that giveth (you) 
Want or Plenty. 
And to Him shall be 
Your return (2: 245). 
It is stated in the Sunnah that giving an interest-free loan (Qard Hasan) is more 
rewarding than giving voluntary charity (Sadaqah). The justification for this is that: 
"whereas the petitioner may ask for what he owns, the borrower is prompted by his need 
to borrow" (Abdulbage, 1980, vol. 2,812). In addition, it is stated that the Prophet 
(pbuh) said: 
"... whoever brought his (Muslim) brother out of a discomfort, Allah will bring him 
out of the discomforts of the Day of Resurrection, and whoever screened a 
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Muslim, Allah will screen him on the Day of Resurrection" (Khan, 1985, vol. 3, 
373). 
The interest-free loan is socially and economically vital to the community as it reflects 
co-operation and contributes to social security. Therefore, the basic condition for Qard 
is that it should be interest-free. The charging of interest would be considered as usury, 
which is absolutely prohibited in Islamic Shari 'ah. 
Indeed, so strict is the prohibition of interest in Qard contracts that some fugaha go as 
far as prohibiting gifts from the borrower to the lender if they are suspected to be a 
reward for the service. However, if the borrower decides voluntarily to give more, this is 
acceptable according to the Prophet's (pbuh) statement: 
" ... 
for the best amongst the people is he who repays his debts in the most 
handsome manner" (ibid., vol. 3,339). 
For more details see the same book, vol. 3,336 - 340. 
Interest-free loans are one method of house financing based on co-operation, 
interdependence and a desire for God's reward. As such, interest-free loans are not an 
instrument for investment. Government, institutions and individuals should pay due 
attention to this method for the benefit of those who cannot secure houses using their 
own means. 
Interest-free loan financing is used, especially, in assisting members of the community 
such as small businessmen, farmers, etc., so that they may gain financial independence. 
This technique is also used in carrying out government schemes, which may not be 
expected to produce profit, but which are of benefit to the community. This provision of 
interest-free loan for financial aid in the cases mentioned is in line with the principles of 
benevolence (Ihsan), and would also aid in advancing individual initiatives and the 
distribution of resources (Ali, M. 1992,346). 
The Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt provides interest-free loans to the holders of 
investment and current accounts, in accordance with the conditions laid down by its 
board of directors. The Jordanian Islamic Bank Law is authorised to give interest-free 
loans for productive purposes in various fields to enable the beneficiaries to start 
independent lives or to raise their income and standard of living (Ahmad, A. 1993,49). 
It should be mentioned in this context that the banks that provide interest-free loans are 
permitted to charge the borrower a service charge to cover the administrative cost of 
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handling these loans, so long as the charge is not related to the amount or the duration of 
the loan (Khan, M. And Mirakhor, 1987,5). 
3.3 DISCUSSION 
The various financing techniques available have different economic implications for 
financier and beneficiary, due to differences in the nature of the finance, the role of the 
financier and the degree of risk involved. 
Financing techniques can be classified in accordance with the nature of the finance 
involved in each. Bay'AI-Salam and Murabahah can be considered as debt-based modes 
of finance, as in both cases, the finance is in the nature of a debt (Khan, F, 1991,13). 
The beneficiary (the buyer) is obliged to pay back the entire sum or, as agreed in Bay'Al- 
Salam, its equivalent. The repayment by the beneficiary is pre-determined. Therefore, it 
is a type of debt from his perspective. In contrast, Mudarabah and Musharakah are non- 
debt modes since the beneficiary (the working partner) is not obliged to repay the total 
amount of finance. Mudarabah and Musharakah involve the beneficiary paying 
according to the profit or loss that results from the use of the finance, whereas in Ijarah, 
only rent is paid, which is usually a small part of the total value of the asset (ibid. ). 
The debt-creating modes (Bay'Al-Salam and Murabahah) involve a financial burden on 
the user, regardless of how much or how little he benefits from the funds, whereas non- 
debt-creating modes (Mudarabah and Musharakah) carry no financial burden, the 
beneficiary paying only according to any benefit he derives from the finance (ibid. ). 
The methods under review differ in terms of the role of the financier. The financier has 
no role in the management of the funds by the beneficiary under Bay'Al-Salam, since 
after the total price has been handed over, the beneficiary has the freedom to use the 
funds (total price) as he wishes. Mudarabah may also be considered under this category, 
since the financier has no right to interfere in the management of any enterprise for 
which the funds are being used. However, Musharakah allows the financier the 
opportunity to have a role in the fund management. Under Murabahah, full control over 
the use of funds is in the hands of the financier himself (ibid. ). 
With regard to the extent of risk, Mudarabah involves the entire capital invested by the 
financier being at stake. He is responsible for any financial losses involved in any 
enterprise for which the funds are used. Under Musharakah, the financier must bear any 
financial losses, proportional to his capital in the total investment of the enterprise. 
79 
Likewise, Ijarah makes the asset-owner responsible for risks involved during the life of 
the enterprise. Under Bay'Al-Salam, risk ensues from the uncertainty of the future price 
of the commodity involved in the enterprise (ibid., 14). However, under Murabahah, the 
risk is significantly less, in that the risk-bearing of the financier lasts only until the goods 
are handed over to the beneficiary, not until the return of the capital. Hence, Murabahah 
involves minimal risk for the financier when compared with other modes because: 
1. The financier's risk is for only that period in which a spot sale is to be made and the 
goods handed over to the beneficiary. This is important since other modes involve the 
risk's remaining throughout the period of the enterprise. 
2. The only consideration in this form of finance is the current prices of goods involved 
to determine the finance and its return (ibid. 14,15). 
Also of interest is the economic role of the various finance techniques. In terms of 
household consumption/saving choice, Murabahah and Bay'Al-Salam would appear to 
have an advantage over the other techniques from the point of view of the beneficiary, in 
that they may be used for meeting household consumption needs, whereas the 
Mudarabah and Musharakah techniques cannot be utilised thus (ibid., 20,21). 
It would seem that among PLS techniques, Musharakah may be preferable to 
Mudarabah, in that in the former the capital owner has a right to participate in the 
management, thus providing some control over any problems. However, there is no such 
control with Mudarabah (ibid., 21). 
With regard to financial intermediation, Mudarabah and Musharakah are argued in the 
literature to be the most suitable instruments for managing the liability side of banking 
(i. e. bank-depositor relationship). The advantages of Mudarabah are: (ibid., 25) 
1. Banks simply select a suitable entrepreneur, invest their funds and await results for the 
PLS. 
2. This method is capable of being utilised for varying periods of investment and with a 
variety of entrepreneurs, large or small, allowing the bank varying degrees of risk and 
return. 
However, the disadvantages of Mudarabah include the fact that the bank's bearing all 
the loss. This could result in moral hazard on the part of the users of the bank's funds 
(ibid. ). 
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Musharakah offers the following advantages: (ibid., 26) 
1. Moral hazards are reduced as the client would also be investing. The bank would also 
have the right to participate in the management of the project. 
2. The bank can improve its profitability by investing in larger and already established 
concerns, thus, ensuring higher profitability and less risk. 
3. This mode can be employed for either short or long periods in the industrial, 
commercial, agricultural and service sectors. 
Although this type of finance (Musharakah) allows the bank the right to participate in 
the management of the funds, it might choose to waive this right and act only as the 
financial intermediary (ibid. ). 
Lease-based finance such as Ijarah requires a bank to change its role of financial 
intermediator and involve itself in: 
1. Purchase of an asset (requiring certain expertise) which it would then retain until the 
asset is disposed, necessitating storage capacity. 
2. Maintaining the asset and bearing all maintenance and replacement costs should it be 
defective or fail to perform the service for which it has been leased. This would entail 
knowledge and expertise in respect of the assets under lease. 
3. Disposal of the asset, should it not be needed. This involves accepting the risks 
resulting from price fluctuation and from lack of marketing expertise (ibid., 26,27). 
An advantage of lease-based finance is that it does not involve informational asymmetry, 
as in the case of Mudarabah/Musharakah. Should a bank not be completely satisfied 
that its clients will declare correct profits, it can then provide them financing on the basis 
of leasing instruments/equipment/assets. Some moral hazard issues may still, however, 
remain, as clients may misuse the assets, thus imposing unnecessary costs on the bank as 
the owner of the assets. 
Murabahah financing is similar to that of Ijarah, except that the bank is involved in 
trading, rather than leasing, to earn income. Murabahah has several advantages over 
lease-based finance since the risk-bearing period in trade finance is less than that in lease- 
based finance. In addition, the bank knows its profit immediately after the purchase-sale 
transaction is completed, even though its investment may not have been fully recovered. 
Bay'Al-Salam also involves the bank in trading, but provides the bank with no objective 
basis for anticipating its profits, and forces speculation on future prices. This mode of 
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finance may prove unattractive to clients because of the possibility of exploitation by the 
bank in the process of speculating on future prices (ibid., 28). 
Ijarah techniques may create more liquidity problems than PLS techniques, since it is 
unlikely that the rental assets can be redeemed at short-notice without adversely 
affecting the profitability of the financier. However, Murabahah is totally illiquid from 
the point of view of the financier. 
Islamic financing techniques also have distinct macroeconomic implications. The 
Mudarabah and Musharakah techniques can be used to augment production and capital 
accumulation; they also make all the capital within the economy risk-bearing capital. In 
addition, they create new entrepreneurs. In particular, Mudarabah looks for 
entrepreneurs to provide capital with some positive earning. This may encourage people 
to reconsider entrepreneurial activity when they see the availability of risk-bearing 
capital. It follows that this may create new sources of growth in the economy, that may 
not be available in an interest-based system (ibid., 29). 
Ijarah can best serve the purpose of capital accumulation through development financing 
institutions in the public sector. Trading-based techniques, i. e., mark-up and Bay'Al- 
Salam, are the least conducive to capital accumulation compared to other techniques, 
since they only add the value of the trading service to the economy. 
Mudarabah and Musharakah may not prove ideal in promoting the formation of fixed 
assets and infrastructural development. Ijarah techniques are more suited to the 
formation of fixed assets, infrastructural development, long-term investment and the 
financing of larger projects such as dams, roads, railways and airways, etc. (ibid., 30). 
Mudarabah and Musharakah techniques finance production, not consumption. Hence, 
they are unlikely to generate demand-pull inflation in the economy. Ijarah techniques 
and, on a lesser scale, Murabahah, can generate cost-push inflation because of the cost 
of capital being predetermined, and they may rise, for example, due to excess demand 
for consumer-durable goods, yet not create any corresponding increase in output or 
productivity (ibid. ). 
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In terms of employment generation and alleviation of poverty, the implications of 
Islamic financing techniques are: 
1 Mudarabah and Bay' Al-Salam meet the capital needs of human resources who do 
not possess capital. In addition, Mudarabah can generate quick income for them, 
helping them to meet their needs and providing an incentive to save. 
2 Musharakah can be used to help those who possess limited capital. The possibility of 
obtaining capital on the Musharakah basis will serve the same purpose as that of 
Mudarabah for labour without capital. 
3 Ijarah and trading-based techniques may also be helpful. However, people with low 
incomes may be unable, initially, to afford the fixed cost of the rent or mark-up 
techniques (ibid., 31) 
The Musharakah method may fare better when compared with Murabahah, instalment 
Sale or interest. It provides a cushion against inflation, from the viewpoint of the 
financier, as Musharakah secures a percentage of the value of the asset to the financier. 
While the value of the building appreciates with inflation, the share of the financier will 
also appreciate. Therefore, the financier becomes secured against inflation. If the 
building is sold, the share of the financier will increase due to capital appreciation. If 
Musharakah continues, it will reap the lock-in effects as well as the increase in rent 
(Salama, 1995). 
In the case of Musharakah and Mudarabah, the financier remains the owner until the 
end of the contract. In case of liquidating an enterprise, these features of Musharakah 
and Mudarabah contracts create no difficulty. However, financing an ongoing enterprise 
with such Musharakah and Mudarabah contracts is practicable. 
Moreover, share prices are determined in stock markets. These markets are not very 
active in Muslim countries. Therefore, the parties have to agree in advance to accept the 
share prices yearly indicated by their auditors, instead of depending on the prevailing 
prices of the shares (Bendjilali and Khan, 1995,20). 
Under any method of housing finance there is a risk to the financier of delayed payment 
or non-repayment. Interest acts as a deterrent to such risk since if the principal is not 
repaid, the interest will accumulate as the remaining balance stays fixed. However, in the 
case of Murabahah and Bay'ajil, non-repayment entails no cost for the beneficiary 
(borrower). Under decreasing partnership, rent will affect a customer who evades 
repayment, as it will remain fixed as long as repayment of the principal is not made. 
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Under Murabahah and Bay'ajil the bank would be wise to adopt extra precautionary 
measures such as mortgages. A special court should be established to ensure that prompt 
measures are taken against delinquents as these housing finance methods are dependent 
on how quickly repayment is made to the financiers (Salama, 1995). 
Murabahah is not entirely free of risk. Purchasers may refuse to accept items purchased, 
and if this happens the seller has to bear the loss since a promise to buy is not regarded 
as binding in a sale contract under according to most school offigh.. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to survey Islamic financing techniques. In 
Section One, the general background issues related to Islamic methods of financing were 
highlighted, beginning with quotations from the Qur'an forbidding interest and explaining 
briefly why the interest system is prohibited. In Section Two, various methods of 
financing devised by Islamic banks to comply with Islamic teaching were looked into in 
some detail. Section Three examined the implications of these methods of financing for 
both the financier and beneficiary, and their possible impact on the economy as a whole. 
It may be observed that Islamic financing techniques are far more interesting and 
complex than conventional banking. Even in the case of deposit mobilisation, Islamic 
financing techniques have been able to offer various kinds of financial products. 
However, it is in the area of assets rather than in liabilities that the practices of Islamic 
banks are more diverse and complex than those of conventional banks. 
Although this chapter has not attempted a comparative study of the frequency of use of 
different financing techniques, it is generally believed that Murabahah is the most 
widely-used technique and that the majority of the financing provided by Islamic banks 
goes to short-term trade and the financing of real estate. 
There is no doubt that Murabahah was the most popular financing technique in the early 
stages of the development of Islamic banks. This was for several reasons, as follows: 
First, Murabahah is simple to apply. In terms of simplicity of application, the 
Murabahah financing technique may be best placed to compete with conventional 
interest based borrowing. All other Islamic financing techniques require more elaborate 
arrangements for their application. 
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Second, it was possible to get higher returns on depositors' money using this technique, 
and in their initial stages of establishment and development. Islamic banks required 
higher returns in order to build up their confidence (Ahmad, A. 1993). 
However, it should be borne in mind that the dynamics of contemporary Islamic banking 
change at a fast rate under market pressure. Hence, it may be that the composition of the 
financing techniques used by Islamic banks is also undergoing a significant change. 
These techniques offer a number of feasible alternatives to the western-style mortgage 
system, which can be used in the area of housing finance. 
Nevertheless, there are disadvantages as well as advantages with each of these financing 
techniques. For instance, under Murabahah and Bay'ajil the capital provider would be 
wise to adopt extra precautionary measures such as mortgages since the client faces no 
penalties for delayed repayment. 
Thus, each of the financing techniques has its own particular profile. This makes it 
possible to see that the capital provider must select his preferred mode of financing 
according to the nature of the enterprise, and that the complexity and variety of banking 
techniques that have grown in reponse to Islam ensure him a great flexibility of choice. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will consider four aspects of the study design: the study sample will be 
described, the features of the questionnaires used in the study will be discussed and their 
preparation and the conduct of the pilot study reported, the selected data collection 
methods will be presented and finally, the methods used in analysis and tabulation of the 
collected data will be explained. Hence, this chapter is organised into four main sections, 
together with a conclusion, as follows: 
1. The Sample. 
2. The Questionnaires. 
3. Data Collection. 
4. Analysis and Tabulation of Data. 
5. Conclusion. 
4.1 THE SAMPLE 
This section is divided into four parts: the first part presents a discussion of the sampling 
method, while the second part describes the area of the study. Part three presents a 
discussion regarding the sample size and finally, part four deals with the limitations of 
the sample population. 
4.1.1 SAMPLING METHOD 
As this study is for research purposes, the sample was chosen at random from Saudi 
citizens who had already received loans from the REDF (i. e. borrowers) and those 
currently seeking REDF loans (ie. loan seekers). In other words, the target population 
under study were those people who already had REDF loans and those attempting to 
obtain a loan in order to build a residence. 
The Systematic Sampling Technique (SST) was used. In SST, each and every unit of the 
population has an equal chance of being selected. This method was chosen due to limited 
resources and the fact that no reliable list of names of the population was available. The 
city of Jeddah was selected for the study, based on several criteria which will be 
discussed below. 
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4.1.2 AREA OF THE STUDY 
The ' sample was drawn from the population of REDF borrowers and loan seekers in 
Jeddah, a city which has been transformed in the last fifty years from a mud-walled town 
of 25,000 inhabitants to an international metropolis with a population of over one and a 
half million and a corresponding growth in the number of dwelling units. 
At present, modem buildings are being constructed, representing a radical shift from mud 
buildings. Jeddah, like most cities in Saudi Arabia, is growing rapidly and expanding 
geographically at a great rate. In addition, like many other cities and villages in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jeddah has witnessed a great improvement in the quality of 
construction during the last twenty years. 
Limiting the study to Jeddah city raises the question of representation, or in other words 
to what extent this city is representative of the total population. Since the population of 
Saudi Arabia is relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, language, religious 
affiliati on, etc., any segment of the population should be a fairly accurate represention of 
the population as a whole. Furthermore, the representation of that segment of the total 
population affected by the fund programme will be even greater, partly because of the 
conditions attached to REDF loans. It is mostly adult citizens over the age of twenty-one 
years, usually married, who share the same interest in obtaining REDF loans and 
probably the same aspiration to build their own homes. Hence, homogeneity among all 
REDF programme recipients is considerable. 
4.1.3 SAMPLE SIZE 
A successful survey generally requires a large sample in order to include a cross-section 
of the population, adequately reflecting any differences which might exist in the total 
population, and to allow estimation of the incidence or prevalence of any relatively rare 
phenomena. Undoubtedly, small samples and poor responses negatively affect the final 
results of a survey. 
A sample is a small selected portion of the population. The availability of resources is a 
primary factor in determining sample size. Another basic factor in determining sample 
size is that results from large samples do not vary as much as results from small samples. 
A large sample, however, was beyond the scope and nature of this study, particularly in 
view of time and resource constraints. 
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At this point, it is important to stress that a small sample can provide a fair 
representation of the total population, especially if it is homogeneous, as noted by 
Pourcher: 
"... the accuracy of the inquiry will depend primarily upon the representativeness 
quality of the sample: in a homogeneous population the sample may be extremely 
small, whereas in a heterogeneous population a larger sample may be necessary" 
(quoted in A1-Saati, 1987,31). 
With respect to the size of the sample of this study, it was small enough to fit within the 
practical time limitations. At the same time, it was large enough to reflect potentially 
significant differences between sub-groups of the target population within the sample. 
Four hundred cases from each group (borrowers and loan seekers) were selected 
randomly to ensure that the results obtained would be representative of the population. 
Thus, the sample consisted of 800 cases, involving the distribution of 800 questionnaires, 
as shown in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 
The Sample Size of the Study 
No. Category Sample size 
1 Borrowers 400 cases 
2 Loan seekers 400 cases 
TOTAL 800 cases 
4.1.4 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SAMPLE POPULATION 
The limitations of the sample population taken for this study are listed, as follows: 
1. The survey was conducted in the city of Jeddah. Other cities and villages were 
excluded. 
2. Saudis living overseas for any purpose were excluded. 
3. Saudi women were excluded, due to cultural considerations. 
4. Mentally ill or handicapped Saudis, or those incarcerated during the period of the 
interview section of the study were excluded. 
Aside from these limitations, the results of the survey are generally applicable to the 
whole country, based on the fact that Saudi society is homogeneous, as previously 
mentioned. 
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4.2 THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
This- section is divided into five parts. The first part outlines the primary goals of the 
questionnaires. Parts two and three describe the preparation of the questionnaires and the 
pilot study respectively. The fourth part discusses the questionnaires' reliability. Finally, 
the fifth part relates to the number of questions which were used in the questionnaires. 
4.2.1 PRIMARY GOALS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
It was deemed appropriate to collect the required data by means of a sample survey of 
borrowers and loan seekers, primarily because of the paucity of available data from the 
REDF. 
The instruments used were questionnaires addressed to people who had sought or were 
seeking to obtain a loan to build a house. Those who had already received REDF loans 
(borrowers) were distinguished from those still seeking a loan to build a house (loan 
seekers). Separate questionnaires were addressed to each of these categories of 
respondents. 
The main goals of the questionnaires were to: 
1. collect the required data to test the hypotheses of this study; 
2. obtain statistics of a descriptive nature, such as frequencies of cases; 
3. determine the opinions and attitudes of respondents towards certain subjects related 
to financial matters; 
4. seek opinions regarding some Islamic housing financing methods. 
4.2.2 PREPARATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
The preparation of the questionnaires involved many drafts. The first drafts of the two 
questionnaires were drawn up in English in the winter of 1995 and reviewed by the 
researcher's academic supervisor, Professor Rodney Wilson of the Department of 
Economics at the University of Durham. The questionnaires were quite lengthy, some 
areas proving problematic, with several questions needing to be removed and additional 
ones incorporated. 
Modifications were made, and the second drafts were reviewed by Miss Cathy 
Thompson of the Information Technology Service of Durham University, as well as by 
the research supervisor. However, both considered that certain parts of the 
questionnaires required further modification. Cathy Thompson recommended the 
following workbook: Questionnaire Design: A Practical Introduction, developed by 
89 
Noel Wilson and Sally McClean. Accordingly, the researcher read the workbook and 
incorporated ideas into the design of the questionnaire for this study. 
The third drafts of the questionnaires were translated into Arabic by an English/Arabic 
translator. Copies of the questionnaires were then distributed to members of the 
Economics Department of King Abdulaziz University, particularly those with experience 
in questionnaire design. The Department members were informed of the purposes of the 
survey and requested to comment on the clarity and comprehensibility of the questions. 
Additional modifications were suggested and incorporated into the fourth drafts of the 
questionnaires. These fourth drafts were reviewed by professors in the Statistics 
Department at King Abdulaziz University, and their notes and comments were taken into 
account to improve the wording of the questions. In addition, these professors agreed 
that the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) program could be used for 
statistical analysis, which would allow the researcher to make a correlation between the 
variables. 
Because the final versions of the questionnaires were in English, a language not 
understood by the prospective respondents, the questionnaires were then translated back 
into Arabic. The translation was checked by an independent native Arabic speaker. 
4.2.2.1 THE PILOT STUDY 
The pre-testing of the questionnaires was carried out exactly as it would be performed in 
the main study. Thirty cases from each group (borrowers and loan seekers) were 
selected randomly. They were then interviewed using the fourth draft of the 
questionnaire for the pilot study. 
The purpose of the pilot study was to: 
1. test the ability of the questionnaires to do the job for which they were designed; 
2. improve the clarity of any questions which may have been vague or difficult for 
respondents to answer; 
3. reduce the number of questions with an open-ended format, substituting questions 
with appropriate response categories to facilitate data analysis; 
4. reveal any weaknesses in the questionnaires and improve their organisation; 
5. measure the length of time taken to answer the questions; 
6. identify subjective questions. 
The researcher noted any ambiguity, misunderstanding, or sensitivity that occurred. 
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Some respondents sought clarification on certain items, which was immediately given. In 
addition, the responses of the reviewers were used to improve the wording of the 
questions. 
Reservations by respondents were noted, particularly if they avoided answering certain 
questions, e. g. those about monthly income and number of dependants. 
The positive reaction of respondents of the pilot study toward the questionnaires and any 
interesting comments were noted and taken as an indication that the questionnaires were 
meaningful and successful. 
The results of the pilot study were, then, used to construct the final questionnaires. For 
example, it was decided that sensitive and personal questions, especially those dealing 
with financial matters, should only require the respondent to choose a single answer 
from a selected list of broad categories, rather than to give detailed information. 
To make the questionnaires easy to complete, it was mostly a matter of simply ticking 
boxes. In other words, most questions were multiple choice questions. The questions 
were also arranged sequentially. 
A covering letter was attached explaining the procedure for completing the 
questionnaires and advising that the survey would be used for independent research only. 
Respondents were briefed on the purpose of gathering the information and were 
requested to co-operate by providing accurate replies to all questions. The statement, 
"Your replies are anonymous and all information will be treated as strictly confidential", 
was included in the covering letter, in order to encourage respondents to answer all the 
questions. 
Final versions of the two questionnaires were designed, one for REDF loan borrowers, 
and another for those seeking REDF loans, with versions in both English and Arabic. 
4.2.3 QUESTIONNAIRE RELIABILITY 
In line with the recommendations of Hill and Kerber (1957,64: quoted in A1-Mizjaji, 
1982,67) the following measures were taken in this study in order to maximise the 
reliability of questionnaire items: 
1. The two questionnaires had a primary subject, seeking only information which 
could not be obtained from non-survey data. 
2. The two questionnaires requested only data essential to that subject. 
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3. Respondents were given clear instructions on how to answer each question. 
4. Questions were objectively constructed, with no hint of desired responses. 
5. Questions were presented in good psychological order, proceeding from general to 
specific responses. 
6. Embarrassing questions were avoided. 
These are the characteristics of a reliable questionnaire, which were very carefully 
followed during the construction of the questionnaire. 
4.2.4 NUMBER OF QUESTIONS 
Two questionnaires were used in the survey, one for REDF borrowers, and the other for 
REDF loan seekers. The two questionnaires contained thirty-one questions altogether. 
Besides general information, the questionnaires sought information on specific financial 
matters. 
The questionnaire for REDF borrowers consisted of ten questions, while that for REDF 
loan seekers consisted of twenty-one questions. A greater number of questions were 
directed at the loan seekers because borrowers were already in possession of loans, and 
therefore houses. In contrast, loan seekers had neither (loans nor houses) and thus faced 
a greater problem. Consequently, their answers were more important in relation to this 
study, since the major problems addressed were those facing this particular group of the 
population. 
The original versions of the questionnaires are provided in Appendices A. 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION 
This section is divided into two parts. The first one describes the methods used for data 
collection. The second part discusses the elimination of errors in the data collection. 
4.3.1 THE METHODS USED FOR DATA COLLECTION 
Interviews were used for collecting most of the data. However, questionnaires were 
handed out to some respondents who expressed a preference for this method. 
There were several reasons for adopting the interview technique for gathering most of 
the data for this study. They are listed below: 
1. A face to face interview provides the interviewer with the opportunity to eliminate 
any possible misunderstanding of questions by respondents. 
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2. Some of the questions required explanation, in particular those about Islamic 
housing financing methods, since they contained information new to most of the 
loan seeker respondents. 
3. Some respondents were illiterate and the questionnaires would not have generated 
any information in such cases. 
4. Interviews help to reduce the number of missing answers. 
Since the mail survey technique is well known for its poor response rate, it was thought 
desirable to develop some kind of personal contact with the respondents. 
To summarise, most of the data required to test the hypotheses of this study was 
generated by face to face interviews. 
The interviews were conducted by the researcher and a team of seven volunteers. The 
status of the interviewers in higher education reduced suspicion among the respondents 
about the questions. Each interviewer was asked to interview about ninety people. 
Hence, the interviewers were asked to interview a total of about six hundred and thirty 
people (7 x 90 = 630). The researcher planned to interview about one hundred and 
seventy people. 
Some of the interviewers were acquainted with some of the borrowers and loan seekers 
or knew some of the managers of certain public establishments, which made it easier to 
interview employees who were suitable for the survey. 
It should be pointed out here that some managers requested a letter of authority from 
King Abdulaziz University and then required a considerable amount of time to schedule 
the interviews. 
In order to meet the requirements of the managers, several copies of recommendation 
letters were obtained from the Economics Department at King Abdulaziz University. 
Each included brief information about the investigator: his name, his job, the title of his 
research and encouragement to help him. These letters provided protection against any 
suspicion and were presented to some respondents before conducting the interview. 
All of this increased the time required for data collection. Nevertheless, interviewing 
employees in their place of work simplified the data collection considerably, as the 
alternative was conducting the interviews in the homes of respondents, which were 
obviously spread around different parts of the city of Jeddah. 
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Meanwhile, in order to overcome difficulties, the help of several mediators or third- 
parties was sought to facilitate arranging meetings with the respondents. These mediators 
included relatives of the respondents, close friends, colleagues and employers. 
Efforts were made to allow respondents to consider their answers for as long as they 
needed. The interview schedule was designed to allow respondents sufficient time to 
give a considered response to the questions. Hence, the interviewers did not rush the 
respondents during the interview, especially when answers involved a calculation or 
when respondents were answering rank order questions, since the options were 
superficially similar to each other and it may have been difficult to detect the difference 
between them. 
Most respondents completed the questionnaires at their workplace, but some completed 
them in their homes. A third group was contacted at home by telephone. The main 
reason for this was that they were very busy. 
It should be pointed out that there were several interruptions during some interviews, 
since they were conducted at work. On average, each interview lasted about fifteen 
minutes. 
Almost all interviews went smoothly, with some respondents seeming very friendly and 
co-operative. However, twenty-five respondents refused to complete the questionnaires. 
After the interview, the questionnaire was carefully checked by the investigator in order 
to ensure that all questions had been properly answered. 
Overall, due to delays in arranging interviews and the unenthusiastic attitudes of some 
respondents, data collection took over three months to complete. The sample survey 
was conducted during the period from June to October 1995. It must be emphasised that 
despite the tremendous efforts of the researcher and the team of interviewers, only two 
hundred and sixty-three questionnaires were returned by the first group (borrowers) and 
two hundred and sixty-five by the second group (loan seekers). 
Thirteen borrowers' questionnaires were discarded (nine incomplete and four 
inconsistent in their responses). Fifteen loan seekers' questionnaires were discarded 
(seven incomplete and eight inconsistent in their responses) as shown in Table 4.2 below. 
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Table 4.2 
Discarded Questionnaires 
Discarded 
No. Category Incomplete Inconsistent Total 
1 Borrowers 9 4 13 
2 Loan seekers 7 8 15 
TOTAL 16 12 28 
To sum up briefly, twenty-eight questionnaires were rejected. The survey yielded two 
hundred and fifty questionnaires with all questions answered, for each sample category, 
as shown in Table 4.3 below. 
Table 4.3 
Questionnaires Used 
No. Category Collected Discarded Yielded 
1 Borrowers 263 13 250 
2 Loan seekers 265 15 250 
TOTAL 528 28 500 
Five hundred cases were finally found suitable to be considered for this study. In other 
words, out of the eight hundred borrowers and loan seekers (400 borrowers and 400 
loan seekers) approached, five hundred (250 borrowers and 250 loan seekers) responded 
to the questionnaires. This constitutes 62.5% of the original number of borrowers and 
loan seekers (800 cases) approached (see Table 4.4). The return rate could be considered 
acceptable for statistical testing. Having such a rate of return does not necessarily mean 
that the sample is biased, because there was no known systematic reason for non- 
response. 
Table 4.4 
Target and Actual Sample Size of the Study 
No. Category 
Sam le size Return 
Target Actual Rate 
1 Borrowers 400 250 62.5% 
2 Loan seekers 400 250 62.5% 
TOTAL 800 500 62.5% 
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4.3.2 ELIMINATION OF ERRORS IN THE DATA COLLECTION 
Considerable care was taken in data collection. Errors which affect data collection can 
be divided into two groups as follows: 
I. Sampling Errors: those which occur because data is gathered from a sample rather 
than from an entire population; 
2. Non-sampling Errors: it is difficult to provide a comprehensive list of sources of 
non-sampling errors. However, these can be broadly divided into four categories, as 
follows: 
a) Conceptual error: due to survey design, definitions or specifications. 
b) Non-response error: due to no coverage, lack of respondents' co-operation or 
collecting agents' omissions, illegible entries, lost records, etc. 
c) Response error: where description of the same situation is different on different 
occasions, or different if given by two different people. 
d) Assessment error: due to a lack of environmental control, poorly calibrated 
measuring instruments, a badly designed questionnaire or improper scrutiny. 
Attempts were made to control all the above non-sampling errors. Respondents were 
assured that the information would remain confidential. Some influential intermediaries 
assisted in data collection. 
4.4 ANALYSIS AND TABULATION OF DATA 
The researcher used the SPSS program for analysis of data. The data collected was 
tabulated in statistical tables and presented in the form of statistical charts and diagrams. 
Such presentation helps the reader to appreciate visually the salient characteristics of the 
data and can also suggest the type of statistical treatment. 
4.4.1 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
Following the completion of all questionnaires in October 1995, the raw data was coded 
into a standard format and entered on the computer. Closed-ended questions were 
assigned mutually exclusive categories representing each variable in the study. The codes 
were equally spaced and, in order to preserve as much of the original detail in the data as 
possible, exhaustive categories were established for each question. After the creation of 
a code manual, each questionnaire was coded and the data was then entered into an 
SPSS data file. Each measure was evaluated using univariate analysis and an 
96 
Multivariate analysis when appropriate. The data was tabulated using the SPSS 
programme. Presentation and analysis of the data involved the following: 
4.4.2 ONE WAY TABULATIONS 
One way tabulations were used to study frequency and percentage of respondents who 
answered certain questions. Distribution tables were utilised to: 
A. display the distribution of responses to each variable in the survey; 
B. detect wild codes; 
C. compare different groups' responses. 
These descriptive statistics were very helpful in presenting most data in a relatively 
simple way that could be understood by the non-researcher. However, cross-tabulation 
technique was also incorporated in order to combine relevant statistics with explanatory 
material (Alreck and Settle, 1985,324). It should be mentioned in this context that 
frequency tables alone do not include enough information for the purposes of the study, 
as one of the aims of the thesis is to define relationships among several variables. 
Norusis (1990) states that: 
"Frequency tables, bar charts and histograms are not of much help in answering 
questions, like those questions that involve relations among several variables". (p. 
105). 
4.4.3 CROSS-TABULATION 
Cross-tabulation was mainly used to test the level of significance between the dependent 
variable and each independent variable. This helped to identify contributing measures as 
well as to eliminate irrelevant ones. 
In the cross-tabulation test, caution must be exercised in interpreting data when the 
percentage of cells with an expected frequency of less than 5 is more than 20% of the 
total. The researcher had to combine the classes within variables. Bryman and Cramer 
(1990) state that: 
"chi-square should not be used when any expected frequency is smaller than 1 or 
when more than 20 per cent of the expected frequencies are smaller than 5. In this 
situation, it may be possible to increase the expected frequencies in a category by 
combining them with those of another. " (p. 122) 
Thus, for this study cross-tabulation is used for comparative purposes to examine the 
independence of two nominal variables in order to analyse the results of the data. The 
chi-square method of cross-tabulation, which is in fact a test of independence, was used 
where appropriate. The chi-square was used to test the significance of the difference 
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between the frequency obtained by the researcher and the frequency anticipated for the 
random proposition. Chi-square tests provided a simple way to answer many questions 
relating to counting data with one or two variables of classification, since all that was 
needed to carry out these tests was the ability to calculate a set of expected frequencies 
with which the observed frequencies can be compared. Chi-square was used to test the 
agreement between hypothesis and observation. 
4.4.4 HYPOTHESES 
The null hypothesis (HO) is a hypothesis containing no differences. It is used mainly for 
the purpose of rejection. If and when rejected, the alternative hypothesis (H1) may be 
said to be true. The alternative hypothesis is the actual statement of the experimenter's 
research hypothesis. That is to say, the results of the statistical tests (for cross tabulated 
data) are examined by rejecting the null hypothesis HO in favour of the research 
(alternative) hypothesis H1, if these statistical techniques yield a value whose associated 
probability of occurrence under HO is less than, or equal, to the probability or 
significance level (P less than 0.05). Large values of chi-square indicate that a systematic 
relationship of some sort exists between the variables. This, however, depends in part 
upon degrees of freedom which vary with the number of rows and columns. These are 
important because the probability of obtaining a specific chi- square value depends on the 
number of cells in the table. 
By its nature, this statistic will be large in situations where the observed and expected 
frequencies are very different, and it will be small when the observed and expected 
frequencies are similar. A value of zero can occur only if all the observed frequencies are 
exactly equal to their expected values. Thus, the chi-square statistic is an objective 
measure of agreement between the observed and expected frequencies. 
In passing it is noteworthy that, when calculating the chi-square test for a 2X2 table, it is 
common to make use of what is called "Fisher's exact test" with the idea of improving 
the chi squared approximation for the significant level of the data. 
4.4.4.1 CHI-SQUARE: 
The hypothesis that two variables of a cross-tabulation are independent of each other is 
often of interest to researchers. Two variables of definition are independent if the 
probability that a case falls into a given cell is simply the product of the marginal 
probabilities of the two categories defining the cell. 
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A statistic often used to test the hypothesis that the rows and columns variables are 
independent is the Pearson Chi-Square. It is calculated by summing over all cells the 
squared residuals divided by the expected frequencies. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explained the design of the empirical research conducted in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia. A detailed account has been given of the sample, the design of the two 
questionnaires, data collection and approach to the analysis and tabulation of data. The 
responses to the questionnaires will be presented in the next two chapters, beginning in 
Chapter Five with responses obtained from those who have already received REDF 
loans. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALYSIS OF BORROWERS' RESPONSES 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings of the survey administered to the REDF borrowers. 
The aim of this chapter is to study their responses and analyse their attitudes towards 
certain financial matters. The questions used can be divided into five groups, as follows: 
The first group consists of the first three questions which relate to background 
information on the respondent: marital status, number of dependants and income level 
respectively. 
The second group is made up of two questions, 4 and 4A, which relate to the 
construction cost of housing. 
The third group comprises two questions, 5 and 5A, which ask the respondents to 
indicate whether they have any overdue annual repayments and if so, to indicate the 
reasons for this. 
The fourth group is composed of two questions, 6 and 7, which attempt to ascertain the 
respondents' attitudes towards repaying by monthly direct debit. 
The fifth group consists of question 8 only, which asks the respondents to indicate their 
opinions concerning their awareness of the fact that their own prompt repayments would 
reduce the waiting period for obtaining REDF loans for others who seek them. 
Accordingly, the main body of this chapter is divided into six sections, corresponding to 
the above groups. Within each group, frequencies and percentages of responses are 
analysed for each question. The final section will present the conclusion. Therefore, the 
main sections of this chapter are headed as follows: 
1. Respondents' background information. 
2. Construction cost. 
3. Delayed repayments. 
4. Repayment by monthly direct debit. 
5. Respondents' attitude towards prompt repayment. 
6. Conclusion. 
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5.1 RESPONDENTS' BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This section analyses the character of the sample in terms of marital status, number of 
dependants and income level. 
5.1.1 MARITAL STATUS OF REDF LOAN HOLDERS 
The first question dealt with the marital status of REDF loan holders (borrowers). Table 
and Figure 5.1 present the responses, as follows: 
Table 5.1 
Marital status of REDF loan borrowers 
Marital 
status 
Value Frequency Percent 
Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Married 2 247 98.8 98.8 100 
TOTAL 2150 100 100 
Eisure 5J 
?J tfdl Sbdm of BSDF IA= Haee+awan 
256 
t, 
128 
0 
Marital status 
The first group consists of only three respondents (1.2% of the survey population) who 
were single. 
The second group consists of the vast majority of respondents (two hundred and forty- 
seven respondents, 98.8% of the survey population) who were married. In other words, 
the largest percentage of loans went to people who were married, as shown in Table and 
Figure 5.1. 
These findings may be explained by the fact that loans from the REDF are provided to 
any Saudi citizen who is twenty-one years old, or eighteen years of age and married. It 
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should be mentioned in this context that, on average, a twenty-one year old seeking an 
REDF loan would expect to wait seven years to obtain such a loan. As a result, by the 
time they receive the loan, they will be twenty-eight years of age on average, which in 
Saudi Arabia inevitably means that they are likely to be married. This is due to the 
importance of marriage in the religion and culture of Saudi Arabia where sexual 
relationships are prohibited outside marriage and religious laws encourage people to 
marry. The Prophet (pbuh) said: 
O young people: whoever among you is able to marry, should marry, and whoever is 
not able to marry, is recommended to fast, as fasting diminishes his sexual power. 
(Khan, 1985, vol. 7, p. 4) 
Another possible explanation for the above finding could be that most of the people who 
want to build homes wish to do so to shelter their families. In addition, some single 
people applying for loans could include those planning to marry in the near future. 
5.1.2 NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS OF REDF LOAN HOLDERS 
Question two studied the family size (number of dependants) of REDF loan holders. 
Most had three to six dependants (one hundred and ninety-two respondents, 76.8% of 
the survey population). However, twelve respondents (4.8% of the survey population) 
had eight dependants. In contrast, three respondents (1.2% of the survey population) had 
no dependants as they were single. A possible reason for this may be that they preferred 
to build their houses in anticipation of their marriages. 
Table 5.2 
Number of dependants of REDF loan borrowers 
Number of Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative dependants percent percent 
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Figure 5.2 
Number of Dependants of RDEF Loan Borrowers 
54 
27 
0 
Sixteen respondents (6.4% of the survey population) and twenty-seven respondents 
(10.4% of the survey population) had two and seven dependants respectively, as shown 
in Table and Figure 5.2. The average number of dependants of the families surveyed 
(borrowers) was 4.8. 
The above findings are consistent with the religion and culture of Saudi Arabia which 
encourages individuals to have large families. The Prophet (pbuh) said: 
Marry such women as are affectionate, child-producing; and verily I shall be an 
instrument in increasing your members among the nations. (Hasan, A. 1982, vol. 5, 
p. 545,546) 
5.1.3 MONTHLY INCOME OF REDF LOAN HOLDERS 
Question three relates to the data regarding monthly income level (from all sources) of 
the survey population. The monthly income groups were set to cover a range from less 
than SR 3,000 to greater than SR 9,000 at intervals of 3,000. This breakdown could 
show how the REDF loans are distributed by monthly income level. If the REDF were 
primarily reaching low income people, then there would be a higher percentage of loans 
at the top of Table 5.3. If the more wealthy respondents were primarily the recipients, 
the greater percentage would be seen at the lower end of the table. However, from Table 
and Figure 5.3 it can be seen that loans were spread across the four groups, as follows: 
103 
None Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight 
Number .f depeadasb 
Table 5.3 
Monthly income of REDF loan borrowers 
Monthly 
income (SR) 
Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Less than 3.000 1 23 9.2 9.2 9.2 
From 3000To6 2 68 27.2 27.2 36.4 
From 6.001 To 9,000 13 80 32 11 32 68.4 
More than 9000 4 79 31.6 31.6 100 
TOTAL 2 As Q 100 
Figure 5.3 
Monthly Income of REDF Loon Borrower 
78 
39 
0 
The first group consisting of only twenty-three respondents (9.2% of the survey 
population) had a monthly income of less than SR 3,000. 
The second group consisting of sixty-eight respondents (27.2% of the survey 
population) had a monthly income of between SR 3,000 and SR 6,000. 
The third group including eighty respondents (32% of the survey population) had a 
monthly income of between SR 6,001 and SR 9,000. 
The fourth group consisting of seventy-nine respondents (31.6% of the survey 
population) had a monthly income of more than SR 9,000. 
There was no significant difference in the number of cases for each income group. 
However, as can be seen from Table and Figure 5.3, the number of cases in the fourth 
group (80 cases) was almost the same as in the third group (79 cases). Respondents in 
both of these groups had a monthly income of more than SR 6,000. In addition, neither 
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the fourth group nor the third group was the minority group. As a consequence, many 
borrowers (one hundred and fifty-nine respondents, 63.6% of the survey population) had 
a monthly income of more than SR 6,000. One possible explanation could be that most 
borrowers (one hundred and seventy-five respondents, 70% of the survey population) 
had built more than one housing unit (as shown in Table and Figure 5.4), living in one 
and renting out the other(s) to increase their income. 
In conclusion, it seems to be the case that every economic group has benefited from the 
policy of the REDF, but those in the middle and higher income groups appear to have 
benefited more. 
5.2 CONSTRUCTION COST 
This section presents the findings from two questions related to construction: whether 
respondents had built one housing unit or more; and the cost of construction in the case 
of building a single unit. 
5.2.1 SINGLE OR MULTIPLE CONSTRUCTION 
The borrowers were asked whether they had built one housing unit or more. The 
responses are presented in Table and Figure 5.4, as follows: 
Table 5.4 
Did you construct more than one housing unit? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
percent percent 
V ps 1 17 _5 70 70 70 
No 75 30 30 100 
TO T, 2-% 1 100 1 100 
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Figure 5.4 
Did you Construct more than One Housing Unit? 
170 
85 
fir 
0 
The answers 
The first group consisting of one hundred and seventy-five respondents (70% of the 
survey population) said `yes'. 
The second group consisting of seventy-five respondents (30% of the survey 
population) said `no'. 
The replies revealed that a significant majority had built more than one housing unit. 
This can be explained by the fact that property is one of the best investments, as housing 
demand has greatly increased during the past decade or so, particularly since the Second 
Development Plan (1975-1980) which resulted in a great increase in foreign manpower 
requiring houses. This has led to a rise in house rental prices. Foreign companies 
contracting for project construction within certain periods must provide housing for their 
employees, whatever the rent. Hence, rental prices have become higher as the demand 
for housing has increased. In brief, a rapid population increase has created a massive 
demand for dwellings. 
Table and Figure 5.4 indicate that seventy-five respondents (30% of the survey 
population) had built only one housing unit. This is likely to be because these borrowers 
did not have enough money to build more. 
The question arises as to whether subsidised funds should be provided to those building 
more than one housing unit, when first time buyers have a long waiting period for funds. 
It can be argued that those who build housing for rent should only have access to funds 
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on commercial terms rather than subsidised loans. There is no reason why there should 
be any restriction on multiple ownership, as rented accommodation is needed, especially 
by immigrant workers, but whether it is the role of the REDF to finance such 
accommodation is more questionable. 
5.2.2 COST OF CONSTRUCTING A SINGLE HOUSING UNIT 
The questionnaire then asked the respondents who had built only one housing unit to 
indicate whether the construction cost was more than SR 429,000. The intention here 
was to ascertain whether SR 300,000 represented 70% of the construction cost, since the 
REDF grants up to 70% of the estimated home construction cost up to a maximum of 
SR 300,000. However, it should be noted here that the wording of the question was 
indirect in order to overcome the difficulties of calculation. From Table and Figure 5.4A 
it can be seen that the answers were categorised into two groups, as follows: 
Table 5.4A 
Was the construction cost more than SR 429,000? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
ercent ercent 
Yes 55 70 73.3 73.3 
No 2 20 30 26.7 100 
TOTAL 75 100 100 
Figure 4.4A 
W as töe Coostmction Coshnoce tbao SR 429,000? 
52 
Y 
° 26 
w 
0 
The answers 
The first group consists of fifty-five respondents (73.3% of the survey population who 
had built only one housing unit) whose answer was `yes'. 
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The second group consists of twenty respondents (26.7% of the survey population who 
had built only one housing unit) whose answer was `no'. 
In other words, it was found that in most cases (55 cases out of 75) the cost of 
constructing one housing unit was more than SR 429,000, of which SR 300,000 
represented 69.93%. This can be taken as clear evidence of the fact that a substantial 
portion (often around one-third) of the construction cost must be met by the borrowers 
themselves. The above finding can perhaps be explained by rising construction costs. 
These result from imported inflationary pressures, combined with those generated 
domestically which have brought about a significant rise in the cost of living in Saudi 
Arabia. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged in Saudi Arabia that increased government 
spending has tended to increase inflationary pressure. 
In the light of this finding, the policy that eligible citizens wishing to build their own 
houses should be granted up to 70% of the estimated home construction cost up to a 
maximum of SR 300,000, should be reviewed, as it may be necessary to change the 
maximum loan available. 
The issue which now arises is whether the REDF should try to cover all construction 
costs, or whether its share of housing finance should be allowed to fall as far as each 
applicant is concerned. There is a choice between funding the whole construction cost 
for fewer houses, or funding a proportion of the purchase price for a greater number. 
5.3 DELAYED REPAYMENTS 
The responses analysed in this section give an indication of the incidence of overdue loan 
repayments, and reasons for not paying on time. 
5.3.1 DELAYED ANNUAL REPAYMENTS 
Question five was important since it related to annual repayments and views about 
delays in repayment of loan instalments. Specifically, the question was: did your annual 
repayment (SR 9,600) ever get delayed? From Table and Figure 5.5 it can be seen that 
the answers were classified into two groups, as follows: 
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Table 5.5 
Did your annual repayment (SR 9,600) ever get delayed? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Yes 1 159 63.6 63.6 63.6 
No 21 1 91 1 1 36.4 36.4 100 
TOTAL 250 100 100 
Figure 5.5 
Did Your Annual Repayment (SR 9,600) 
ever get Delayed' 
154 
w 77 
rat 
0 
The answers 
The first group consisting of one hundred and fifty-nine respondents (63.6% of the 
survey population) stated they had not always been on time with their annual repayments 
of SR 9,600. 
The second group including ninety-one respondents (36.4% of the survey population) 
stated they had always been on time with their annual repayments of SR 9,600. 
In the majority of cases, the answer to this question was `yes', as can be seen in Table 
and Figure 5.5. This means that only 36.4% of the survey population were repaying the 
annual repayments of SR 9,600 regularly. This figure is surprisingly low and explains 
why the REDF is experiencing a lack of repayment and why the waiting period for 
obtaining the loan is longer for new REDF loan seekers. 
It is noteworthy that repayments are scheduled over a twenty-five year period, with no 
interest on the unpaid balance. Furthermore, to encourage the borrowers to repay their 
loans, the REDF has initiated a policy under which the borrower will be exempt for 20% 
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of the amount of each annual repayment repaid within sixty days of the due date. From 
the above findings it can be seen that the majority of respondents did not take advantage 
of this 20% discount. 
It is worth mentioning that some borrowers used their loans to buy other things, rather 
than to build houses. This may be due partly to a low educational level and a lack of 
information about the REDF, but it could also indicate that borrowers are deliberately 
abusing the system. In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, some action should be 
taken to protect the REDF against recipients who carelessly default and take advantage 
of generous government grants and a long legal process, at the expense of granting 
needed loans to new seekers (Nassier, 1991,137). In addition, such action would be in 
line with the long-term goal of the REDF to become a self-sustaining programme under 
which loan repayments would be used as paid-in capital to continue financing other 
loans. 
5.3.2 THE REASONS FOR DELAYING THE ANNUAL REPAYMENTS 
Respondents who had delayed their annual repayment (SR 9,600) were asked to indicate 
their reasons for this. The answers were divided into three groups, namely: could not 
repay, forgot to repay and both of these. The responses are presented in Table and 
Figure 5.5A, as follows: 
Table 5.5A 
Reasons for delaying the annual repayments 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
percent percent 
I could not repay 
and I forgot to repay 
3 26 16.4 16.4 100 
I-- TOTAL 159 100 100 
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Figure 5.5A 
Reasons for Delay the Annual Repayments 
92 
46 
0 
The first group composed of over one-fifth of respondents who had delayed their 
annual repayment (thirty-eight respondents, 23.9% of the survey population who had 
delayed their annual repayment). This group said they could not repay. 
The second group consisting of nearly three-fifths of respondents who had delayed their 
annual repayment (ninety-five respondents, 59.7% of the survey population who had 
delayed their annual repayment). This group said they forgot to repay. 
The third group including twenty-six respondents (16.4% of the survey population who 
had delayed their annual repayment). This group said that sometimes they could not 
repay and sometimes they forgot to repay. 
Thus, it is clear from Table 5.5A that the most common reason given for late repayment 
was forgetting to repay (about 121 cases out of 159,76.1% of the survey population 
who had delayed their annual repayment). Therefore, there is a need for the REDF 
authorities to make regular follow-up visits/letters, etc. to remind borrowers of their 
responsibility. Such information may be very helpful in providing appropriate solutions in 
an attempt to overcome this difficulty. 
Another way to overcome the problem of repayments being overlooked, would be to 
introduce a system of monthly repayment by direct debit, which would take the worry 
out of repaying the annual repayment (SR 9,600) by spreading the instalment over the 
year (SR 9,600 / 12 = 800 SR per month). This automatically raises the question of 
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whether the borrowers like the idea of repaying by monthly direct debit. This is 
addressed in the next section. 
5.4 REPAYMENT BY MONTHLY DIRECT DEBIT 
This section considers respondents' views on monthly direct debit as a method of loan 
repayment. It also explores whether they might be prepared to increase the direct debit 
payment in order to reduce the repayment period and obtain a larger discount. 
5.4.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS MONTHLY DIRECT DEBIT 
Question six tried to ascertain the respondents' attitudes towards monthly direct debits. 
Table 5.6 gives details of the respondents' answers, which were, as follows: 
Table 5.6 
Would you prefer to repay your annual repayment 
by monthly direct debit? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid` Cumulative 
Figure 5.6 
Would You Prefer to Repay Your Annual Instalment 
by Monthly Direct Debit? 
250 
125 
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The answers 
The positive answer was given by two hundred and forty-one respondents (96.4% of 
the survey population) who ticked the `yes' box. 
The negative answer was given by nine respondents (3.6% of the survey population) 
who ticked the `no' box. 
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It was very encouraging to find that the vast majority of the respondents (two hundred 
and forty-one respondents, 96.4% of the survey population) were in favour of repaying 
monthly instalments of SR 800 rather than repaying the whole SR 9,600 in a single 
annual repayment, as shown in Table and Figure 5.6. In addition, this would reduce a 
problem experienced by the REDF. 
Thus, as expected, the overwhelming majority of respondents would like the REDF to 
deduct repayments directly from their monthly salary cheques or from their bank. As a 
result, nearly all of the respondents would be able to take advantage of the REDF's 20% 
discount on timely repayments. This finding shows beyond doubt that the best method 
for repayment of the total annual requirement of SR 9,600 is by monthly direct debit. It 
would also prove advantageous for the REDF since the total repayments would be 
increased. 
5.4.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF EACH 
MONTHLY INSTALMENT 
In an attempt to achieve further improvement in REDF services, borrowers were also 
asked to indicate their attitudes towards increasing the amount of each monthly 
instalment. The scheme put forward for their consideration was to repay the annual 
repayment with an exemption of 20% (i. e. 12,000 * 20% = 9,600 SR) plus the value of 
one instalment prior to the due date with an exemption of 30% (i. e. 12,000 * 30% = 
8,400 SR) by monthly direct debit { Le. [ (9,600 + 8,400) / 12] = 18,000 / 12 = 1,500 SR 
per month}. From Table and Figure 5.7 it can be seen that the answers were combined in 
two groups, as follows: 
Table 5.7 
Would you prefer to repay your annual repayment (SR 9,600) 
and the value of one instalment prior 
to the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Yes 1 207 82.8 82.8 82.8 
No 2 43 17.2 17.2 100 
TOTAL 250 100 100 
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Figure 5.7 
Would You Prefer to Repay Your Annual Repayment(SR 9,600) 
and the Value of One Instalment Prior to the Due Date(SR 8,400) 
by Monthly Direct Debit? 
Yes No 
The answers 
The first group consisting of two hundred and seven respondents (82.8% of the survey 
population) said they would prefer to repay their loans by this method. 
The second group composed of forty-three respondents (17.2% of the survey 
population) who said they would not prefer to repay their loans by this method. In other 
words, they were not in any hurry to repay what they had borrowed. They were either 
willing to take up to the full twenty-five year term to repay the loan amount or they 
belonged to the low income category, and so could not afford larger repayments. 
From the above findings, it can be concluded that the vast majority of respondents would 
prefer to repay two instalments by this method. If they did so, their loans would be 
repayable over 12 to 13 years instead of 25 years. This finding supports the previous 
findings. On this basis, it can be deduced that monthly direct debit is the best method of 
repayment for both borrowers and REDF, and that an accelerated repayment option 
would be taken up by many borrowers. 
5.5 RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS PROMPT 
REPAYMENT 
Finally, and most importantly for this research, borrowers were asked about their 
awareness of the fact that their repayment would reduce the waiting period for obtaining 
loans for those who seek REDF loans. From Table and Figure 5.8 it can be seen that the 
answers were combined in five groups, as follows: 
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Table 5.8 
Respondents' opinions regarding the following statement: 
Your prompt repayment would reduce the waiting period for those 
who seek loans 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Stronviv Agree 1 33 13.2 13.2 
Ae 2 77 30.8 30.8 44 
Undetermined 3 63 25.2 25.2 69.2 
Disa ree 4 63 25.2 25.2 94.4 
-Strowzlv 
Disa ree 5 14 5.6 5.6 100 
Figure 5.8 
Respondents' Opinions Regarding the Following Statement: 
Your Repayment Would Reduce the Waiting Period 
forThose who Seek Loan. 
74 
37 
GT. 
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The first group consisting of thirty-three respondents (13.2% of the survey population), 
stated that they strongly agreed with the statement. 
The second group comprised seventy-seven respondents (30.8% of the survey 
population), stated that they agreed with the statement. 
The third group including sixty-three respondents (25.2% of the survey population), 
stated that they had no opinion, so they were marked undetermined. 
The fourth group containing sixty-three respondents (25.2% of the survey population), 
stated that they disagreed with the statement. 
The fifth group consisting of fourteen respondents (5.6% of the survey population), 
stated that they strongly disagreed with the statement. 
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It was found that a total of one hundred and ten respondents (44% of the survey 
population) strongly agreed or agreed with the statement. However, almost a third of the 
respondents (seventy-seven respondents, 30.8% of the survey population) strongly 
disagreed or disagreed with the statement. The remaining respondents (sixty-three 
respondents, 25.2% of the survey population) had no opinion and indicated 
`Undetermined'. 
In general, it appears from the findings that, regarding repayment of the loan in question 
8, over half of the respondents (140 cases out of 250,56% of the survey population) 
indicated that they strongly disagreed, disagreed or were undetermined (see Table and 
Figure 5.8). It seems that many do not feel that they have any responsibility or duty to 
repay their loans at the stipulated time. In order to overcome this problematic attitude, 
the findings support the need to indicate clearly and simply in the loan agreement that 
strong action will be taken in the case of a delay in repayment. This is an important topic 
since repayments are used as paid-in capital to enable the financing of new loans. Above 
all, shorter periods of repayment may be introduced to satisfy the private sector's 
anxiety and to help achieve a quick cash turnover. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has revealed that the majority of REDF borrowers are married, with 
moderately large families. They are spread across all income groups, though middle and 
higher income groups appear to have benefited more than those of low income. Seventy 
per cent had built more than one housing unit, suggesting that REDF loans are being 
used to finance investment projects. Those who built only one unit were meeting a 
substantial portion of the cost from their own resources, raising the question of whether 
the loan should be increased (and fewer loans made) or whether the REDF should allow 
its share of construction cost per unit to fall, in order to serve more applicants. A large 
proportion of respondents had failed to meet repayments on time. 
There are a number of reasons which have contributed to the low rate of repayment, 
such as inability to repay, forgetting to repay and the carelessness of borrowers who do 
not feel there is any responsibility to repay their loans on time. Monthly direct debits 
could resolve the first two reasons for the problem of late repayment, while clear 
information and warnings of strong action could help change the attitudes of borrowers. 
If these methods are used in combination, it should be possible for the waiting period for 
obtaining a loan to be reduced. 
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The question now arises: would the loan seekers, who will be the borrowers of the 
future, agree with these measures? Further discussion of this issue will be left for the 
next chapter which presents the findings from the loan seekers' sample. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSES OF REDF 
LOAN SEEKERS 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings of the survey administered to those who seek REDF 
loans. Its aim is to study their responses and analyse their attitudes towards certain 
financial matters. The questions used may be divided into five groups, as follows: 
The first group consists of the first six questions which relate to background 
information on the respondents. The first one deals with marital status, while the second 
one deals with the number of dependants. Question three relates to the income level of 
the respondent surveyed. Question four asks whether or not the respondent is facing any 
housing problems. Question five asks whether or not the respondent has applied for an 
REDF loan. Finally, question five (A) asks those who have not applied for an REDF 
loan, their reason(s) for not doing so. 
The second group is made up of three questions which relate to the respondents' ability 
to repay more in order to obtain some advantage, such as a reduction of the waiting 
period or a greater discount. These questions are 6,6A and 6B. 
The third group consists of only one question, which asks the respondents to indicate 
their opinions concerning whether or not strong action should be taken in order to 
prevent overdue annual repayments. 
The fourth group is composed of three questions which attempt to ascertain the 
respondents' attitudes toward increasing the REDF loan and the amount of annual 
repayment. 
The fifth group contains the last six questions which investigate respondents' attitudes 
towards interest loans and Islamic housing financing methods. They can be sub- 
categorised as follows: 
(a) Interest loans questions, consisting of two questions: 11 and 11A. 
(b) Islamic housing financing methods questions, consisting of four questions: 12, 
12A, 13 and 14. However, each of the last two questions is divided into two 
questions: 13A and 14A. 
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This chapter is, therefore, divided into sections, corresponding to these groups of related 
questions. Frequency and percentage tables are provided for each question. The final 
section will present the conclusion. Therefore, the main sections of this chapter are 
headed as follows: 
6.1 Respondents' background information. 
6.2 The ability to increase repayment. 
6.3 Attitudes towards action against overdue repayments. 
6.4 Attitudes towards alternative schemes. 
6.5 Attitudes towards loans involving interest and Islamic housing financing methods. 
6.6 Conclusion. 
6.1 RESPONDENTS' BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This section analyses the personal background data obtained from the questionnaire 
including family circumstances, income, housing problems and whether or not the 
respondent has applied for an REDF loan. 
6.1.1 MARITAL STATUS OF REDF LOAN SEEKERS 
The first question deals with the marital status of REDF loan seekers. From Table and 
Figure 6.1 it can be seen that the answers were as follows: 
Table 6.1 
Marital status of REDF loan seekers 
Marital Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Soncyle 1 59 23.6 23.6 23.6 
Married 2 191 76.4 76.4 100 
TnTAT, 250 100 100 
Fly, 6.1 
Markel Sdtm of REDF Lou Sin 
186 
a v 93 
0 
Marital status 
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Single Married 
The first group consists of fifty-nine single respondents (23.6% of the survey 
population). 
The second group consists of one hundred and ninety-one married respondents (76.4% 
of the survey population). 
As expected, the majority of the respondents were married. In other words, the largest 
percentage of REDF loans will go to people who are married, as shown in Table and 
Figure 6.1. These findings may be explained by the fact that private loans from REDF 
are provided to any Saudi citizen who is either twenty-one years old, or eighteen years 
of age and married (see page 20). It should be mentioned in this context that in the case 
of a potential borrower who is twenty-one years old, he must own a site upon which to 
build against the mortgage of land and has obtained municipal permission (see page 20). 
Hence, the home ownership programme is limited to land owners with municipal 
permission to build, as conditions for REDF loan applications. As a result of this and the 
considerable rise in land prices, the lower-income level citizen cannot take advantage of 
the credit system available. Many individuals wait until they have saved the money 
required to buy a plot of land. On average this takes seven years, at which time they 
immediately apply for an REDF loan. As a result, the average age of loan seekers is 
twenty-eight years, by which age most Saudi men are married. This is due to the 
importance of marriage in the religion and culture of Saudi Arabia, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Another possible explanation for the above finding could be that most 
of the people who want to build houses do so to provide shelter for their families. 
On the other hand, a minority of respondents were single. This number (fifty-nine) is 
greater than the number of single people in the borrowers group (only three 
respondents). The number of single people in the loan seekers group was nearly twenty 
times the number of single people in the borrowers group. One possible explanation for 
this could be that the average age of the borrowers group is twenty-eight years, by which 
age Saudi citizens are usually married, as previously mentioned. However, the loan 
seekers, by definition, have not yet received a loan and are, therefore, more likely to be 
younger on average, and thus single. Consequently, the number of single respondents in 
the loan seekers group exceeds the number of single respondents in the borrowers group. 
6.1.2 NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS OF REDF LOAN SEEKERS 
Studying the family size (number of dependants) of REDF loan seekers, from Table and 
Figure 6.2 it can be seen that the answers were as follows: 
120 
Table 6.2 
Number of dependants of REDE loan seekers 
Number of 
de endants 
Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
None 0 59 23.6 23.6 23.6 
One 1 4 1.6 1.6 25.2 
Two 2 25 10 10 35.2 
Three 3 33 13.2 13.2 48.4 
Four 4 41 16.4 16.4 64.8 
Five 5 43 17.2 17.2 82 
Six 6 25 10 10 92 
Seven 7 10 4 4 96 
Eiizht 8 9 3.6 3.6 99.6 
Nine 9 1 0.4 0.4 100 
L TOTA L 250 100 100 
Figure 6.2 
Number of Dependants of REDF Loan Seeken 
56 
28 
0 
Fifty-nine respondents (23.6% of the survey population) had no dependants, as they 
were single. So the most frequent number of dependants recorded was zero. A possible 
reason for this may be that they hoped to build their houses before marriage. In contrast, 
one respondent (0.4% of the survey population) had nine dependants and nine 
respondents (3.6% of the survey population) had eight dependants. The second greatest 
number had between two and six dependants. Furthermore, forty-three respondents 
(17.2% of the survey population) had five dependants. Ten respondents (4% of the 
survey population) had seven dependants. In brief, the average number of dependants of 
the Saudi families surveyed in the loan seekers group was 3.3. The above findings are 
very similar to the average number of dependants of the Saudi families surveyed in the 
borrowers group, i. e. 4.8 dependants (see page 103). However, the average number of 
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dependants of those in the borrowers group was greater than that of the loan seekers 
group. This could be explained by the following: 
(a) The number of single people in the loan seekers group (59) was nearly twenty 
times the number of single people in the borrowers group (3); thus, the average 
number of dependants would immediately be reduced. 
(b) Loan seekers were on average younger than the borrowers, as previously 
mentioned. Accordingly, the number of children of the former group would be 
less, on average, than the number of children of the latter group. Hence, there is a 
positive correlation between the age of the individual and the number of his 
children. 
6.1.3 MONTHLY INCOME OF REDF LOAN SEEKERS 
Question three sought to ascertain the economic status of REDF loan seekers, expressed 
in terms of monthly income level (from all sources) of the survey population. The 
income groups varied from less than SR 3,000 per month to greater than SR 9,000 per 
month. Intervals of SR 3,000 were used to divide the respondents. This breakdown 
shows the distribution of applicants by income level. If REDF loans primarily attract low 
income people, then there should be a higher percentage of applicants at the top of Table 
6.3, and the converse is also true. From Table and Figure 6.3 it can be seen that the 
answers were combined in four groups, as follows: 
Table 6.3 
Monthly income of REDF loan seekers 
Monthly 
income (SRI 
Value Frequency Percent Valid 
nercent 
Cumulative 
cent 
Less than 3.000 1 25 10 10 10 
From 3000To6000 2 88 35.2 35.2 45.2 
From 6001 To 9000 3 76 30.4 30.4 75.6 
More than 9 000 4 61 24.4 24.4 100 
TOTAL 250 100 ion 
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Figure 6.3 
Monthly Income of REDF Loan Seekers 
86 
43 
wL 
0 
The first group consisting of only twenty-five respondents (10% of the survey 
population), had a monthly income of less than SR 3,000. 
The second group consisting of eighty-eight respondents (35.2% of the survey 
population), had a monthly income of between SR 3,000 and SR 6,000. 
The third group consisting of seventy-six respondents (30.4% of the survey 
population), had a monthly income of between SR 6,001 and SR 9,000. 
The fourth group consisting of sixty-one respondents (24.4% of the survey population), 
had a monthly income of more than SR 9,000. 
As Table and Figure 6.3 show, the number of cases in the third group (76) is almost 
three times the number in the first group (25). However, the first group is the minority 
group, whereas, the greatest number of respondents is in the second group. This means 
that the greatest number of respondents (65.6% of the survey population) had a monthly 
income of between SR 3,000 and SR 9,000. The third group is in second position with 
30.4%. Nearly a quarter of the survey population (24.4% of the survey population) were 
in the top income bracket (more than SR 9,000). 
The above findings show that respondents from all income groups are interested in 
seeking REDF loans. Furthermore, these findings support the claim that this survey has 
been conducted in such a way that all economic groups were represented in the sample. 
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6.1.4 FACING A HOUSING PROBLEM 
The REDF loan seekers were asked whether or not they were facing any housing 
problems. From Table and Figure 6.4 it can be seen that the answers were combined in 
two groups as follows: 
Table 6.4 
Are you facing a housing problem? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Yes 1 160 64 
No 2 90 36 36 100 
TOTAL 1 1 250 11 00 00 1 100 too I 
Figure 6.4 
Are You Facing a Housing Problem? 
156 
78 
ä4 
0 
The answers 
The first group consists of one hundred and sixty respondents, 64% of the survey 
population who said `yes'. This group represents over three-fifths of the survey 
population, that is, the majority of respondents. 
It should be pointed out that housing problems can take one of the following forms: 
(a) The housing unit is too small. 
(b) The housing unit is too old. 
(c) The housing unit does not have the necessary facilities, e. g. modem toilet and 
sewage network, etc. 
(d) The rent of the housing unit is too high. 
The above findings are probably due to the increased housing demand over the last few 
years, especially since the waiting period has become very long. The REDF's policy 
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Yes No 
should be adapted to take this situation into account, reduce the waiting period for 
obtaining a loan, and thus help meet the country's demand for housing. 
The second group consists of ninety respondents (36% of the survey population) who 
said `no'. However, this does not necessarily mean that they do not wish to take 
advantage of an REDF loan. It could mean that the majority of them are single and live 
with their parents, in which case they will be planning to marry in the near future. 
Another possible explanation for the above findings could be that most of the people 
who answered negatively had fewer dependants than the others or had a monthly income 
high enough to enable them to rent a suitable house. 
6.1.5 APPLICATION FOR AN REDF LOAN 
The questionnaire, then, asked the respondents to indicate whether or not they had 
applied for an REDF loan. 
Table 6.5 
Have you applied for an REDF loan? 
Response ue Frequency Percent 
Valid 
percent 
L Cumulative 
percent 
Yes 156 62.4 62.4 62-4 
No 2 94 37.6 37.6 100 
TOTAL 250 100 100 
Figure 6.5 
Have You Applied for an REDF Loan? 
152 
1 76 
0 
The answers 
From Table and Figure 6.5 it can be seen that the answers were divided into two groups, 
as follows: 
The first group consists of one hundred and fifty-six respondents (62.4% of the survey 
population) who had already applied. 
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The second group consists of ninety-four respondents (37.6% of the survey population) 
who had not applied. In other words, the majority of the respondents had already applied 
for an REDF loan and were on the waiting list. 
Cases where the answer was `no', were sub-divided into three groups as can be seen in 
Table and Figure 6.5A. 
6.1.5.1 REASONS FOR NOT APPLYING FOR AN REDF LOAN 
Question 5A is important since it relates to the reason for not applying for an REDF 
loan. The responses are presented in Table and Figure 6.5A, as follows: 
Table 6.5A 
Why have you not applied for an REDF loan? 
Valid Cumulative Response Value Frequency Percent 
percent percent 
I do not own 
a Mat af land 
1 91 96.8 96.8 96.8 
The waiting period 2 2 2 1 2 1 98.9 is too lon . . 
Insufficient 
3 1 1.1 1.1 100 
monev 
A 94 100 100 
Figure 6.5A 
Why Have You not Applied for 
an REDF Loan? 
94 
v 
47 
0 
The reasons 
The first group consists of ninety-one respondents (96.8% of those who had not applied 
for an REDF loan). They had not applied for a loan because they did not own a plot of 
land. 
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The second group is composed of two respondents (2.1% of those who had not applied 
for an REDF loan). They had not applied for a loan because the waiting period for 
obtaining a loan is too long. 
The third group included only one respondent (1.1% of those who had not applied for 
an REDF loan). He had not applied for a loan because he did not have sufficient money. 
As the REDF grants up to 70% of the estimated home construction cost, to a maximum 
of SR 300,000, the choice of the third reason implies that the respondent cannot save, or 
arrange to borrow privately, the remaining 30% of the construction cost. 
According to Table 6.5A, almost all the respondents who had not applied for an REDF 
loan said they had not done so because they did not own a plot of land. Hence, they did 
not meet the condition for an REDF loan application. This was due to the fact that a 
potential borrower must own a plot of land upon which to build, with a municipal permit 
within the city boundaries. In other words, the REDF loan programme is limited to land 
owners with a municipal permission to build (see page 20). 
One possible reason for not owning a plot of land could be the considerable rise in the 
price of residential land in the cities, which prevents many poor individuals from buying 
land and thus taking advantage of this programme. 
To sum up briefly, the land ownership condition for REDF loan application was what 
prevented the overwhelming majority of respondents, who had not applied for an REDF 
loan, from taking advantage of the credit system available. 
One method of overcoming this difficulty would be for the government to distribute land 
without payment, on condition that housing be built within a certain period from the date 
of hand-over. Another possible solution could be that a bank or a government 
establishment should have land available at reasonable prices on which housing units 
could be built, with all necessary services. Fund accounts could be opened for those who 
are in need of housing and who might be able, within a certain period, to obtain land 
plots varying in size, at a price agreed at the outset. The remainder would be repayable 
in the form of monthly repayments. 
It should be mentioned in this context that some citizens have been forced to seek cheap 
residential plots outside the municipality boundaries which lack most essential public 
services, in the hope of utilities being provided for them at a later date. This was due to 
the following: 
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1. Requirement of land ownership to qualify for an REDF loan application. 
2. Prices of residential land in the cities have increased substantially in recent years 
and land speculation is growing. 
This has caused some difficulties for the municipality, a major one being rapid expansion 
of government expenditure on physical infrastructure projects such as provision of public 
services and basic networks. Therefore, during the Second Five-Year Development Plan 
(1975-1980) the Saudi economy substantially improved its infrastructure through 
massive investments in physical and social overhead capital for sustained economic 
growth. 
At this point, it should be stressed that there is vacant land within the city boundaries. 
Possible explanations for this could be the following: 
1. There is no compulsion on a land owner to develop his land within a certain time. 
2. There are no taxes imposed on vacant lots within the city boundaries. 
It is also worth mentioning that, in an attempt to overcome this difficulty, the MMRA 
has envisaged the preparation of plots of land with all the necessary services for 
distribution to those who are in need of housing in various parts of the Kingdom. This 
would enable them to build houses for themselves. This has yet to be implemented, 
however, as the necessary infrastructure is not yet in place. 
Returning to the reasons given for not applying for an REDF loan, Table 6.5A shows 
that two respondents said the waiting period for obtaining a loan is too long, as they 
would have to wait for more than nine years to obtain the loan. In contrast, when the 
REDF began operating in 1975, it took less than six months for applicants to obtain a 
loan. For this reason, the number of private loans taken out registered a notable decline 
of about 81% from 47,063 loans in 1976 to 8,867 loans in 1992. 
However, from the above findings it can be seen that the overwhelming majority of 
respondents (ninety-two respondents, 97.9% of the survey population who had not 
applied for an REDF loan) were not immediately concerned about the waiting period. 
One possible explanation could be that REDF loans are extended without bearing costs 
or charges. In addition, these loans are repayable in twenty-five annual instalments. This 
means the amount paid annually to cover the cost of building a house to one's own 
specification is less than the annual rental value of a similar house. 
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The third reason given for not applying for a REDF loan was insufficient money. 
However, only one respondent chose this answer, as the table shows. It should also be 
noted here that the overwhelming majority of respondents who had not applied for an 
REDF loan were not primarily concerned about the third reason. This is probably due to 
the fact that: 
1. The waiting period for obtaining an REDF loan is very long, so potential applicants 
do not know how much they would be able to save during this period. 
2. The REDF loans are extended without bearing costs or charges and are repayable in 
twenty-five annual instalments. 
3. There is no action taken if an applicant decides not to obtain the loan. 
In conclusion, the main reason given for not applying for a REDF loan was not owning a 
plot of land. 
6.2 ABILITY TO INCREASE REPAYMENT 
If applicants were willing and able to increase payments in exchange for some benefit, 
the availability of capital to the REDF would be greatly improved, enabling it to serve 
more applicants. Accordingly, applicants were asked about this possibility. 
6.2.1 ABILITY TO REPAY THE ANNUAL REPAYMENT WITHOUT 
DISCOUNT 
The respondents were asked if they could repay the annual instalment without discount 
in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining the REDF loan. The answers were 
divided into two groups, as follows: 
Table 6.6 
Could you repay the annual instalment (SR. 12,000) without discount 
in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining the loan? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Yes 1 224 89.6 89.6 89.6 
No 2 26 10.4 10.4 100 
TOTAL 250 100 100 f -1 
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Figure 6.6 
Could You Repay the Annual Instalment (SR 12,000) without Oscount 
in order to Reduce the Waiting Period for Obtaining the Loan? 
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The answers 
The first group consisting of two hundred and twenty-four respondents (89.6% of the 
survey population) said that they could. 
The second group consisting of twenty-six respondents (10.4% of the survey 
population) said that they could not. A possible explanation for this could be one of the 
following: 
(a) They could not repay without discount since they belonged to the low income 
category or they had heavy financial obligations, such as a large number of 
dependants. 
(b) They could wait in order to get discount since they: 
1. were single and lived with their parents; 
2. had fewer dependants than the others; therefore, their housing problems were not 
so urgent. 
To sum up briefly, it was found that the vast majority of the respondents preferred to 
repay the annual instalment without discount in order to reduce the waiting period for 
obtaining an REDF loan (see Table and Figure 6.6). This could be taken as evidence that 
current REDF policies are not adequate for today's societal conditions. In addition, many 
of these policies appear to be out of date and were intended to meet conditions that may 
no longer exist. 
The group of respondents who answered yes to question six were then sub-divided into 
five groups, according to their responses to questions 6A and 6B. These responses are 
analysed in the following sub-section. 
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6.2.2 ABILITY TO INCREASE ANNUAL REPAYMENT IN ORDER TO 
REDUCE THE WAITING PERIOD 
In an attempt to achieve further improvement in REDF repayments, the questionnaire 
then asked those respondents who answered affirmatively to question six to indicate the 
extent to which they would be prepared to increase their annual repayment in order to 
reduce the waiting period for obtaining a loan. In other words, the aim of this question 
was to discover how many instalments they could afford to repay to reduce the waiting 
period for obtaining an REDF loan. Thus, five different options were offered: 
(a) One instalment (i. e. 12,000 SR); the waiting period would be nine years and the 
monthly repayment would be (12,000 / 12) = 1,000 SR. 
(b) Two instalments (i. e. 2x 12,000 = 24,0000 SR); the waiting period would be 
seven years and the monthly repayment would be (24,000 / 12) = 2,000 SR. 
(c) Three instalments (Le. 3 x12,000 = 36,000 SR); the waiting period would be five 
years and the monthly repayment would be (36,000 / 12) = 3,000 SR. 
(d) Four instalments (i. e. 4 x12,000 = 48,000 SR); the waiting period would be three 
years and the monthly repayment would be (48,000 / 12) = 4,000 SR 
(e) Five instalments (i. e. 5x 12,000 = 60,000 SR); the waiting period would be one 
year and the monthly repayment would be (60,000 / 12) = 5,000 SR 
However, it may be noted that in the questionnaire sheet (Appendix A) the question was 
phrased differently in order to overcome the difficulties of calculation and to be more 
specific. Hence, the question was: how much could you repay in order to reduce the 
waiting period for obtaining the loan as follows: 
(a) SR 1,000 monthly and the waiting period =9 years. 
(b) SR 2,000 monthly and the waiting period =7 years. 
(c) SR 3,000 monthly and the waiting period =5 years. 
(d) SR 4,000 monthly and the waiting period =3 years. 
(e) SR 5,000 monthly and the waiting period =1 year. 
From Table and Figure 6.6A it can be seen that the answers were combined in five 
groups, as follows: 
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Table 6.6A 
How much could you repay in order to reduce 
the waiting period of the loan, as follows: 
Valid Cumulative 
Response Value Frequency Percent 
ercent percent 
SR 1,000 monthly, 
the waiting period 1 28 12.5 12.5 12.5 
=9 ears 
SR 2,000 monthly, 
the waiting period 2 54 24.1 24.1 36.6 
=7 years 
SR 3,000 monthly, 
the waiting period 3 60 26.8 26.8 63.4 
=5 ears 
SR 4,000 monthly, 
the waiting period 4 54 24.1 24.1 87.5 
=3 ears 
SR 5,000 monthly, 
the waiting period 5 28 12.5 12.5 100 
=1 year I I - 
+ 
Table 6.6A 
How much could you repay in order to reduce 
the waiting period of the loan, as follows: 
58 
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The first group consisted of twenty-eight respondents (12.5% of the survey population 
who could increase the annual instalment). These respondents stated that they could 
repay SR 1,000 monthly, in order to obtain the loan nine years after the date of receipt 
of the application form. 
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The second group consisted of fifty-four respondents (24.1% of the survey population 
who could increase the annual instalment). These respondents stated that they could 
repay SR 2,000 monthly, in order to obtain the loan seven years after the date of receipt 
of the application form. 
The third group included sixty respondents (26.8% of the survey population who could 
increase the annual instalment). These respondents stated that they could repay SR 
3,000. monthly, in order to obtain the loan five years after the date of receipt of the 
application form. 
The fourth group contained fifty-four respondents (24.1% of the survey population 
who could increase the annual instalment). These respondents stated that they could 
repay SR 4,000 monthly, in order to obtain the loan three years after the date of receipt 
of the application form. 
The fifth group consisted of twenty-eight respondents (12.5% of the survey population 
who could increase the annual instalment). These respondents stated that they could 
repay SR 5,000 monthly, in order to obtain the loan one year after the date of receipt of 
the application form. 
As Table 6.6A shows, the majority of the respondents would preferred the third option. 
This means that the highest percentage of respondents could repay SR 3,000 monthly. 
On the other hand, the first and fifth groups represent the lowest percentage. In other 
words, the first and fifth groups were the minority groups. Table 6.6A also shows that 
almost a quarter of respondents who could increase the annual instalment stated that 
they could repay SR 2,000 monthly. This is the same as the percentage of respondents 
who could repay SR 4,000 monthly. Statistically speaking, the mean, median and mode 
of the answers to this question are equal to three. Hence, the skewness is equal to zero. 
In conclusion, most of the respondents (one hundred and ninety-six respondents, 87.5% 
of the survey population who could increase the annual instalment) stated that they 
could repay more than one instalment annually, without discount, in order to reduce the 
waiting period for obtaining an REDF loan. However, the amount of monthly repayment 
preferred varied from SR 1,000 to SR 5,000 at intervals of SR 1,000 for each group. 
These differences may be explained by the variations of income and the size of the 
housing problem being faced. 
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The above breakdown shows how the repayment could be collected if the REDF used 
this policy rather than the present one. It is clear that the proposed policy would be 
advantageous for the REDF since the total repayments would be increased. Hence, the 
present policy should be revised so as to enable every applicant to decide how much he 
wishes to repay in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining the loan. Moreover, 
this policy is in line with the long-term goal of the REDF to become a self-sustaining 
programme in which the loan repayments would be used as paid-in capital in order to 
continue financing new borrowers. 
6.2.3 ABILITY TO INCREASE ANNUAL REPAYMENT IN ORDER TO 
OBTAIN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DISCOUNT 
Along the same line as the previous question, question 6B explored another way of 
achieving further improvement in REDF services by increasing the number of payment 
options offered, in order to increase the amount of repayments. The questionnaire, then, 
asked the respondents who could repay the annual instalment without discount in order 
to reduce the waiting period for obtaining an REDF loan, to indicate their attitudes 
towards increasing their repayment by varying amounts, in order to obtain different 
levels of discount. The following options were given: 
(a) One instalment (SR 12,000 annually) without discount. Consequently, the 
monthly repayment would be (12,000 / 12 ) =1,000 SR. 
(b) Two instalments (2 x 12,000 = 24,000 SR) to get 5% discount (i. e. 24,000 x 0.05 
= 1,200 SR). Therefore, the annual repayment would be 24,000 - 1,200 = 22,800 
SR. Consequently, the monthly repayment would be (22,800 / 12) =1,900 SR. 
(c) Three instalments (3 x 12,000 = 36,000 SR) to get 10% discount (i. e. 36,000 x 
0.1 = 3,600 SR). Therefore, the annual repayment would be 36,000 - 3,600 = 
32,400 SR. Consequently, the monthly repayment would be (32,400 / 12) = 2,700 
SR 
(d) Four instalments (4 x 12,000 = 48,000 SR) to get 15% discount (i. e. 48,000 x 
0.15 = 7,200 SR). Therefore, the annual repayment would be 48,000 - 7,200 = 
40,800 SR. Consequently, the monthly repayment would be (40,800 / 12) =3,400 
SR 
(e) Five instalments (5 x 12,000 = 60,000 SR) to get 20% discount (i. e. 60,000 x 0.2 
= 12,000 SR). Therefore, the annual repayment would be 60,000 - 12,000 = 
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48,000 SR. Consequently, the monthly repayment would be (48,000 / 12) _ 
4,000 SR. 
It should be noted at this point that the repayment amounts, that is, the annual 
instalments, were calculated specifically on the questionnaire sheet (Appendix A). This 
was done in order to overcome difficulties of calculation and to be more specific. Hence, 
the question was, "How many instalments could you repay together in order to get 
discount as follows: " 
(a) One instalment = SR 1,000 monthly (i. e. 0% discount). 
(b) Two instalments = SR 1,900 monthly (i. e. 5% discount). 
(c) Three instalments = SR 2,700 monthly (i. e. 10% discount). 
(d) Four instalments = SR 3,400 monthly (i. e. 15% discount). 
(e) Five instalments = SR 4,000 monthly (i. e. 20% discount). 
From Table and Figure 6.6B it can be seen that the answers were combined in five 
groups as follows: 
Table 6.6B 
How many instalments could you repay 
together in order to obtain discount, as follows? 
Response Value Frequency Percent 
Valid Cumulative 
percent percent 
SR 1,000 monthly 
=0 (discount 
1 41 18.3 18.3 18.3 
SR 1,900 monthly 
discount = 5% 
2 51 22.8 22.8 41.1 
SR 2,700 monthly 
(discount = 10/o 
3 47 21 21 62.1 
SR 3,400 monthly 
discount =15% 
4 35 15.6 15.6 77.7 
SR 4,000 monthly 
discount = 20%) 
5 50 22.3 22.3 100 
TOTAL 224 100 100 
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Figure 6.6B 
How Many Instalments Could You 
Repay Together in order to Obtain Discount as Follows? 
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The answers 
The first group consisted of forty-one respondents (18.3% of the relevant population). 
They stated that they could repay SR 1,000 monthly. In other words, they could repay 
one annual instalment without discount. 
The second group consisted of fifty-one respondents (22.8% of the relevant 
population). They stated that they could repay SR 1,900 monthly. Therefore, they could 
repay two annual instalments in order to obtain a discount of 5%. 
The third group included forty-seven respondents (21% of the relevant population). 
They stated that they could repay SR 2,700 monthly. Therefore, they could repay three 
annual instalments in order to obtain a discount of 10%. 
The fourth group contained thirty-five respondents (15.6% of the relevant population). 
They stated that they could repay SR 3,400 monthly. In other words, they could repay 
four annual instalments in order to obtain a discount of 15%. 
The fifth group consisted of fifty respondents (22.3% of the relevant population). They 
stated that they could repay SR 4,000 monthly. In other words, they could repay five 
annual instalments in order to obtain a discount of 20%. 
It is clear from the above table that the second option (SR 1,900 monthly) has the largest 
number in the frequency column. In addition, this number (fifty-one cases) is marginally 
bigger than the number of cases that chose the fifth option (fifty cases). To put it more 
simply, it was found that the highest percentage of respondents was in the second and 
fifth groups respectively. The first group (forty-one cases) held the third position, 
136 
SR 1,900 SR 2,700 SR 3,400 SR 4,000 
(the discount =05%) (the discount =10%) (the discount =15%) (the discount -20%) 
followed by the third group (forty cases). The fourth group occupied the last position 
(thirty-five cases). There was a fairly even spread of respondents in each group which 
can probably be explained by individual differences of income groups and the size of 
financial obligations, such as the number of dependants. This again is evidence that the 
survey sample contained a good, even sample of the population. This breakdown shows 
how the repayments could be collected if the REDF adopted this policy instead of its 
current policy. 
From the financial point of view, this policy would be advantageous for the REDF, since 
the total amount of the repayments would be increased. In addition, this policy is in line 
with the long-term goal of the REDF to become a self-sustaining programme in which 
loan repayments would be used as paid-in capital to continue financing new loans, as 
previously stated. From this point of view, the current policy of repayment should be 
revised so as to enable every borrower to decide how much he wishes to repay in order 
to obtain the discount he can afford. 
6.3 ATTITUDES TOWARDS ACTION AGAINST OVERDUE 
REPAYMENTS 
The respondents were asked to indicate their opinions regarding strong action being 
taken against those who are late in repaying their annual repayments, in order to reduce 
the waiting period for obtaining a loan. From Table and Figure 6.7 it can be seen that the 
answers were split into five groups as follows: 
Table 6.7 
Respondents' opinions on the following statement: 
Strong action should be taken to prevent overdue annual 
repayments in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining a loan. 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Stronplv agree 1 150 60 60 60 
A 2 58 23.2 23.2 83.2 
Undetermined 3 24 9.6 9.6 92.8 
Disa ree 4 13 5.2 5.2 98 
Stroh 1 disc ree 5 5 2 2 100 
TOTA 250 100 100 
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Opinions 
The first group consisted of three-fifths of the respondents (one hundred and fifty 
respondents, 60% of the survey population) who stated that they strongly agreed with 
the statement. 
The second group comprised fifty-eight respondents (23.2% of the survey population) 
who stated that they agreed with the statement. 
The third group included twenty-four respondents (9.6% of the survey population) 
who stated that they had no opinion; so they were marked "undetermined". 
The fourth group: contained thirteen respondents (5.2% of the survey population) who 
stated that they disagreed with the statement. 
The fifth group consisted of five respondents (2% of the survey population) who stated 
that they strongly disagreed with the statement. 
The findings show that the number of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with 
the statement is substantially higher than the number of respondents who disagreed, or 
strongly disagreed, with the statement. In other words, the vast majority of respondents 
(two hundred and eight respondents, 83.2% of the survey population) stated that they 
strongly agreed or agreed with strong action being taken (see Table and Figure 6.7). It 
seems that most of the respondents consider there to be a responsibility, or duty, to 
repay the loan in the stipulated time in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining 
their loan. This response could be taken as evidence of the acceptance of any reasonable 
action introduced to prevent overdue annual instalments. 
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Figure 0.7 
Respondents' Opinions Regarding the Following Statement 
Strong Action Should be Taken to Prevent Overdue Annual fipaý menu 
in order to Reduce the Waiting Period for Obtaining a Loan 
At this point, it is important to stress that a total of 159 borrowers out of 250 (63.6% of 
the survey population) stated that they had not always been on time with their annual 
repayments, as mentioned in the previous chapter (see page 109). Therefore, this action 
could be used as a new policy to increase the rate of repayments. Consequently, the 
waiting period for obtaining REDF loans would theoretically decrease. 
6.4 ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES 
This section considers respondents' attitudes towards various alternatives by which 
applicants might be enabled to obtain larger loans, or a ready-built property. 
6.4.1 ATTITUDES TOWARD INCREASING THE REDF LOAN 
Turning to repayments, question eight attempted to ascertain respondents' attitudes 
toward increasing the REDF loan and the amount of annual repayment. Specifically, the 
question asked was, "Could you repay SR 25,000 annually in order to obtain a housing 
loan of SR 500,000? ". The answers were combined in two groups as follows: 
Table 6.8 
Could you repay SR 25,000 annually in order 
to obtain a housing loan of SR 500,000? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
ercent 
Yes 1 102 40.8 40.8 40-8 
N 2 148 59.2 59.2 100 
TOTAL 250 100 100 
Figure 6.8 
Could You Repay SR 25,000 Annually in order to 
Obtain a Housing Loan of SR. 500,000? 
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Yes No 
The positive answer was given by one hundred and two respondents (40.8% of the 
survey population). This could be because the present loan of SR 300,000 is not 
sufficient to cover 70% of the construction cost, as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
The negative answer was given by one hundred and forty-eight respondents (59.2% of 
the survey population). This could be due to either of the following reasons: 
(a) They could not afford to repay SR 25,000 per year. 
(b) They wanted to take advantage of the discounts available for the present loan (i. e. 
30% and 20%). 
In brief, among opinions regarding the repayment of loan procedure in question eight, 
some (40.8%) respondents stated that they agreed. These findings indicate that there is a 
good degree of acceptance of this idea, which could, therefore, be introduced as a new 
method. Furthermore, the above findings also support the notion that there is a 
willingness to repay more if this will provide some advantage such as a reduced waiting 
period for obtaining a loan or a higher discount, as previously mentioned. 
It should be mentioned in this context that using the current method, that is for the 
REDF loan of SR 300,000, the total repayment for a loan of SR 500,000 would be SR 
400,000 due to the discount of 20% which equals SR 100,000 (500,000 x 0.2 = 100,000 
SR). This would be repayable over a forty-one year period, since the annual repayment 
is SR 9,600 (400,000/9,600 = 41.67 year). On the other hand, in the case of the new 
method proposed in question eight, the total repayments would be equal to SR 500,000 
repayable over a twenty year period since the annual repayment would be SR 25,000 
(500,000/25,000 = 20 year). For this reason, this method would be advantageous for the 
REDF, since the loan would be repayable over a shorter period, without any discount. 
6.4.2 AYFITUDES TOWARDS THE OPTION OF A VILLA 
Along the same lines as the previous question, the questionnaire then (in question 9) 
asked the respondents to indicate their attitudes towards the option of a villa instead of 
the option of a loan. The exact wording of this question was: The REDF is considering 
building estates consisting of villas, each having a floor area of 230 square metres, and 
consisting of six large rooms. The villa would be built on a plot of land of 400 square 
metres, valued at SR 400,000 repayable over twenty years (i. e. SR 20,000 annually). 
The villa would be available one year after the date of the application. Would you prefer 
this option? From Table and Figure 6.9 it can be seen that the answers were divided into 
two groups, as follows: 
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Table 6.9 
Would you prefer the option of a villa? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Yes 1 211 84.4 84.4 84.4 
No 2 39 15.6 15.6 100 
TOTAIL 250 r- -100 -1 
. 
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Figure 6.9 
Would You Prefer the Option of a ViUa? 
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The answers 
The first group consisting of two hundred and eleven respondents (84.4% of the survey 
population) stated that they would prefer the option of a villa. In other words, the vast 
majority of the respondents preferred this option. This could be explained by any of the 
following reasons: 
(a) The villa option meets the immediate need for a house. 
(b) The present loan of SR 300,000 is not sufficient for the construction cost of one 
housing unit, as previously mentioned (see page 108). 
(c) Some people would prefer to live on an estate like this (i. e. where all villas are the 
same). 
(d) It would be cheaper not to have to pay an architect to design the house. 
(e) Respondents were confident that the construction standard required by the 
government would be high. 
The second group consisting of thirty-nine respondents (15.6% of the survey 
population) stated that they would not prefer the option of a villa. This could be 
explained by any of the following: 
(a) They could not repay SR 20,000 per year. 
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(b) They wished to take advantage of the discount of the present loan scheme (i. e. 
30% and 20%). 
(c) They wanted to design their own homes. 
It is evident that the number of respondents who answered `yes' to question nine is 
significant. This could be taken as evidence that the option of a villa would be acceptable 
to many REDF loan seekers. Accordingly, this option could be used by the REDF as a 
new approach to addressing housing problems. 
An important aspect of the above findings is that it also supports the notion of "ability to 
repay more in order to get some advantages", indicated previously. 
It is also worth noting that this option is similar to one of the projects constructed by the 
MPWH entrusted to the REDF in the implementation of the CM's Resolution No. 130, 
dated 06.04.89 (see page 58), for distribution to citizens. The method of repayment in 
that project is the same as that applied for repaying a loan of SR 300,000, as mentioned 
in the second chapter. In other words, the proposed villa option and the projects 
constructed by the MPWH are similar in that both of them have the same specification, 
in terms of land area and the number of rooms, etc. On the other hand, the repayments 
under the proposed option would be larger than the repayments for the MPWH project. 
This is because in the case of the method currently in operation, the repayment on a loan 
of SR 400,000 would be SR 320,000 due to the discount of 20% which equals SR 
80,000 (400,000 x 0.2 = 80,000 SR). The total repayments, i. e. SR 320,000, would be 
repayable over a thirty-three year period, since the annual repayment is SR 9.600 
(320,000/9,600 = 33.33 years). In contrast, in the case of the new proposal, the total 
repayments would be SR 400,000 which would be repayable over a twenty year period, 
since the annual repayment is SR 20.000 (400,000/20,000 = 20 years). Therefore, the 
new option would be advantageous for the REDF, as the loan would be repayable over a 
shorter period without any discount. 
In addition, through the new option, cost minimisation may be achieved, as this is one of 
the main features of the economics of mass production. In other words, the construction 
cost of each housing unit of the proposed option would decrease. To speed up this 
project, the pre-fabricated and-half-finished system of construction could be used. 
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Furthermore, the following should be considered: 
(a) strict privacy and simple design; 
(b) the protection of householders from sudden exposure, i. e. the sudden entrance of 
a stranger into the house without warning; 
(c) recognition of the segregation of visitors from the family; 
(d) abundant space, i. e. enough space for the family and a variety of controlled spaces 
for children to play in; 
(e) opportunity for separate social interaction for males and females. 
Above all, the estate should include all essential facilities such as electricity, water and 
sewerage networks, schools, mosques, public parks and playgrounds. In other words, the 
project should not only consist of housing facilities as such, but should also include a 
wide variety of educational, religious and social buildings which enhance a community 
and would make the estate a worthwhile place to live in. 
The following question now arises: which option is more acceptable, the cash option (SR 
500,000) of question eight, or the villa option of question nine? 
6.4.3 PREFERENCE FOR CASH OR VILLA 
According to Table and Figure 6.10 it can be seen that the answers to question ten were 
as follows: 
Table 6.10 
Which option would you prefer? 
Valid alid Cumulative ulati Response Value Frequency Percent 
percent 
The option 
of cash (of Q. 8) 
1 51 20.4 20.4 20.4 
The option 
of villa (of Q. 9) 
2 199 79.6 79.6 100 
TOTAL 250 100 100 
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Which Option Would You Prefer? 
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The answers 
The first group consisting of nearly a fifth of the respondents (fifty-one respondents, 
20.4% of the survey population), stated that they would prefer the cash option. 
The second group consisting of nearly four-fifths of the respondents (one hundred and 
ninety-nine respondents, 79.6% of the survey population), stated that they would prefer 
the villa option. 
As expected from the previous findings, the number of respondents who chose the villa 
option is much larger than the number of respondents who chose the cash option. This 
result could be explained by the following: 
(a) The annual repayment for the villa option is less than the annual repayment for the 
cash option. Specifically, the annual repayment for the villa option is exactly four- 
fifths of the annual repayment for the cash option. This may prevent many low 
income people from taking advantage of the cash option but enable them to take 
advantage of the villa option. 
(b) The cash option is limited to land owners and thus excludes many individuals who 
do not own a plot of land from utilising this programme. 
At this point it is also important to remember that: Over one-third of the 
respondents (ninety-one respondents, 36.4% of the survey population) do not own 
a plot of land (see Table 6.5A). 
(c) The villa option is suitable for those who can afford to repay more than one 
instalment at a time but do not own a plot of land. 
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At this point it is also important to remember that: Over 69% of respondents could 
repay more than one annual instalment at a time in order to obtain some advantage 
(see Table 6.6A and 6.6B). 
d. The difficulties of the construction process could also deter many individuals from 
utilising the cash option. 
To sum up briefly, there are a number of factors which have contributed to the lower 
rate of acceptance of the cash option. Hence, the option of a villa would be a more 
practical one for many people. 
6.5 ATTITUDES TOWARDS LOANS INVOLVING INTEREST AND 
ISLAMIC HOUSING FINANCING METHODS 
There are a variety of options that could be used for housing finance. These options can 
be classified, according to Islamic law (shari'ah) into prohibited and permissible. The 
prohibited options may be defined as any financing methods which involve a loan on 
which interest is charged (usury). In contrast, the permissible options may be defined as 
any financing methods not involving interest. Consequently, the questionnaire attempted 
to determine the degree of acceptance of these options among REDF loan seekers. 
6.5.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTEREST LOANS 
The respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes towards the first option. The 
question was phrased as follows: "If there were no REDF loans, would you take out a 
loan on which interest is charged in order to build your house? " From Table and Figure 
6.11 it can be seen that the answers were combined in two groups, as follows: 
Table 6.11 
Would you take out a loan on which interest is charged 
in order to build your house? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
percent percent 
Yes 141.6 1.6 1.6 
No 2 246 98.4 98.4 100 
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The answers 
The first group consisting of only four respondents (1.6% of the survey population), 
stated that they would. However, this number (four cases) is insignificant. 
The second group consisting of nearly all the respondents (two hundred and forty-six 
respondents, 98.4% of the survey population), stated that they would not take out a loan 
on which interest is charged in order to build their houses. An explanation for the 
overwhelming rejection of interest loans is given by the responses to the next question in 
the survey, as discussed below. 
6.5.1.1 REASONS FOR NOT TAKING OUT THE INTEREST LOANS 
The respondents, who stated that they would not take out a loan on which interest is 
charged in order to build their houses, were asked (in question 1 IA) to state their 
reasons. From Table and Figure 6.11A, it can be seen that the answers were divided into 
five groups, as follows: 
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Table 6.11A 
Why would you refuse a loan on which interest is charged 
in order to build your house? 
No. Response Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
percent percent 
Prohibited 
1 Riba 1 196 79.7 79.7 79.7 
The repayment 
would become 2 3 1.2 1.2 9 80 2 . 
ve great 
3 1 and 2 5 32 13 13 93.9 
1 and difficult 4 
conditions 
6 7 2.8 2.8 96.7 
3 and difficult 5 
conditions 
7 8 3.3 3.3 100 
TOTAL 246 100 100 
Figure ä ]IA 
Why Would You Refuse a Loan on which Interest is Charged 
in order to build your house? 
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The answers 
The first group consisting of nearly four-fifths of respondents (one hundred and ninety- 
six respondents, 79.7% of the survey population who would not take out an interest 
loan) who refused interest because it is prohibited. 
The second group contained only three respondents (1.2% of the survey population 
who would not take out an interest loan) who refused interest because the repayment 
would become very great. 
The third group included thirty-two respondents (13% of the survey population who 
would not take out an interest loan) who refused interest because of reasons one and 
two combined (it is prohibited and the repayment would become very great). 
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The fourth group contained only seven respondents (2.8% of the survey population 
who would not take out an interest loan) who refused interest because it is prohibited 
and because of the difficult conditions of obtaining the loan. 
The fifth group consisting of eight respondents (3.3% of the survey population who 
would not take out an interest loan) who refused interest because it is prohibited, the 
repayment would become very great and because of the difficult conditions of obtaining 
the loan. 
Careful observation of this table shows that the common factor among the first, third, 
fourth and fifth reasons is that of prohibition. Thus, this reason prevented two hundred 
and forty-three respondents (98.8% of the survey population who would not take out an 
interest loan) from considering any housing finance involving interest. 
To summarise, the degree of acceptance of the option of a loan involving interest in 
order to build their house among REDF loan seekers is 1.6% (see Table 6.11), since it is 
prohibited according to Islamic law (Shari'ah). In other words, the main reason for not 
taking out a loan on which interest is charged is purely religious. The following question 
now arises: what is the degree of acceptance of permissible options among REDF loan 
seekers? 
6.5.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISLAMIC HOUSING FINANCING METHODS 
Respondents were asked to consider a number of alternative Islamic housing financing 
methods. Their views on these are analysed below. 
6.5.2.1 ACCEPTANCE OF ISLAMIC HOUSING FINANCING METHODS 
The respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes towards Islamic housing finance. 
The question posed was: If Islamic housing financing methods were available, would 
you prefer them? The responses are presented in Table and Figure 6.12 as follows: 
Table 6.12 
If Islamic housing financing methods were available, 
would you prefer them? 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
percent percent 
Yes 240 96 96 
No 2 10 44 100 
TOTAL 250 100 100 
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The answers 
The first group consisting of a very high percentage of respondents (two hundred and 
forty respondents, 96% of the survey population) said `yes'. 
The second group consisting of a very low percentage of respondents (ten respondents, 
4% of the survey population) said `no'. However, this number (ten cases) is insignificant. 
In other words, the degree of acceptance of permissible finance among REDF loan 
seekers is 96%. It is reasonable to assume that this acceptance is because the methods 
described are based on Islamic principles. Thus, they will gain a wide acceptance among 
Saudi citizens who are deeply attached to their religious beliefs and also wish to own 
their houses. 
6.5.2.2 REASONS FOR NOT FAVOURING ISLAMIC HOUSING FINANCING 
METHODS 
Those respondents who did not favour the Islamic housing financing methods were 
asked to indicate their reasons. From Table and Figure 6.12A, it can be seen that the 
answers were combined in four groups, as follows: 
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Table 6.12A 
Why would you not prefer Islamic housing financing methods? 
Valid Cumulative 
Response Value Frequency Percent 
percent percent 
It takes too long 
to ohta*n the loan 
1 3 30 30 30 
Lack of knowledge 
and awareness 
2 4 40 40 70 
The schemes are 
not very easy 3 2 20 20 90 
to understand 
The instalments 
would be 4 1 10 10 100 
very rest I 
-- -100 
i 
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The first group consisting of three respondents (30% of the survey population who 
would not prefer Islamic housing financing methods) who said that they would not 
prefer Islamic housing financing methods because it takes too long to obtain the loan. 
The second group comprised four respondents (40% of the survey population who 
would not prefer Islamic housing financing methods) who said that they would not 
prefer Islamic housing financing methods because of their lack of knowledge and 
awareness. 
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The third group included two respondents (20% of the survey population who would 
not prefer Islamic housing financing methods) who said that they would not prefer 
Islamic housing financing methods because the schemes are not very easy to understand. 
The fourth group contained only one respondent (10% of the survey population who 
would not prefer Islamic housing financing methods) who said he would not prefer 
Islamic housing financing methods because the instalments would be very great. 
Finally, and most importantly for this research, these reasons should be taken into 
consideration when Islamic housing financing methods are adopted, in order to increase 
the degree of their acceptance among REDF loan seekers. From this point of view, 
various policies may be suggested. The mass media, audio and visual, newspapers, 
magazines, etc. should be utilised in order to make the goals, operations and rules of the 
Islamic housing financing methods better known to all citizens. 
It should be noted that the Islamic housing financing methods may be divided into two 
groups: methods of purchase and methods of partnership. 
In an attempt to achieve further information regarding the respondents' attitudes towards 
these methods, the following questions sought to determine which method was most 
acceptable to them. In other words, the objectives of questions thirteen and fourteen 
were to rank some methods of purchase and partnership respectively. 
6.5.2.3 METHODS OF PURCHASE 
As previously mentioned, the respondents were asked to rank three methods of purchase 
according to their preference. The answers were as follows: 
6.5.2.3.1 THE FIRST PREFERENCE AMONG PURCHASE METHODS 
As can be seen from Table and Figure 6.13 the answers regarding the first preference 
were divided into three groups, as follows: 
Table 6.13 
The first preference among purchase methods 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid 
percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Murabaha 1 126 50.4 50 4 50.4 
Istisna'a 2 86 34.4 34.4 84.8 
Lease purchase 3 38 15.2 15.2 100 
TOTAL 250 100 loo 
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The first group consists of one hundred and twenty-six respondents (50.4% of the 
survey population) whose first preference was Murabaha. 
The second group is composed of eighty-six respondents (34.4% of the survey 
population) whose first preference was Istisna'a. 
The third group includes thirty-eight respondents (15.2% of the survey population) 
whose first preference was Lease purchase. 
6.5.2.3.2 THE SECOND PREFERENCE AMONGPURCHASE METHODS 
Regarding the second preference, Table 6.13A gives details of the respondents' answers 
which were as follows: 
Table 6.13A 
The second preference among purchase methods 
Response Value Frequency Percent 
Valid 
ercent 
Cumulative 
percent 
Murabaha 1 90 36 36 36 
Istisna'a 2 64 25.6 25.6 61.6 
Lease ur has 3 96 38.4 38.4 100 
TOTAL 250 100 100 
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The first group consists of ninety respondents (36% of the survey population) whose 
second preference was Murabaha. 
The second group is composed of sixty-four respondents (25.6% of the survey 
population) whose second preference was Istisnaa. 
The third group consists of ninety-six respondents (38.4% of the survey population) 
whose second preference was Lease purchase. 
Combining the third columns of Tables 6.13 and 6.13A will show the total frequency of 
each method as shown in Table 6.13B. Consequently, the number of valid cases in Table 
6.13B is twice that in Table 6.13 or 6.13A. To put it more simply, Table 6.13B is 
derived from Tables 6.13 and 6.13A and the number of valid cases in Table 6.138 is 
500. 
Table 6.13B 
Summary of preferences among purchase responses 
Response Code Count Percentage 
of res onses 
Percentage 
of Cases 
Muraba&L_ 1 216 43.2 6.4 
Istisna'a 2 150 30 60 
Lease purchase 3 134 26.8 53.6 
I-- 
- 
OTAL 5w 1 100 200 
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Table 6.13B shows results similar to those set out in Table 6.13. Both show the highest 
percentage of cases in the first row. This means that Murabahah is the preferred method 
of financing among the Islamic purchase methods with 43.2%. The relative significance 
of Murabahah has been presented in Table 6.13B which is self-explanatory. Istisna'a 
occupied the second position with 30%. Lease purchase occupied the last position with 
26.8%. 
It is worth mentioning that Murabahah is based on the first price. In addition, original 
price, manner of payment and final profit margin should be known. Such information is 
very helpful in explaining why this method occupied the first position among the Islamic 
purchase housing financing methods. 
6.5.2.4 METHODS OF PARTNERSHIP 
Regarding the second group of Islamic housing financing methods, that is methods of 
partnership, the respondents were again asked to rank three methods according to their 
preference. The respondents' answers were as follows: 
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Table 6.14 gives details of the respondents' answers which were as follows: 
Table 6.14 
The first preference among partnership methods 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Partnershin (11 166 66.4 66.4 66.4 
Partnershi 2 2 26 10.4 10.4 76.8 
Decressin artnershi 3 58 23.2 23.2 100 
TOTAL 250 100 100 :: 
d 
Figure 6.14 
The First Partnership Preference 
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The first option was chosen by the majority of respondents. In other words, more than 
three-fifths of the respondents (one hundred and sixty-six respondents, 66.4% of the 
survey population) chose the first type of partnership as their first preference. 
The second option was chosen by the minority of respondents. In other words, just over 
one-tenth of the respondents (twenty-six respondents, 10.4% of the survey population) 
chose the second type of partnership as their first preference. 
The third option was chosen by nearly a quarter of the survey population (fifty-eight 
respondents, 23.2% of the survey population) whose first preference was decreasing 
partnership. 
6.5.2.4.2 THE SECOND PREFERENCE AMONG PARTNERSHIP METHODS 
Regarding the second preference, as can be seen from Table 6.14A the answers were 
divided into three groups, as follows: 
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Partnership (1) Partnership (2) Decreasing Partnership 
The options 
Table 6.14A 
The second preference among partnership methods 
Response Value Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
AUUAII 
Partnershin (I 1 ý 1 62 24.8 24.8 
Partnershi 2 2 45 18 18 42.8 
Decreasin artnershi 
I 
3 143 57.2 57.2 100 
TOT A 1, 
Figure 6.14A 
The Second Partnership Preference 
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The first group consists of sixty-two respondents (24.8% of the survey population) 
whose second preference was the first type of partnership. 
The second group is composed of a minority of respondents (forty-five respondents, 
18% of the survey population) whose second preference was the second type of 
partnership. 
The third group consists of the majority of respondents (one hundred and forty-three 
respondents 57.2% of the survey population) whose second preference was decreasing 
partnership. 
Combining the third columns of Tables 6.14 and 6.14A gives the total frequency for 
each method, as shown in Table 6.14B. Consequently, as in the case of Table 6.13B, the 
number of valid cases in Table 6.14E is 500. 
156 
Partnership (1) Partnership (2) Decreasing Partnership 
The options 
Table 6.14B 
Summary of preferences among partnership methods 
Response Code Count 
Percentage Percentage 
of responses of Cases 
Partnershin (1) 1 45.6 91.2 
Partnershi (2) 2 71 14.2 14.2 
[Decreasing 
artnershi 3 201 40.2 80.4 
Figure 6.14B 
Summary of Preference of Partnership Responses 
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Table 6.14B shows very similar results to those of Table 6.14. Both of them show that 
the highest percentage of cases is in the first row. This means that the first type of 
partnership is the most preferred method of financing among the Islamic partnership 
housing finance methods, with 45.6%. In contrast, the second type of partnership 
occupies the last position with 14.2%. Thus, decreasing partnership occupies the second 
position with 40.2%. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
The data analysed in this chapter revealed that over three quarters (76.4%) of the loan 
seekers group were married. On average, this group had fewer dependants than the 
borrowers group. They were spread across all income groups. More than three-fifths 
(64%) of the survey population were facing housing problems of one kind or another. 
The majority of the respondents (62.4) had already applied for an REDF loan and were 
on the waiting list. Those who had not, were prevented from doing so, mainly because 
they did not own a plot of land on which to build. 
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Partnership (1) Partnership (2) Decreasing Partnership 
The options 
The vast majority (89.6%) of the respondents were prepared to repay the annual 
instalment without discount in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining an REDF 
loan, the preferred option being to repay SR 3,000 monthly in order to bring the waiting 
period down to five years. Many of the respondents would also be prepared to repay 
multiple instalments to obtain varying levels of discount. 
Widespread acceptance was expressed of the suggestion to implement strong action in 
order to prevent overdue annual repayments. 
A considerable level of interest was expressed in the proposed alternative schemes, 
whereby borrowers would pay more to gain some advantage. Of the schemes suggested, 
the one which found most favour was the option of a villa on a new government housing 
development. This would obviously be an advantage to those who lack land of their 
own. 
Hardly any of the respondents would be prepared to consider an interest loan, for 
religious reasons. However, all the Islamic alternatives suggested gained support. 
Murabahah is the preferred method of financing among the Islamic purchase methods, 
while the first type of partnership is the preferred technique of financing among the 
Islamic partnership housing finance methods 
Thus, there is ample evidence from the responses that a more varied and flexible 
approach to housing finance, which would reduce the burden on the REDF, would be 
welcomed by both existing and potential loan applicants. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO BORROWERS' 
QUESTIONS 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will consider the hypotheses related to borrowers' questions, the type of the 
test which was used and the aim of hypothesis will be indicated, the result will be 
presented. These hypotheses may be divided into two groups, namely, the descriptive 
and analytical hypotheses. 
This chapter is, therefore, divided into two sections, corresponding to these groups of 
hypotheses. The final section will present the conclusion. Therefore, the main sections of 
this chapter are: 
1. The descriptive hypotheses 
2. The analytical hypotheses 
3. Conclusion. 
7.1 THE DESCRIPTIVE HYPOTHESES 
The descriptive hypotheses can be divided into two groups, namely, the hypotheses 
which have been rejected and the hypotheses which have not been rejected. Hence, this 
section is divided into two parts. The first presents the hypotheses which have been 
rejected, while the second presents the hypotheses which have not. 
7.1.1 THE DESCRIPTIVE HYPOTHESES WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 1 
SR 300,000 is equal to 70% (or more) of the construction cost of one housing unit. 
Aims to discuss whether the existing loan maximum (SR 300,000) is equal to (or more 
than) 70% of the construction cost of one housing unit. 
Type of test: Binomial test (Table 7.1) 
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Table 7.1 
Was the construction cost more than SR 429,000? 
The null hypothesis: p: 5 0.55 
Proportion test for p=0.55 
HO: p: 50.55 
Hi: p>0.55 for those who said SR 300,000 is less than 70% of the construction cost of 
one housing unit. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.7333 
Normal approximation. 
1- tailed p=0.0011 
The p-value = 0.0011 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident 
that SR 300,000 is less than 70% of the construction cost of one housing unit. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 2 
The borrowers have always been on time with their annual repayments of SR 
9,600. 
Aims to assess whether the annual repayments (SR 9,600) are ever delayed. 
Type of test: Binomial test (Table 7.2) 
Table 7.2 
Did your annual repayment (SR 9,600) ever get delayed? 
The null hypothesis: p<_ 0.55 
Proportion test for p=0.55 
HO: p: 50.55 
Hl: p>0.55 for those who have not been on time with their annual repayments of SR 
9,600. 
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Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion =0 . 636 
Normal approximation. 
1- tailed p=0.0038 
The p-value = 0.0038 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident 
that more than 55% of borrowers have not been on time with their annual repayments of 
SR 9,600. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 3 
There is no main reason for the delayed repayment of an annual instalment. 
Aims to study the reasons why some annual repayments (SR 9,600) might be delayed, in 
an attempt to overcome any difficulties. 
Type of test: Binomial test (Table 7.3) 
Table 7.3 
Why did you delay? 
Value label Frenuenev 
_I could not renav 38 I for of to repay 2 95 
TOTAL 133 
The null hypothesis: pS0.55 
Proportion test for p=0.55 
HO: p50.55 
Hl: p>0.55 for those who forgot to repay. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.7143 
Normal approximation. 
1- tailed p=0.0001 
The p-value = 0.0001 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident 
that more than 55% of borrowers have not always been on time with their annual 
repayments of SR 9,600 because they forgot to repay. In other words, the main reason 
for delayed repayment of an annual instalment is forgetting to repay. 
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HYPOTHESIS NO. 4 
The borrowers would not prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) by 
monthly direct debit. 
Aims to identify borrowers' preferences regarding the various methods of loan 
repayment in order to increase the repayments. 
Type of test: Binomial test (Table 7.4) 
Table 7.4 
Would you prefer to repay your annual 
instalment by monthly direct debit? 
Value labe slue Frenuenev 
Yes 
ý 
241 
yal 
No 29 
TOTAL 250 
The null hypothesis: p: 5 0.55 
Proportion test for p=0.55 
HO: p<_0.55 
H1: p>0.55 for those who would prefer to repay the annual instalment by monthly 
direct debit. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion =0 . 964 
Normal approximation. 
1- tailed p=0 
The p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
more than 55% of borrowers would prefer to repay the annual instalment by monthly 
direct debit. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 5 
The borrowers would not prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) and the 
value of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit. 
Aims to identify borrowers' preferences regarding the various methods of loan 
repayment in order to increase the repayments. 
Type of test : Binomial test (Table 7.5) 
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Table 7.5 
Would you prefer to repay your annual instalment (SR 9,600) 
and the value of one instalment prior to 
the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit? 
The null hypothesis: p: 5 0.55 
Proportion test for p=0.55 
HO: p: 0.55 
Hl: p>0.55 for those who would prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) and 
the value of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct 
debit. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion =0 . 828 
Normal approximation. 
1- tailed p=0 
The p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
more than 55% of borrowers would prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) 
and the value of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit. 
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7.1.1.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE NULL 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO BORROWERS' QUESTIONS, 
WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED 
Table 7.6 
Summary of the Results of the Descriptive Null Hypotheses 
Related to Borrowers' Questions, which have been Rejected 
No. The Null Hypotheses 
SR 300,000 is equal to 70% (or more) of the construction cost of one housing 1 
Unit 
2 
The borrowers have always been on time with their annual repayments of SR 1 9.600. 
3 There is no main reason for the delayed repayment of an annual instalment. 
The borrowers would not prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9 600) by 4 , 
monthl direct debit. 
The borrowers would not prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) and 
5 the value of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct 
7.1.2 THE DESCRIPTIVE HYPOTHESES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN 
REJECTED 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 6 
The borrowers are aware of the fact that their repayments would reduce the 
waiting period for obtaining loans for those who seek REDF loans. 
Or 
The different responses of the borrowers regarding the fact that their repayments 
would reduce the waiting period for obtaining loans for those who seek REDF 
loans are equally likely. 
Aims to ascertain borrowers' views as to whether their prompt repayment would reduce 
the waiting period for those who seek loans. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the observations and expectations of the answers to question 
8 (see Table 7.7) 
Table 7.7 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Question 8 
Value label Value Cases observed Einected Residual . Strongly agree 
and avree 
1 110 125 -15 
Undetermined, disagree 
and strop 1 disagree 2 140 125 15 
TOTAL 250 250 
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Chi-square = 3.6, degrees of freedom =1 and p-value = 0.0578 which is greater than 
0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. However, p-value is very close to 
0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected at the 0.1 level. 
7.1.2.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE NULL 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO BORROWERS' QUESTIONS, 
WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN REJECTED 
Table 7.8 
Summary of the Results of the Descriptive NO Hypotheses Related to 
Borrowers' Questions, which have not been Rejected 
No. The Null Hypotheses 
The borrowers are aware of the fact that their repayments would reduce the 1 
waitinLy neriod for obtaining loans for those who seek REDF loans. 
The different responses of the borrowers regarding the fact that their 
1A repayments would reduce the waiting period for obtaining loans for those 
who seek REDF loans are equally likel . 
7.2 THE ANALYTICAL HYPOTHESES 
The analytical hypotheses can be divided into two groups, namely, the hypotheses which 
have been rejected and the hypotheses which have not been rejected. Hence, this section 
is divided into two parts. The first presents the hypotheses which have been rejected, 
while the second presents the hypotheses which have not. 
7.2.1 THE ANALYTICAL HYPOTHESES WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 7 
There is no significant association between repaying the annual instalment 
regularly and monthly income. 
The correlation between the answers to question 5 and the answers to question 3. 
Aims to ascertain the socio-economic status of those who have taken out loans 
(borrowers). 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 5 and the 
answers to question 3 (see Table 7.9). 
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Table 7.9 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 5 
and the Answers to Question 3 
Q. 5 Q. 3 
Monthly income of REDF loan borrowers (SR) 
Did your (count and row er n 
annual repayment less from from more 
(SR 9,600) ever than 3,000 6,001 than 
get delayed? 3,000 to 6,000 to 9,000 9,000 
21 47 50 41 
Yes 29.6% 31.4% 25.8% 
2 21 30 38 
No 2.2% 23.1% 33% 41.8% 
Minimum expected frequency: 8.372 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 13.23385, degrees of freedom =3 and p-value = 0.00416 which is less than 
0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has been rejected. 
The table also shows the percentages for each group. As monthly income rises, the 
percentage of respondents failing to repay the annual instalment on time falls. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 8 
There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
instalment (SR 9,600) and the value of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 
8,400) by monthly direct debit and monthly income. 
The correlation between the answers to question 7 and the answers to question 3. 
Aims to identify borrowers' preferences regarding the various methods of loan 
repayment in order to increase the repayments. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 7 and the 
answers to question 3 (see Table 7.10). 
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Table 7.10 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 7 
and the Answers to Question 3 
Q. 7 Q. 3 
Would you prefer Monthly income of REDF loan 
to repay your annual borrowers (SR) 
instalment (SR 9,600) and count and row percents ! es) 
the value of one instalment less from from more 
prior to the due date 3,000 6,001 
(SR 8,400) by monthly 
than to to than 
direct "? 3,000 6.000 9. (M 9,000 
Yes 8 62 68 69 3.9% 30% 32.9% 33.3% 
No 
15 6 12 10 
34.9% 14% 27.9% 23.3% 
Minimum expected frequency: 3.956 
Cells with expected frequency less than 5: 1 of 8 (12.5%) 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 42.00261, degrees of freedom =3 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Hence, the null hypothesis has been rejected. 
From Table 7.10 it can be seen that as income increases the percentage of respondents 
who would prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) and the value of one 
instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit also increases. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 9 
There is no significant association between repaying the annual instalment 
regularly and awareness of the fact that the repayments would reduce the waiting 
period for obtaining loans for those who seek REDF loans. 
The correlation between the answers to question 5 and the answers to question 8. 
Aims to: 
1. ascertain borrowers' views as to whether their prompt or even early repayment would 
reduce the waiting period for those who seek loans; 
2. study the reasons why some annual repayments (SR 9,600) might be delayed, in an 
attempt to overcome any difficulties. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 5 and the 
answers to question 8 (see Table 7.11). 
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Table 7.11 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 8 
and the Answers to Question 5 
Q. 5 Q. 8 
Did Respondents' opinions regarding the following 
your statement: Your prompt repayment would reduce 
annual the waiting period for those who seek loans 
repayment (count and row percentages) 
(SR 9,600) Strongly Strongly 
ever get Agree Undetermined Disagree 
delayed? agree disagree 
12 52 44 44 7 
Yes 7.5% 32.7% 27.7% 27.7% 4.4% 
21 25 19 19 7 
No 23.1% 27.5% 20.9% 20.9% 7.7% 
Minimum expected frequency: 5.096 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 14.32734, degrees of freedom =4 and p-value = 0.00632 which is less than 
0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has been rejected. 
7.2.1.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYTICAL NULL 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO BORROWERS' QUESTIONS, 
WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED 
Table 7.12 
Summary of the Results of the Analytical Null Hypotheses Related to 
Borrowers' Questions, which have been Rejected 
No. The NO Hypotheses 
1 
There is no significant association between repaying the annual instalment 
reLyulariv and monthly income. 
There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
2 instalment (SR 9,600) and the value of one instalment prior to the due date 
(SR 8.400) b monthl direct debit monthly income, 
There is no significant association between repaying the annual instalment 
3 regularly and awareness of the fact that the repayments would reduce the 
waiting eriod for obtaining loans for those who seek REDF loans. 
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7.2.2 THE ANALYTICAL HYPOTHESES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN 
REJECTED 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 10 
There is no significant association between repaying the annual instalment 
regularly and marital status. 
The correlation between the answers to question 5 and the answers to question 1. 
Aims to ascertain the socio-economic status of those who have taken out loans 
(borrowers). 
Type of test: Fisher's exact test is used instead of Chi-square since some of the 
expectations are less than 5 and the table is a 2x2 table (contingency 
table) (see Table 7.13). 
Table 7.13 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 5 
and the Answers to Question 1 
Q. Q. 1 
Marital status of 
Did your annual repayment REDF loan borrowers 
(count and row percentages) 
(SR 9600 ever get delayed? Sin le Married 
1 158 
Yes 0.6% 99.4% 
2 89 
No 2.2% 97.8% 
Minimum expected frequency: 1.092 
Cells with expected frequency less than 5: 2 of 4 (50%) 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Fisher's exact test gives a p-value of 0.30027 which is greater than 0.05. Hence, the null 
hypothesis has not been rejected. This result is probably due to the small number of 
single respondents. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 11 
There is no significant association between repaying the annual instalment 
regularly and number of dependants. 
Aims to ascertain the socio-economic status of those who have taken out loans 
(borrowers). 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 5 and the 
answers to question 2 (see Table 7.14). 
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Table 7.14 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 5 
and the Answers to Question 2 
Q. 5 Did your annual repayment Q. 2 (SR 9,600) ever get delayed? 
Number of Dependants (count and row percentages) 
Yes No 
1 2 
0 33.3% 66.7% 
12 4 
2 75% 25% 
23 16 
3 59% 41% 
36 19 
4 65.5% 34.5% 
36 20 
5 64.3% 35.7% 
28 14 
6 66.7% 33.3% 
17 10 
7 63% 37% 
6 6 
8 50% 50% 
Minimum expected frequency: 1.092 
Cells with expected frequency less than 5: 3 of 16 (18.8%) 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 3.67294, degrees of freedom =7 and p-value = 0.81658 which is greater 
than 0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 12 
There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
instalment (SR 9,600) by monthly direct debit and number of dependants. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6 and the answers to question 2. 
Aims to ascertain the socio-economic status of those who have taken out loans 
(borrowers). 
Type of test: Fisher's exact test is used instead of Chi-square since some of the 
expectations are less than 5 and the table is a 2x2 table (contingency 
table) (Table 7.15). 
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Table 7.15 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6 
and the Answers to Question 2 
Q. 6 
Would you prefer to repay Q. 2 
your annual Number of Dependants 
instalment (SR 9,600) by 
monthly (count and row percentages) 
direct debit? 0 -4 5-8 
110 131 Yes 45.6% 54.4% 
36 No 33.3% 66.7% 
Minimum expected frequency: 4.068 
Cells with expected frequency less than 5: 2 of 4 (50%) 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Fisher's exact test gives a p-value of 0.35387 which is greater than 0.05. Hence, the null 
hypothesis has not been rejected. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 13 
There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
instalment (SR 9,600) by monthly direct debit and monthly income. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6 and the answers to question 3. 
Aims to identify borrowers' preferences regarding the various methods of loan 
repayment in order to increase the repayments. 
Type of test: Fisher's exact test is used instead of Chi-square since some of the 
expectations are less than 5 and the table is a 2x2 table (contingency 
table) (Table 7.16). 
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Table 7.16 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6 
and the Answers to Question 3 
Q. 6 Q. 3 
Would you prefer Monthly income of REDF loan borrowers (SR) 
to repay your annual (count and row percentages) 
instalment (SR 9,600) to more than 
by monthly direct debit? 6,000 6,000 
Yes 90 151 
37.3% 62.7% 
No 
1 [18 
11.1% 88.9% 
Minimum expected frequency: 3.276 
Cells with expected frequency less than 5: 1 of 4 (25%) 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Fisher's exact test gives a p-value of 0.10047 which is greater than 0.05. Hence, the null 
hypothesis has not been rejected. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 14 
There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
instalment (SR 9,600) and the value of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 
8,400) by monthly direct debit and number of dependants. 
The correlation between the answers to question 7 and the answers to question 2. 
Aims to identify borrowers' preferences regarding the various methods of loan 
repayment in order to increase the repayments. 
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Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 7 and the 
answers to question 2 (see Table 7.17). 
Table 7.17 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 7 
and the Answers to Question 2 
Q. 7 Q. 2 
Would you prefer to repay 
your annual Number of Dependants 
instalment (SR 9,600) 
(count and row percentages) and the value of one instalment 
prior to the due date (SR 8,400) 0 -3 4-5 6-8 .? 
Yes 
50 96 61 
24.2% 46.4% 29.5% 
6 15 20 
1 
No 
1 18.6% 34.9% 46.5% 
Minimum expected frequency: 9.976 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 4.72382, degrees of freedom =2 and p-value = 0.09424 which is greater 
than 0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. The majority of each group 
(with 0-3,4-5 and 6-8 dependants) seem to respond positively. 
7.2.2.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYTICAL NULL 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO BORROWERS' QUESTIONS, 
WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN REJECTED 
Table 7.18 
Summary of the Results of the Analytical Null Hypotheses Related to 
Borrowers' Questions, which have not been Rejected 
No. The Null Hypotheses 
There is no significant association between repaying the annual instalment 
1 regularly and marital status. 
There is no significant association between repaying the annual instalment 
2 regularly and number of dendants. 
There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
3 instalment (SR 9,600) by monthly direct debit and number of dendants. 
There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
4 instalment (SR 9,600) b y monthly direct debit and monthly income. 
There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
5 instalment (SR 9,600) 
(SR 8-400) hv monthIv 
and the value of one instalment prior to the due date 
direct debit and number of denendant-q- 
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7.3 CONCLUSION 
Table 7.19 
Summary of the Results of the Null Hypotheses Related to 
Borrowers' Questions 
No. The Null Hypotheses The Result 
There is no significant association between repaying 
1 the annual instalment regularly and marital status. has not been rejected 
There is no significant association between repaying 
2 the annual instalment regularly and number of has not been rejected 
d endants. 
There is no significant association between repaying 
3 the annual instalment regularly and monthly income. has been rejected 
SR 300,000 is equal to 70% (or more) of the 4 
construction cost of one housing unit. 
has been rejected 
The borrowers have always been on time with their 5 
annual repayments of SR 9,600. 
has been rejected 
There is no main reason for the delayed repayment 6 
of an annual instalment. 
has been rejected 
The borrowers would not prefer to repay the annual 
7 instalment (SR 9,600) by monthly direct debit. has been rejected 
There is no significant association between 
8 preference to repay the annual 
instalment (SR 
has not been rejected 9,600) by monthly direct debit and number of 
dependants. 
There is no significant association between 
9 preference to repay the annual instalment (SR has not been rejected 
9.600) b monthl direct debit and monthly income 
The borrowers would not prefer to repay the annual 
10 
instalment (SR 9,600) and the value of one has been rejected instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by 
monthly direct debit. 
There is no significant association between 
preference to repay the annual instalment (SR 
11 9,600) and the value of one instalment prior to the has not been rejected 
due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit and 
number of dendants. 
There is no significant association between 
preference to repay the annual instalment (SR 
12 9,600) and the value of one instalment prior to the has been rejected 
due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit and 
I monthly income. 
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13 
The borrowers are aware of the fact that their 
repayments would reduce the waiting period for 
obtaining loans for those who seek REDF loans. 
has not been rejected 
The different responses of the borrowers regarding 
13A the 
fact that their repayments would reduce the has been rejected waiting period for obtaining loans for those who 
seek REDF loans are equally likely. 
There is no significant association between 
repaying the annual instalment regularly and 
14 awareness of the fact that the repayments would has been rejected 
reduce the waiting period for obtaining loans for 
I those who seek REDF loans. 
a) There is a significant association between repaying the annual instalment regularly 
and monthly income; and awareness of the fact that the repayments would reduce 
the waiting period for obtaining loans for those who seek REDF loans. 
b) There is a significant association between preference to repay the annual instalment 
(SR 9,600) and the value of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by 
monthly direct debit and monthly income. 
c) SR 300,000 is less than 70% of the construction cost of one housing unit. 
d) There is a main reason for the delayed repayment of an annual instalment. 
e) The borrowers: 
0 have not been on time with their annual repayments of SR 9,600; 
" would prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) by monthly direct 
debit; 
" would prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) and the value of one 
instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit; 
" are aware of the fact that their repayments would reduce the waiting period for 
obtaining loans for those who seek REDF loans. 
f) There is no significant association between repaying the annual instalment 
regularly and marital status; number of dependants. 
g) There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
instalment (SR 9,600) by monthly direct debit and number of dependants; 
monthly income. 
h) There is no significant association between preference to repay the annual 
instalment (SR 9,600) and the value of one instalment prior to the due date 
(SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit and number of dependants. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO LOAN SEEKERS' 
QUESTIONS 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will consider the hypotheses related to those who seek REDF loans 
questions, the type of the test which was used and the aim of hypothesis willbe 
indicated, the result will be presented. These hypotheses may be divided into two 
groups, namely, the descriptive and analytical hypotheses. 
This chapter is, therefore, divided into two sections, corresponding to these groups of 
hypotheses. The final section will present the conclusion. Therefore, the main sections of 
this chapter are: 
1. The descriptive hypotheses 
2. The analytical hypotheses 
3. Conclusion. 
8.1 THE DESCRIPTIVE HYPOTHESES 
The descriptive hypotheses can be divided into two groups, namely, the hypotheses 
which have been rejected and the hypotheses which have not been rejected. Hence, this 
section is divided into two parts. The first presents the hypotheses which have been 
rejected, while the second presents the hypotheses which have not. 
8.1.1 THE DESCRIPTIVE HYPOTHESES WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 15 
There is no main reason for not applying for an REDF loan. 
Aims to study the reasons why some people who say they are interested in REDF loans 
do not apply for them. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the the observations and expectations of the answers to 
question 5A (see Table 8. land 8. IA). 
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Table 8.1 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Question 5A 
Cases 
Response Value Expected Residual 
observed 
I do not own 
a plot of land 
1 91 31.33 59.67 
The waiting period 
is too long 2 2 31.33 -29.33 
I have insufficient 
3 1 31.33 -30.33 money 
TOTAL 94 94 
Chi-square = 170.4468, degrees of freedom =2 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
there is a main reason for not applying for an REDF loan. 
Table 8.1A 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Question 5A 
Cases 
Response Value 
observed 
Expected Residual 
I do not own 
a plot of land 1 
91 47 44 
The waiting period 
is too long 2 3 
F 
47 -44 and I have 
TOTAL 94 94 
Chi-square = 82.3830, degrees of freedom =1 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
there is a main reason for not applying for an REDF loan. 
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Type of test: Binomial test (see Table 8.1B) 
Table 8.1B 
Why have you not applied for an REDF loan? 
Response Value Frequency 
I do not own 
a plot of land 1 91 
The waiting period 
is too long and 23 
I have insufficient money 
TOTAL 94 
The null hypothesis: p< 0.55 
HO: p: 50.55 
HI: p>0.55 for those who say "I do not own a plot of land". 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.9681 
Normal approximation 
I- tailed p=0 
The p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
the proportion who say "I do not own a plot of land" is more than 55% of the survey 
population who have not applied for an REDF loan. Hence, there is a main reason for 
not applying for an REDF loan. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 16 
Loan seekers could not repay the annual instalment without discount in order to 
reduce the waiting period for obtaining an REDF loan. 
Aims to review REDF regulations and policies which appear to be out of date and were 
intended to meet conditions that may no longer exist. 
Type of test: Binomial test (see Table 8.2) 
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Table 8.2 
Could you repay the annual instalment (SR 12,000) without 
discount in order to reduce the waiting period 
for obtaining the loan? 
Response Value Frequency 
Yes 1 224 
No 2 26 
TOTAL 250 
The null hypothesis: p: 5 0.55 
HO: p <_ 0.55 
H1: p>0.55 for those who could repay the annual instalment without discount in order 
to reduce the waiting period for obtaining an REDF loan. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.896 
Normal approximation 
I- tailed p=0 
The p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
more than 55% of loan seekers could repay the annual instalment without discount in 
order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining an REDF loan. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 17 
Loan seekers do not agree that strong action should be taken to prevent overdue 
annual repayments in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining a loan. 
Aims to suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Binomial test (see Table 8.3) 
Table 8.3 
Respondents' opinions on the following statement: 
Strong action should be taken to prevent overdue annual 
repayments in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining a loan 
Response Value Frequency 
Strongly agree 208 1 
and agree 
Undetermined, 
2 42 
disagree and strongly disagree 
TOTAL 250 
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The null hypothesis: p !g0.55 
HO: p <_ 0.55 
H1: p>0.55 for those who strongly agree or agree that strong action should be taken to 
prevent overdue annual repayments in order to reduce the waiting period for 
obtaining a loan. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.832 
Normal approximation 
I- tailed p=0 
The p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
more than 55% of loan seekers strongly agree or agree that strong action should be 
taken to prevent overdue annual repayments in order to reduce the waiting period for 
obtaining a loan. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 18 
Loan seekers would not prefer to repay SR 20,000 annually in order to obtain a 
villa. 
Aims to suggest methods by which the repayments to REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Binomial test (see Table 8.4) 
Table 8.4 
Would you prefer the option of a villa? 
Response Value Frequency 
Yes 1 211 
No 2 39 
TOTAL 250 
The null hypothesis: p :!! g 0.55 
Proportion test for p=0.55 
HO: p <_ 0.55 
H1: p>0.55 for those who would prefer to repay SR 20,000 annually in order to obtain 
a villa. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.844 
Normal approximation 
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I- tailed p=0 
The p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
more than 55% of loan seekers would prefer to repay SR 20,000 annually in order to 
obtain a villa. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 19 
The degree of acceptance of the option of a loan of SR 500,000 is equal to the 
degree of acceptance of the option of a villa among REDF loan seekers. 
OR 
The acceptance of the option of a loan of SR 500,000 and the acceptance of the 
option of a villa among REDF loan seekers are equally likely. 
Aims to suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the observations and expectations of the answers to question 
10 (Table 8.5). 
Table 8.5 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Question 10 
Response Value 
Cases Expected Residual 
observed 
The option 1 51 125 -74 
of cash (of 0.8) 
The option 2 199 125 74 
of a villa (of 0.9) 
TOTAL 250 250 0 
Chi-square = 87.616, degrees of freedom =1 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
the acceptance of the option of a loan of SR 500,000 and the acceptance of the option of 
a villa among REDF loan seekers are not equally likely. 
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HYPOTHESIS NO. 20 
Loan seekers would take out a loan on which interest is charged in order to build 
their houses. 
Aims to evaluate REDF loan seekers' views on being offered a loan on which interest is 
charged in order to build their houses. 
Type of test : Binomial test (Table 8.6) 
Table 8.6 
If there were no REDF's loan, would you take out a loan on 
which interest is charged in order to build your house? 
Res onse Value Frequency 
Yes 14 
No 2 246 
TOTAL 250 
The null hypothesis: p: 5 0.55 
HO: p: 50.55 - 
H1: p>0.55 for those who would not take out a loan on which interest is charged in 
order to build their houses. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.984 
Normal approximation 
I- tailed p=0 
The p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
more than 55% of loan seekers would not take out a loan on which interest is charged in 
order to build their houses. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 21 
The main reason for not taking out a loan on which interest is charged is not 
purely religious. 
Aims to evaluate REDF loan seekers' views on being offered a loan on which interest is 
charged in order to build their houses. 
Type of test : Binomial test (Table 8.7) 
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Table 8.7 
Why would you refuse a loan on which interest is charged 
in order to build your house? 
No. Res onse Value Frequency 
1 It is prohibited 1 196 
2 Other reasons 2 50 
TOTAL 246 
The null hypothesis: p: 5 0.55 
HO: p_50.55 
H1: p>0.55 for those who would not take out a loan on which interest is charged in 
order to build their houses because it is prohibited. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.7967 
Normal approximation 
1- tailed p=0 
The p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
more than 55% of the survey population who would not take out an interest loan (246 
respondents) would not do so because it is prohibited. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 22 
Loan seekers would not prefer Islamic housing financing methods. 
Aims to evaluate REDF loan seekers' views on being offered various Islamic housing 
financing methods in order to meet the increased demand for housing. 
Type of test : Binomial test (Table 8.8) 
Table 8.8 
If Islamic housing financing methods were 
available, would you prefer them? 
Response Value Frequency 
Yes 1 240 
No 2 10 
TOTAL 250 
The null hypothesis: p: 5 0.55 
HO: p: 5 0.55 
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HI: p>0.55 for those who would prefer Islamic housing financing methods. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.96 
Normal approximation 
I- tailed p=0 
The p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
more than 55% of loan seekers would prefer Islamic housing financing methods. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 23 
The three purchase methods are equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
Aims to evaluate REDF loan seekers' views on being offered various Islamic housing 
financing methods in order to meet the increased demand for housing. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the observations and expectations of the answers to question 
13 (Table 8.9). 
Table 8.9 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Question 13 
Murabaha Istisna'a Lease purchase TOTAL 
Observed 126 86 38 250 
Expected 83.33 83.33 83.33 250 
Residual 42.67 2.67 -45.33 
Chi-square = 46.592, degrees of freedom =2 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
the three purchase methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the observations and expectations of the answers to question 
13A (Table 8.9A). 
Table 8.9A 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Question 13A 
Murabaha Istisna'a Lease purchase TOTAL 
Observed 90 64 96 250 
Expected 83.3 83.33 83.33 250 
Residual 6.67 -19.33 12.67 
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Chi-square = 6.944, degrees of freedom =2 and p-value = 0.0311 which is less than 
0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident 
that the three purchase methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
Table 8.9B 
Summary of Preference of Purchase Responses 
Response Code Count 
Percentage of 
91 
Percentage of 
Murabaha 1 216 - 43.2 86.4 
Istisna'a 2 150 30 60 
Lease purchase 3 134 26.8 53.6 
TOTAL RESPONSES 500 100 200 
43.2% preferred Murabaha, 30% Istisna'a and only 26.8% lease purchase (Table 8.9B). 
Hence, the three purchase methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the observations and expectations of the answers to 
questions 13 and 13A (Table 8.9C). 
Table 8.9C 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Questions 13 and 13A 
Murabaha Istisna'a Lease purchase 
Observed 216 150 134 500 
Expected 166.67 166.67 166.67 500 
Residual 49.33 -16.67 -32.67 
Chi-square = 22.672, degrees of freedom =2 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
the three purchase methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 24 
The three partnership methods are equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
Aims to evaluate REDF loan seekers' views on being offered various Islamic housing 
financing methods in order to meet the increased demand for housing. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the observations and expectations of the answers to question 
14 (Table 8.10). 
185 
Table 8.10 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Question 14 
Partnership Partnership Diminishing 
ending with sale (2) partnership TOTAL 
Observed 166 26 58 250 
Expected 83.33 83.33 83.33 250 
Residual 82.67 -57.33 -25.33 
Chi-square = 129.152, degrees of freedom =2 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
the three partnership methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the observations and expectations of the answers to question 
14A (Table 8.1OA). 
Table 8.10A 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Question 14A 
Partnership Partnership Diminishing 
endinL, with sale (21 
TOTAL 
Ohserved 62 45 143 250 
Expected 83.33 83.33 83.33 250 
Residual -21.33 -38.33 59.67 
Chi-square = 65.816, degrees of freedom =2 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
the three partnership methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
Table 8.10B 
Summary of Preferences among Partnership methods 
Category Percentage of Percentage of Code Count 
Partnership ending 1 228 45.6 91.2 
with sale 
Partnershi (2) 2 71 14.2 28.4 
Diminishing 3 201 40.2 
j 
80.4 
artnershi 
RESPON SE&_ 500 100 200 
45.6% preferred Partnership ending with sale, 14.2% preferred Partnership (2) and 
40.2% preferred Diminishing Partnership. Hence, the three Partnership methods are not 
equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
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Type of test: Chi-square of the observations and expectations of the answers to 
questions 14 and 14A (Table 8.10C). 
Table 8.10C 
The Observations and Expectations 
of the Answers to Questions 14 and 14A 
Partnership Partnership Diminishing 
endirr with sale (2) partnership 
TOTAL 
Observed 228 71 201 500 
Ea ected 166.67 166.67 166.67 500 
Residual 61.33 -95.67 34.33 
Chi-square = 84.556, degrees of freedom =2 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
the three partnership methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
8.1.1.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE NULL 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO LOAN SEEKERS' QUESTIONS, 
WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED 
Table 8.11 
Summary of the Results of the Descriptive Null Hypotheses Related to 
Loan Seekers' Questions, which have been Rejected 
No. The Null Hypotheses 
I Tlere is no main reason for not aimlvine for an REDF loan. 
2 
Loan seekers could not repay the annual instalment without discount 
Loan seekers do not agree that strong action should be taken to prevent 
3 overdue annual repayments in order to reduce the waiting period for 
obtaining a loan. 
4 
Loan seekers would not prefer to repay SR 20,000 annually in order to 
The degree of acceptance of the option of a loan of SR 500,000 is equal 
to the degree of acceptance of the option of a villa among REDF loan 
5 seekers. 
The acceptance of the option of a loan of SR 500,000 and the acceptance 
of the option of a villa among REDF loan seekers are equally likely. 
6 
Loan seekers would take out a loan on which interest is charged in order 
7 
The main reason for not taking out a loan on which interest is charged is 
8 Loan seekers would not nrefer Islamic housing financinLy methods. 
9 The three purchase methods are equally table to REDF loan seekers. 
10 The three partnership methods are equally acceptable to REDF loan 
seekenq 
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8.1.2 THE DESCRIPTIVE HYPOTHESES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN 
REJECTED 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 25 
Loan seekers could not repay SR 25,000 annually in order to obtain a housing loan 
of SR 500,000. 
Aims to: 
1. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing money 
to suit their specific needs; 
2. suggest methods by which the repayments to REDF might be increased. 
Type of test : Binomial test (Table 8.12). 
Table 8.12 
Could you repay SR 25,000 annually in order to 
obtain a housing loan of SR 500,000? 
v 
2ýý 
102 
No 2 148 
TOTAL 250 
The null hypothesis: p: 5 0.55 
Proportion test for p=0.55. 
H0: p <_ 0.55 
H1: p>0.55 for those who could repay SR 25,000 annually in order to obtain a housing 
loan of SR 500,000. 
Test proportion = 0.55 
Observation proportion = 0.408 
Normal approximation 
1- tailed p=0.1985 
The p-value = 0.1985 which is greater than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has not been 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that more than 55% of loan seekers could not repay SR 25,000 annually in 
order to obtain a housing loan of SR 500,000. 
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S. 1.2.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE NULL 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO LOAN SEEKERS' QUESTIONS, 
WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN REJECTED 
Table 8.13 
Summary of the Results of the Descriptive Null Hypotheses Related to 
Loan Seekers' Questions, which have not been Rejected 
No. The Null Hypotheses 
Loan seekers could not repay SR 25 000 annually in order to obtain a housing 1 , loan of SR 500,000. 
8.2 THE ANALYTICAL HYPOTHESES 
The analytical hypotheses can be divided into two groups, namely, the hypotheses which 
have been rejected and the hypotheses which have not been rejected. Hence, this section 
is divided into two parts. The first presents the hypotheses which have been rejected, 
while the second presents the hypotheses which have not. 
8.2.1 THE ANALYTICAL HYPOTHESES WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 26 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and number of dependants. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6A and the answers to question 2. 
Aims to: 
1. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing money 
to suit their specific needs; 
2. suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6A and the 
answers to question 2 (see the following Table). 
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Table 8.14 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6A 
and the Answers to Question 2 
Q. 6A 
How much could you repay in order to reduce 
Q. 2 the waiting period of the loan, as follows? 
(count and row percentages) 
SR SR SR SR SR 
Number 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 
monthly, monthly, monthly, monthly, monthly, 
of the the the the the 
waiting waiting waiting waiting waiting 
dependants period period period period period 
=9 years =7 ears =5 years =3 years =1 year 
9 19 16 9 4 
0and1 15 0 0 0 15 0 7% 
2 17 23 27 22 
2'4 
1 1 0 0 0 29.7% 0 L 
17 18 21 18 2 
5-9 
22.4% 0 0 23.7% 0 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required). 
Minimum expected frequency: 7.125 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 37.42953, degrees of freedom =8 and p-value = 0.0000 1 which is less than 
0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is a significant association between the ability to increase the amount 
of annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and number of dependants. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 27 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the discount) and number of dependants. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6B and the answers to question 2. 
Aims to: 
1. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing 
money to suit their specific needs; 
2. suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6B and the 
answers to question 2 (see the following Table). 
190 
Table 8.15 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6B 
and the Answers to Question 2 
Q. 6B 
Q. 2 How many instalments could you repay together 
in order to obtain discount, as follows? 
Number (count and row percentages) 
SR SR SR SR SR 
of 1,000 1,900 2,700 3,400 4,000 
monthly monthly monthly monthly monthly 
dependants (discount (discount (discount (discount (discount 
= 0% = 5% 0% =15% = 20% 
15 11 16 6 9 
Oandl 
26.3% 0 
P 
0 0 15.8% 
8 20 8 18 27 
2-4 8.8% 22% 19.8% 19.8% 29.7% 
18 20 13 11 14 
5-9 23.7% 26.3% 17.1% 14.5% 18.4% 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required) 
Minimum expected frequency: 8.906 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 16.24592, degrees of freedom =8 and p-value = 0.03899 which is less than 
0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is a significant association between the ability to increase the amount 
of annual repayment (depending on the discount) and number of dependants. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 28 
There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 
instalment without discount and monthly income. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6 and the answers to question 3. 
Aims to ascertain the socio-economic status of those who seek REDF loans (loan 
seekers). 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6 and the 
answers to question 3 (see Table 8.16). 
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Table 8.16 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6 
and the Answers to Question 3 
Q. 6 Q. 3 
Could you repay 
the annual 
Monthly income of REDF loan seekers 
instalment without (SR) 
discount in order less from from more 
to reduce than 
3,000 6,001 
than the waiting period for to to 
obtaining the loan? 3,000 6,000 9,000 9,000 
12 78 74 60 
Yes 5.4% 34.8% 33% 26.8% 
13 10 2 1 
No 50% 38.5% 7.7% 3.8% 
Minimum expected frequency: 2.6 
Cells with expected frequency less than 5: 1 of 8 (12.5%) 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 56.46236, degrees of freedom =3 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Hence, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
there is a significant association between the ability to repay the annual instalment 
without discount and monthly income. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 29 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and monthly income. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6A and the answers to question 3. 
Aims to: 
1. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing money 
to suit their specific needs; 
2. suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6A and the 
answers to question 3 (see Table 8.17). 
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Table 8.17 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6A 
and the Answers to Question 3 
Q-3 Q. 6A 
How much could you repay in order to reduce 
Monthly the waiting period of the loan, as follows? 
(count and row ercenta es 
income SR 1,000 monthly, SR SR 4,000 monthly, 
of the waiting period 3,000 the waiting period 
REDF =9 years monthly, =3 years 
loan and the and 
seekers SR 2,000 monthly, waiting SR 5,000 monthly, 
(SR) the waiting period period the waiting period 
=7 ears =5 ears =1 ear 
less than 67 21 1 
6.000 0 23.6% 0 
from 6,001 8 30 37 
to 9000 10.7% 40% 49.3% 
more than 7 9 44 
9000 11.7% 15% 73.3% 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required) 
Minimum expected frequency: 16.071 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 124.71978, degrees of freedom =4 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Consequently, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is a significant association between the ability to increase the amount 
of annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and monthly income. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 30 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the discount) and monthly income. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6B and the answers to question 3. 
Aims to: 
1. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing money 
to suit their specific needs; 
2. suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6B and the 
answers to question 3 (see Table 8.18). 
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Table 8.18 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6B 
and the Answers to Question 3 
Q. 3 Q. 6B 
Monthly 
How many instalments could you repay together 
in order to obtain discount, as follows? 
income of (count and row percentages) 
REDF SR 1,000 monthly SR 2,700 SR 3,400 monthly 
loan (discount = 0%) monthly 
(discount =15%) 
seekers and (discount and SR 1,900 monthly SR 4,000 monthly (SR) 
_ 5%) (discount = 10%) (discount _ 20%) 
less than 63 20 6 
6.000 0 22.5% 6.7% 
from 6,001 21 13 41 
to 9 000 28% 17.3% 54.7% 
more than 
] 
8 14 38 
9000 1 13.3% 23.3% 63.3% 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required) 
Minimum expected frequency: 12.589 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 72.77654, degrees of freedom =4 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We-can say that we are 95% confident that 
there is a significant association between the ability to increase the amount of annual 
repayment (depending on the discount) and monthly income. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 31 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of the 
annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and facing a housing 
problem. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6A and the answers to question 4. 
Aims to: 
1. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing money 
to suit their specific needs; 
2. suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6A and 
the answers to question 4 (see Table 8.19). 
194 
Table 8.19 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6A 
and the Answers to Question 4 
Q. 6A Q. 4 
How much could you repay Are you facing a housing problem? 
in order to reduce (count and row percentages) 
the waiting period of 
the loan, as follows? 
Yes No 
SR 1,000 monthly, 27 1 
the waiting nerind - 96.4% 3.6% 
SR 2,000 monthly, 39 15 
the waitin period =7 ears 72.2% 27.8% 
SR 3,000 monthly, 37 23 
the waitin period =5 ears 61.7% 38.3% 
SR 4,000 monthly, 30 24 
the waitin period =3 ears 55.6% 44.4% 
SR 5,000 monthly, 8 20 
the waiting period =1 year 28.6% 71.4% 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required) 
Minimum expected frequency: 10.375 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 30.94236, degrees of freedom =4 and p-value =0 which is less than 0.05. 
Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident that 
there is a significant association between the ability to increase the amount of the annual 
repayment (depending on the waiting period) and facing a housing problem. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 32 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the discount) and facing a housing problem. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6B and the answers to question 4. 
Aims to: 
1. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing money 
to suit their specific needs; 
2. suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6B and the 
answers to question 4 (see Table 8.20). 
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Table 8.20 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6B 
and the Answers to Question 4 
Q. 6B Q. 4 
How many instalments Are you facing a housing 
could you repay problem? 
together 
in order to obtain 
discount, as follows? 
Yes No 
SR 1,000 monthly 36 5 
(discount =o 87.8% 12.2% 
SR 1,900 monthly 36 15 
discount = 5% 70.6% 29.4% 
SR 2,700 monthly 29 18 
discount =10% 61.7% 38.3% 
SR 3,400 monthly 19 16 
(discount = 15% 54.3% 45.7% 
SR 4,000 monthly 21 29 
(discount = 20% 42% 58% 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required) 
Minimum expected frequency: 12.969 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 22.70186, degrees of freedom =4 and p-value = 0.00015 which is less than 
0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident 
that there is a significant association between the ability to increase the amount of annual 
repayment (depending on the discount) and facing a housing problem. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 33 
There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 
instalment without discount and having already applied for an REDF loan. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6 and the answers to question 5. 
Aims to ascertain the socio-economic status of those who seek REDF loans (loan 
seekers). 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6 and the 
answers to question 5 (see Table 8.21). 
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Table 8.21 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6 
and the Answers to Question 5 
Q. 6 
Could you repay Q. 5 
the annual instalment 
without discount in 
Have you applied for an REDF loan? 
order to reduce (count and row percentages) the waiting period for 
obtaining the loan? Ye No 
Yes 147 9 
Q4 500 
No 
1 
1 77 17 
0 18.1% 
Minimum expected frequency: 9.776 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 9.54776, degrees of freedom =1 and p-value = 0.002 which is less than 
0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected. We can say that we are 95% confident 
that there is a significant association between the ability to repay the annual instalment 
without discount and having already applied for an REDF loan. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 34 
The policy of reducing the waiting period for obtaining the loan would be 
advantageous for the REDF, as would be the policy of choosing how much one 
wishes to repay in order to obtain the discount one can afford. 
Aims to suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test : t-test for paired samples. 
The aim is to see whether there is a difference between the two policies. It can be seen 
that the average repayment under the policy of reducing the waiting period for obtaining 
a loan is SR 3,000, whereas the average repayment under the policy of choosing how 
much one wishes to repay in order to obtain the discount one can afford is SR 2,606. 
A t-test was applied to see if the means of the repayment amount are significantly 
different. 
The p-value =0 which is less than. 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has been rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. 
Hence, the result is highly significant, and we can say that there is a difference between 
the two policies. 
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Table 8.22 
T-test for paired samples 
Variable 
Number 
of 
pairs 
Correlation 
p 
value 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error of 
mean 
Q. 6A 
How much 
could you 
repay in 
order to 3,000 1,220.16 81.525 
reduce the 
waiting 
period of 
theloan? 224 0.814 0.000 
Q. 6B 
How many 
instalments 
could you 
repay 2,606.25 1,060.525 70.859 
together 
in order 
to obtain 
discount? 
Table 8.22A 
Paired Differences 
Table 8.22B 
t-value Degrees of freedom p-value 
8.29 223 0.000 
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8.2.1.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYTICAL NULL 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO LOAN SEEKERS' QUESTIONS, 
WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED 
Table 8.23 
Summary of the Results of the Analytical Null Hypotheses Related to 
Loan Seekers' Questions, which have been Rejected 
No. The Null Hypotheses 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount 
1 of annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and number of 
denendants- 
There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 2 instalment without discount and monthl income. 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount 3 
of annual repayment (depending on the waiting eriod and monthl income. 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount 4 
of annual repayment (depending on the discount) and monthl income. 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount 
5 of the annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and facing a 
housing roblem. 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount 6 
of annual ra ent (depending on the discount) and number of dendants. 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount 
7 of annual repayment (depending on the discount) and facing a housing 
roblem. 
- There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 8 instalment without discount and havin alread a lied for an REDF loan. 
The policy of reducing the waiting period for obtaining the loan would be 
9 advantageous for the REDF, as would be the policy of choosing how much 
one wishes to repay in order to obtain the discount one can afford. 
8.2.2 THE ANALYTICAL HYPOTHESES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN 
REJECTED 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 35 
There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 
instalment without discount and marital status. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6 and the answers to question 1. 
Aims to ascertain the socio-economic status of those who seek REDF loans (loan 
seekers). 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6 and the 
answers to question 1, as shown in Table 8.24. 
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Table 8.24 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6 
and the Answers to Question 1 
Q. 6 Q. 1 
Could you repay Marital status of REDF 
the annual instalment 
without discount 
loan seekers 
in order to reduce the waiting (count and row percentages) 
eriod for obtaining the loan? Single Married 
52 172 
Yes 23.2% 76.8% 
7 19 
No 26.9% 73.1% 
Minimum expected frequency: 6.136 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 0.17772, degrees of freedom =1 and p-value = 0.67334 which is greater 
than 0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 
instalment without discount and marital status. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 36 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and marital status. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6A and the answers to question 1. 
Aims to: 
1. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing money 
to suit their specific needs; 
2. suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6A and the 
answers to question 1(see Table 8.25). 
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Table 8.25 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6A 
and the Answers to Question 1 
Q. 6A 
Q. 1 How much could you repay in order to reduce 
the waiting period of the loan, as follows? 
Marital (count and row ntaizesl 
status SR SR SR SR SR 
of 
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 
monthly, monthly, monthly, monthly, monthly, 
REDF the the the the the 
waiting waiting waiting waiting waiting loan 
period period period period period 
seekers =9 ears =7 ears =5 ears =3 years =1 year 
8 15 16 9 4 
Single 15.4% 28.8% 30.8% 17.3% 7.7% 
20 39 44 45 24 
Married 11.6% 22.7% 25.6% 26.2% 14% 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required). 
Minimum expected frequency: 6.5 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 4.03387, degrees of freedom =4 and p-value = 0.40144 which is greater 
than 0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is no significant association between the ability to increase the 
amount of annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and marital status. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 37 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the discount) and marital status. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6B and the answers to question 1. 
Aims to: 
1. consider loan seekers' views on being offered a flexible method of borrowing money 
to suit their specific needs; 
2. suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6B and the 
answers to question 1 (see Table 8.26). 
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FTable 8.26 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6B 
and the Answers to Question 1 
Q_1 Q. 6B 
How m any instalments could you repay together Marital in order to ob tain discount, as follows? 
status (count and row percentages) 
of SR SR SR SR SR 
REDF 1,000 1,900 2,700 3,400 4,000 
monthly monthly monthly monthly monthly loan (discount (discount (discount (discount (discount 
seekers = 0% = 5%) =10% =15% = 20% 
14 10 13 6 9 Single o 0 0 Olln 17 0 
27 41 34 29 41 Married 15.7% 23.8% 19.8% 16.9% 23.8% 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required). 
Minimum expected frequency: 8.125 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 5.12845, degrees of freedom =4 and p-value = 0.27437 which is greater 
than 0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is no significant association between the ability to increase the 
amount of annual repayment (depending on the discount) and marital status. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 38 
There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 
instalment without discount and number of dependants. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6 and the answers to question 2. 
Aims to ascertain the socio-economic status of those who seek REDF loans (loan 
seekers). 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6 and the 
answers to question 2 (see Table 8.27). 
202 
Table 8.27 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6 
and the Answers to Question 2 
Q. 6 
Could you repay 
Q. 2 
the annual instalment Number of dependants 
without discount in order 
to reduce the waiting period (count and row percentages) 
for obtaining the loan? 0 and 1 2-4 5-9 
57 90 77 
Yes o 407% 0 
69 11 
No 
1 1 23.1% 34.6% 42.3% 
Minimum expected frequency: 6.552 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 0.65044, degrees of freedom =2 and p-value = 0.72237 which is greater 
than 0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 
instalment without discount and number of dependants. 
HYPO'T'HESIS NO. 39 
There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 
instalment without discount and facing a housing problem. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6 and the answers to question 4. 
Aims to ascertain the socio-economic status of those who seek REDF loans (loan 
seekers). 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6 and the 
answers to question 4 (see Table 8.28). 
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Table 8.28 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6 
and the Answers to Question 4 
Q. 6 Q. 4 
Could you repay the annual Are you facing 
instalment without discount a housing problem? 
in order to reduce the waiting (count and row percentages) 
period for obtaining the loan? Yes No 
Yes 141 83 
62.9% 37.1% 
No 19 7 
73.1% 26.9% 
Minimum expected frequency: 9.36 
Number of missing observations: 0 
Chi-square = 1.03767, degrees of freedom =1 and p-value = 0.30836 which is greater 
than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 
instalment without discount and facing a housing problem. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 40 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and having already applied 
for an REDF loan. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6A and the answers to question 5. 
Aims to suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6A and the 
answers to question 5 (see Table 8.29). 
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Table 8.29 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6A 
and the Answers to Question 5 
Q. 6A 
Q. 5 How much could you repay in order to reduce 
the waiting period of the loan, as follows? Have (count nd row er entates) 
you SR SR SR SR SR 
applied 
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 
monthly, monthly, monthly, monthly, monthly, 
for the the the the the 
an REDF waiting waiting waiting waiting waiting 
period = period = period = period = period = 
loan? 9 years 7 years 5 years 3 years 1 year 
Yes 
17 31 39 38 23 
o 0 26.4% 25.7% 15.5% 
No 
11 23 21 16 5 
14.5% 30.3% 27.6 21.1% 6.6% 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required). 
Minimum expected frequency: 9.5 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 5.86877, degrees of freedom =4 and p-value = 0.20916 which is greater 
than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is no significant association between the ability to increase the 
amount of annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and having already 
applied for an REDF loan. 
HYPOTHESIS NO. 41 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the discount) and having already applied for an 
REDF loan. 
The correlation between the answers to question 6B and the answers to question 5. 
Aims to suggest methods by which the repayments to the REDF might be increased. 
Type of test: Chi-square of the cross-tabulation of the answers to question 6B and the 
answers to question 5 (see Table 8.30). 
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Table 8.30 
Cross-Tabulation of the Answers to Question 6B 
and the Answers to Question 5 
Q. 5 Q. 6B 
How many instalments could you repay t ogether Have in order to obtain discou nt, as follows? 
you (count and row percentages) 
applied SR SR SR SR SR 
for 1,000 1,900 2,700 3,400 4,000 
an REDF monthly monthly monthly monthly monthly (discount (discount (discount (discount (discount 
loan? 
= 00/01 = 1-9 o = 100161 = 016 1 = 200/6) 
Yes 
26 31 32 24 35 
17.6% 20.9% 21.6% 16.2% 23.6% 
No 
15 20 15 11 15 
19.7% 1 26.3% 1 19.7% 14.5% 19.7% 
Missing = 26 cases (answer not required). 
Minimum expected frequency: 11.875 
Number of missing observations: 26 
Chi-square = 1.29189, degrees of freedom =4 and p-value = 0.86275 which is greater 
than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis has not been rejected. We can say that we are 95% 
confident that there is no significant association between the ability to increase the 
amount of annual repayment (depending on the discount) and having already applied for 
an REDF loan. 
8.2.2.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYTICAL NULL 
HYPOTHESES RELATED TO LOAN SEEKERS' QUESTIONS, 
WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN REJECTED 
Table 8.31 
Summary of the Results of the Analytical Null Hypotheses Related to 
Loan Seekers' Questions, which have not been Rejected 
No. The Null Hypotheses 
There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 1 instalment without discount and marital status. 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 2 annual repayment (depending on the waiting eriod and marital status. 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 3 annual repayment (depending on the discount) and marital status. 
There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 4 instalment without discount and number of dendants. 
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5 
There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual 
instalment without discount and facing a housing, nroblem- 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
6 annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and having already applied 
for an REDF loan. 
There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
7 annual repayment (depending on the discount) and having already applied for 
an REDF loan. 
8.3 CONCLUSION 
Table 8.32 
Summary of the Results of the NO Hypotheses Related to 
Loan Seekers' Questions 
No. The Null Hypotheses The Result 
There is no significant association between the 
1 ability to repay the annual instalment without 
di. -; cnunt and marital qtatim 
has not been rejected 
There is no significant association between the 
2 ability 
to increase the amount of annual repayment has not been rejected (depending on the waiting period) and marital 
Ctable 
There is no significant association between the 
3 ability to increase the amount of annual repayment 
(denendinLy on the discount) and marital status. 
has not been rejected 
There is no significant association between the 
4 ability to repay the annual instalment without 
discount and number of denendants. 
has not been rejected 
There is no significant association between the 
5 ability 
to increase the amount of annual repayment has been rejected (depending on the waiting period) and number of 
There is no significant association between the 
6 ability to 
increase the amount of annual repayment has been rejected (depending on the discount) and number of 
elenendant-z 
There is no significant association between the 
7 ability to repay the annual instalment without 
discolMt and monthly income. 
has been rejected 
There is no significant association between the 
8 ability to 
increase the amount of annual repayment has been rejected (depending on the waiting period) and monthly 
There is no significant association between the 
9 ability to increase the amount of annual repayment 
(devend L, on the discount) and monthlv income. 
has been rejected 
There is no significant association between the 
10 ability to repay the annual instalment without has not been rejected 
discount and facing a housing roblem. 
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There is no significant association between the 
11 ability 
to increase the amount of the annual has been rejected repayment (depending on the waiting period) and 
There is no significant association between the 
12 ability 
to increase the amount of annual repayment has been rejected (depending on the discount) and facing a housing 
r1 
There is no significant association between the 
13 ability 
to repay the annual instalment without has been rejected discount and having already applied for an REDF 
loan. 
There is no significant association between the 
14 ability 
to increase the amount of annual repayment has not been rejected (depending on the waiting period) and having 
already lif for REDF loan. 
There is no significant association between the 
15 ability 
to increase the amount of annual repayment has not been rejected (depending on the discount) and having already 
lif an REDF loan. 
16 
There is no main reason for not applying for an has been rejected 
Loan seekers could not repay the annual 
17 instalment without discount in order to reduce the 
waiting neriod for obtaining an REDF loan- 
has been rejected 
The policy of reducing the waiting period for 
obtaining the loan would be advantageous for the 
18 REDF, as would be the policy of choosing how has been rejected 
much one wishes to repay in order to obtain the 
discount one can afford. 
Loan seekers do not agree that strong action 
19 should 
be taken to prevent overdue annual has been rejected 
repayments in order to reduce the waiting period 
for obtaining a loan. 
20 
Loan seekers could not repay SR 25,000 annually 
in order to obtain a housing loan of SR 500-000- 
has not been rejected 
21 
Loan seekers would not prefer to repay SR 20,000 
annualiv in order to obtain a villa- 
has been rejected 
The degree of acceptance of the option of a loan 
of SR 500,000 is equal to the degree of acceptance 
of the option of a villa among REDF loan seekers. 
22 has been rejected 
The acceptance of the option of a loan of SR 
500,000 and the acceptance of the option of a villa 
among REDF loan seekers are equally likely. 
23 
Loan seekers would take out a loan on which has been rejected interest is charged in order to build their houses. 
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24 
Loan seekers would not prefer Islamic housing 
financing methods. 
has been rejected 
25 
The main reason for not taking out a loan on has been rejected 
which interest is char ed is not vurely religious. 
26 
The three purchase methods are equally acceptable has been rejected to REDF loan seekers. 
27 
The three partnership methods are equally has been rejected acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
a) There is a significant association between the ability to repay the annual instalment 
without discount and monthly income; and having already applied for an REDF 
loan. 
b) There is no significant association between the ability to repay the annual instalment 
without discount and marital status; number of dependants; and facing a housing 
problem. 
c) There is a significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and number of dependants; 
monthly income; and facing a housing problem. 
d) There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the waiting period) and marital status; and having 
already applied for an REDF loan. 
e) There is a significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the discount) and number of dependants; monthly 
income; and facing a housing problem. 
f) There is no significant association between the ability to increase the amount of 
annual repayment (depending on the discount) and marital status; and having already 
applied for an REDF loan. 
g) There is a main reason for not applying for an REDF loan. 
h) The policy of reducing the waiting period for obtaining the loan would be 
advantageous for the REDF, as would be the policy of choosing how much one 
wishes to repay in order to obtain the discount one can afford. 
i) Loan seekers: 
" could repay the annual instalment without discount in order to reduce the waiting 
period for obtaining an REDF loan. 
" agree that strong action should be taken to prevent overdue annual repayments in 
order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining a loan. 
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" could not repay SR 25,000 annually in order to obtain a housing loan of SR 
500,000. 
" would prefer to repay SR 20,000 annually in order to obtain a villa. 
" would not take out a loan on which interest is charged in order to build their houses. 
" would prefer Islamic housing financing methods. 
j) The acceptance of the option of a loan of SR 500,000 and the acceptance of the 
option of a villa among REDF loan seekers are not equally likely. 
k) The main reason for not taking out a loan on which interest is charged is purely 
religious. 
1) The three purchase methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
m) The three partnership methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
MULTIVARIATE APPROACH 
9.0 INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters, two variables were examined at the same time. Here, more 
variables will be examined simultaneously, in an attempt to find a summary measurement 
of these variables. Specifically, this chapter aims to find out whether the sample 
individuals form any lind of groups or whether they are randomly scattered. Multivariate 
methods, such as Discriminant Analysis and Cluster Analysis, are available to serve this 
purpose. 
Discriminant Analysis starts by finding a combination of variables that best distinguish 
between the groups. These combinations are defined as Discriminant functions. To 
separate "J" groups, "J-1" Discriminant functions are required. 
This method is based on the assumption that all the variables have a normal distribution 
with the same standard deviation within each group. Departure of some of the variables 
from this assumption may be acceptable. However, there is no clear cut distinction 
between reliable and unreliable estimates of the Discriminant function in such situations. 
(For further details see Altman 1995, pp. 358-360, and Chatfield & Collins 1980, pp. 
133-138). 
Given these restrictions and since the data is generally categorical, the Discriminant 
method will not be used. The Cluster Analysis method, which is assumption-free, is more 
appropriate and will be used instead to identify groups, if there are any. 
9.1 CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
Cluster Analysis is a multivariate technique used to group objects of size "h" into classes, 
so that similar objects belong to the same class. The criteria used for classification are the 
characteristics of the "p" variables, associated with each object. This method does not 
determine the number of groups and it is the researcher's personal judgment which will 
do so. However, it has been found that by using this method, researchers are able to 
determine true groups. For example, in psychiatry there has been a great deal of 
disagreement over the classification of depressed patients and Cluster Analysis has been 
used to define objective groups (Manly, 1986). The method is also useful for data 
reduction. For example, in a study which involves the schools of a country, it may be 
impossible to include all the schools, but by finding clusters of similar schools, then a 
211 
sample may be drawn from each cluster to represent all the schools in that cluster. Such a 
sample would be representative and of a reasonable size. 
Many algorithms are available for Cluster Analysis. The most commonly used are the 
Hierarchical technique and the Partition technique. The Hierarchical technique defines 
groups which overlap, while the other method identifies independent groups. (For details 
see Chatfield and Collins 1980). 
In this research, the analysis will be confined to the partition approach, which is found to 
be more suitable to the purposes of the study. The method is defined as K-means by the 
SPSS program -a Statistical Package for Social Science - which is used in this analysis. 
The method allows objects to move in and out of groups at different stages of the 
analysis. It starts by taking arbitrary centres. Then, individuals are allocated to the 
nearest centre; in that way, new centres are created. These are the centres of the 
individuals within each group. Next, an individual is moved to another group if it is 
closer to that group's centre than it is to the centre of its present group. The process 
continues iteratively until stability is reached with the predetermined number of clusters. 
The partition technique (K means method) is able to work to identify groups for 
dichotomous variables if one of the two groups is coded zero. If the coding is of a binary 
form (i. e. 0,1 form) for the two categories, then the final cluster centre can be expressed 
in terms of the percentage of the category which is coded as "1". To explain the idea 
more clearly, consider a binary response which is coded "1" for "Yes" and "0" for "No". 
In a sample of five individuals the response was found to be, as follows: 1,0,1,0,0. The 
mean of the response is therefore: 1+0+1+0+0/5 = 2/5 = 0.4. This answer maybe 
expressed by saying that 40% of the respondents answered "Yes". In this study, the "0" 
and "1" codings have been used for the dichotomous variables. 
9.2 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
9.2.1 AIM 
The aim of the following analysis is to identify clusters of individuals which are similar in 
some sense within groups but different between groups. Two data sets are examined: 
existing borrowers and seekers of REDF loans. 
Since the cluster method is not appropriate for categorical variables with more than two 
categories, only dichotomous variables will be used. 
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9.2.2 BORROWERS 
A few solutions were attempted here, to form two, three, four and five clusters. The 
second and third solutions (three and four clusters respectively) were found to be more 
meaningful than the others (two and five clusters) and will be discussed further in detail. 
The binary variables used here are: 
1. Q. 1 Marital status? 
2. Q. 4 Did you construct more than one housing unit? 
3. Q. 5 Did your annual repayment (SR 9,600) ever get delayed? 
4. Q. 6 Would you prefer to repay your annual repayment (SR 9,600) by monthly 
direct debit (i. e. SR 800 monthly)? 
5. Q. 7 Would you prefer to repay your annual repayment (SR 9,600) and the value 
of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit? 
9.2.2.1 - THREE CLUSTER SOLUTION 
The outcome of the three-cluster analysis is presented in Tables 9.1 and 9. IA. 
Table 9.1 
Three Cluster Solution 
QUESTION NO. 1 45 6 7 
CLUSTER I 0 1 0.6509 1 0.9527 
CLUSTER 2 0.1053 0.3158 0.1053 0.5263 0 
CLUSTER 3 0.0161 0 0.7581 1 0.7419 
Table 9.1A 
Number of Cases 
CLUSTER NUMBER OF CASES 
CLUSTER 1 169 
CLUSTER 2 19 
CLUSTER 3 62 
TOTAL 250 
The following observations may be made in respect of this solution: 
1. The variable Q. 1: `Marital status? ', is not helpful for the classification, since the 
number of single individuals is very small (only three respondents, 1.2% of the 
survey population). 
2. Considering Q. 4: `Did you construct more than one housing unit? ', the response 
was as follows: 
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a) the first cluster consists entirely (100%) (one hundred and sixty-nine 
members) of those who answered "Yes"; 
b) about 32% of second cluster answered "Yes"; 
c) the third cluster is comprised solely of those who answered "No" to the 
same question. 
That is to say, there is a great difference between the first cluster and the second 
cluster with respect to their answers to Q. 4. 
3. Considering Q. 5: `Did your annual repayment ever get delayed? ', the response 
was as follows: 
a) about 65% of the first cluster answered "Yes"; 
b) about 11% of the second cluster did so; 
c) about 76% of the third cluster did so. 
In other words, there is a great difference between the first and the third clusters 
and the second cluster with respect to their answers to Q. 5. 
4. Considering Q. 6: `Would you prefer to repay your annual repayment (SR 9,600) 
by monthly direct debit (i. e. SR 800 monthly)? ', the response was as follows: 
a) the first and third clusters consist entirely (100%) of individuals who 
answered "Yes"; 
b) about 53% of the second cluster answered "Yes". 
To summarise, there is a difference between the first and the third clusters and the 
second cluster with respect to their answers to Q. 6. It should be mentioned in this 
context that the majority of the first and third clusters (65%, 76% respectively) 
had sometimes delayed their annual repayment (SR 9,600). Hence, one way to 
overcome the problem of repayments being overlooked would be to introduce a 
system of monthly repayment by direct debit. 
5. The response to Q. 7: `Would you prefer to repay your annual repayment (SR 
9,600) and the value of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by 
monthly direct debit? ', showed considerable difference between clusters. About 
95% of the first cluster answered "Yes", as did about 74% of the third cluster, 
whereas no one (0%) from the second cluster answered "Yes". 
As expected from the previous findings, the percentage of the second cluster who 
answered "Yes" to question seven was less than the percentage who replied 
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affirmatively (53%) to the previous question. In other words, there is a great 
difference between the first and the third clusters and the second cluster, with 
respect to their answers to Q. 7. 
9.2.2.2 FOUR CLUSTER SOLUTION 
Tables 9.2 and 9.2A present the four-cluster analysis of borrowers' responses. 
Table 9.2 
Four Cluster Solution 
QUESTION NO. 1 4 5 6 7 
CLUSTER 1 0 1 0.6335 1 1 
CLUSTER 2 0.04 0.08 0 1 0.6 
CLUSTER 3 0.1111 0.4444 0.2222 0 0 
CLUSTER 4 0.0182 0.1455 1 1 0.5636 
Table 9.2A 
Number of Cases 
CLUSTER NUMBER OF CASES 
CLUSTER 1 161 
CLUSTER 2 25 
CLUSTER 3 9 
CLUSTER 4 55 
TOTAL 250 
The following observations may be made in respect of this solution: 
1. The variable Q. 1, for the reasons discussed earlier, is once again not very useful 
for classification. 
2. With regard to Q. 4 `Did you construct more than one housing unit? ', the 
response was as follows: 
a) the first cluster consists entirely (100%) (one hundred and sixty-one 
individuals) of those who answered "Yes"; 
b) the second cluster is dominated by those who answered "No"; 
c) the third cluster contains about 44% who answered "Yes"; 
d) the fourth cluster contains about 15% who answered "Yes". 
That is to say, there is a great difference between the first cluster and the second 
cluster with respect to their answers to Q. 4. 
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3. With respect to Q. 5: `Did your annual repayment (SR 9,600) ever get delayed? ', 
the response was as follows: 
a) about 63% of the first cluster answered "Yes"; 
b) the entire second cluster answered "No"; 
c) about 22% of the third cluster answered "Yes"; 
d) all members (100%) of the fourth cluster (fifty-five individuals) answered 
`Yes". 
In other words, with respect to Q. 5, there is a clear difference between the first 
cluster and the second cluster. This means that those individuals who constructed 
more than one housing unit (the first cluster) may not be able to repay the annual 
repayments of SR 9,600 regularly. Hence, the REDF loan should be granted to: 
a) those who want to build one housing unit; 
b) those who want to build more than one housing unit, provided they are 
able to repay the annual repayments of SR 9,600 regularly. 
4. With respect to Q. 6: `Would you prefer to repay your annual repayment (SR 
9,600) by monthly direct debit (i. e. SR 800 monthly)? ', the response was as 
follows: 
a) all members (100%) of the first, second and fourth clusters answered 
"Yes"; 
b) all members (100%) of the third cluster (nine individuals) answered "No". 
That is to say, there is a great difference between the first, second and fourth 
clusters and the third cluster with respect to their answers to Q. 6. 
It should be mentioned in this context that the majority of the first and fourth 
clusters had sometimes delayed their annual repayment (SR 9,600). Hence, one 
way to overcome the problem of repayments being overlooked would be to 
introduce a system of monthly repayment by direct debit. 
5. The pattern of the clusters with respect to Q. 7: `Would you prefer to repay your 
annual repayment (SR 9,600) and the value of one instalment prior to the due 
date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit? ', is as follows: 
a) all members (100%) of the first cluster (one hundred and sixty-one 
individuals) answered "Yes"; 
b) 60% of the second cluster did so; 
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c) all members (100%) of the third cluster (nine individuals) answered "No' ; 
d) about 56% of the fourth cluster answered "Yes". 
It was to be expected, from the previous findings, that the percentage of the third 
cluster who answered "Yes" to question seven would be 0% (the same as for the 
previous question). In other words, there is a great difference between the first, 
second and fourth clusters and the third cluster, with respect to their answers to 
Q. 7. 
It can also be seen clearly that the first cluster, which is fairly large as it is made up of 
one hundred and sixty-one individuals (see Table 9.2A), consists of individuals who 
constructed more than one housing unit; these people answered "Yes" to both questions 
6 and 7 and about 63% of them answered "Yes" to Q. 5 (see Table 9.2). 
9.2.3 LOAN SEEKERS 
Various numbers of clusters (two, three, four and five) were examined in an attempt to 
identify a sensible grouping. The first and second choices, i. e. the two - and three - 
cluster options, will be discussed in detail, as they produced the most meaningful 
solutions. As stated earlier, the number of clusters is not determined by the method but is 
a matter for the researcher's discretion. The variables that are suitable for the present 
purposes are: 
1. Q. 1 Marital status. 
2. Q. 4 Are you facing a housing problem? 
3. Q. 5 Have you applied for an REDF loan? 
4. Q. 6 Could you repay the annual instalment (SR 12,000) without discount in 
order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining the loan? 
5. Q. 8 Could you repay SR 25,000 annually in order to obtain a housing loan of SR 
500,000? 
6. Q. 9 The REDF is considering building estates consisting of villas, each having a 
floor area of 230 square metres, and consisting of six large rooms. The villa 
would be built on a plot of land of 400 square metres, valued at SR 400,000 
repayable over 20 years (ie. SR 20,000 annually). The villa would be available 
one year after the date of application. Would you prefer this option? 
7. Q. 10 Which option would you prefer? 
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9.2.3.1 TWO CLUSTER SOLUTION 
Tables 9.3 and 9.3A respectively present the two-cluster analysis of seekers' responses 
and the size of the clusters so produced. 
Table 9.3 
Two Cluster Solution 
QUESTION NO. 1 4 5 6 8 9 10 
CLUSTER 1 0.8676 0.25 0.4265 0.8529 0.3971 0.8824 0.0882 
CLUSTER 2 0 0.7857 0.6978 0.9121 0.4121 0.8297 0.2473 
Table 9.3A 
Number of Cases 
CLUSTER NUMBER OF CASES 
CLUSTER 1 68 
CLUSTER 2 182 
TOTAL 250 
The following observations may be made in respect of this analysis: 
1. The first cluster consists of mostly single individuals, as answers to Q. 1 show that 
about 87% of this cluster are singles. On the other hand, the second cluster is 
entirely (100%) made up of married individuals (one hundred and eighty-two 
members). 
In brief there is a great difference between the first cluster and the second cluster 
with respect to their answers to Q. 1. 
2. Considering Q. 4: `Are you facing a housing problem?, the response was as 
follows: 
a) 25% of the first cluster answered "Yes"; 
b) about 79% of the second cluster answered "Yes". 
As expected from the previous finding, the majority of the second cluster, who 
are all married, are facing housing problems. The above findings are probably due 
to the fact that most of the people who answered negatively had fewer 
dependants. 
3. Considering Q. 5: `Have you applied for an REDF loan? ', the response was as 
follows: 
a) about 43% of the first cluster have applied for an REDF loan; 
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b) about 70% of the second cluster have done so. 
A possible explanation for this could be one of the following: 
1. The majority (79%) of the second cluster, who are all married, are facing 
housing problems, as previously stated. 
2. The individuals of the first cluster are, on average, younger than those of the 
second cluster. Accordingly, they may not own a plot of land due to the 
considerable rise in price of residential land in the cities (see page 127). 
Hence, they do not meet the condition for REDF loan application. 
4. Considering Q. 6: `Could you repay the annual instalment (SR 12,000) without 
discount in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining the loan? ', the 
response was as follows: 
a) about 85% of the first cluster answered "Yes"; 
b) about 91% of the second cluster answered "Yes". 
In other words, the proportion who answered "files" to Q. 6 is very similar for 
both clusters; it is over 85%. However, the proportion of the second cluster who 
answered "Yes" to Q. 6 is larger than that of the first cluster, since the majority 
(79%) of the second cluster, who are all married, are facing housing problems, as 
previously mentioned. 
5. Considering Q. 8: `Could you repay SR 25,000 annually in order to obtain a 
housing loan of SR 500,000? ', the response was as follows: 
a) about 40% of the first cluster answered "Yes"; 
b) about 41 % of the second cluster answered "Yes". 
In other words, in each cluster only about 40% answered affirmatively. That is to 
say, there is very little difference between the two groups with respect to their 
answers to Q. 8. 
6. Considering Q. 9: `The REDF is considering building estates consisting of villas, 
each having a floor area of 230 square metres, and consisting of six large rooms. 
The villa would be built on a plot of land of 400 square metres, valued at SR 
400,000 repayable over 20 years (i. e. SR 20,000 annually). The villa would be 
available one year after the date of application. Would you prefer this option? ', 
the response was as follows: 
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a) about 88% of the first cluster answered "Yes"; 
b) about 83% of the second cluster did so. 
That is to say, the vast majority (over 82%) of each cluster answered "Yes" to 
this question. However, the proportion who answered "Yes" to Q. 9 from the first 
cluster (the group of single individuals) is slightly larger than that of the second 
cluster (the married group). This finding may be explained by the fact that the 
individuals of the first cluster did not own a plot of land, as previously stated. 
7. Considering Q. 10: `Which option would you prefer? ', referring to the preference 
for the villa or cash option; in the first cluster only about 9% answered "Yes" for 
cash preference, while only about 25% of the second cluster did so. This shows, 
in general, that the villa option is more popular. In addition, this finding supports 
the previous finding. 
The two cluster solution seems to have differentiated between the two clusters mainly 
with respect to the variables represented by questions 1,4,5 and 10. 
9.2.3.2 THREE CLUSTER SOLUTION 
Tables 9.4 and 9.4A present the outcomes of the three-cluster analysis of seekers' 
responses. 
Table 9.4 
Three Cluster Solution 
QUESTION NO. 1 4 5 6 8 9 10 
CLUSTER 1 0 1 0.6446 0.876 0.2231 0.9091 0.0165 
CLUSTER 2 0.0377 0.434 0.7547 0.9811 0.9434 0.6038 0.8491 
CLUSTER 3 0.75 0.2105 0.5 0.8684 0.3289 0.9079 0.0526 
Table 9.4A 
Number of Cases 
CLUSTER NUMBER OF CASES 
CLUSTER 1 121 
CLUSTER 2 53 
CLUSTER 3 76 
TOTAL 250 
This solution yields a good and sensible classification of individuals, since more 
distinguishable groups are created. Further details of smaller groups are displayed. The 
following observations may be made in respect of this solution: 
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1. The first two clusters are dominated by married couples (that is, they contain 0% 
and about 4% of single respondents respectively) while 75% of the third cluster 
are single individuals. 
2. All members (100%) of the first cluster (one hundred and twenty-one 
individuals), who are all married, are facing housing problems, as are around 43% 
of the second cluster and about 21 % of the third cluster. 
As expected from the previous finding, all individuals of the first cluster, who are 
all married, are facing housing problems. It appears likely that, in general, the 
people who answered negatively to Q. 4 had fewer dependants than those who 
answered affirmatively. 
The difference with respect to Q. 5: `Have you applied for an REDF loan? ', is not 
considerable: close to 64% of the first cluster, about 75% of the second cluster 
and 50% of the third cluster answered "Yes". Possible explanations for this could 
be the following: 
1. All individuals of the first cluster, who are all married, are facing housing 
problems, as previously stated. 
2. The individuals of the third cluster are on average younger than those of the 
first cluster. Accordingly, they may not own a plot of land as previously 
mentioned. Hence, they would not meet the condition for REDF loan 
application. 
3. Considering Q. 6: `Could you repay the annual instalment (SR 12,000) without 
discount in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining the loan? ', close to 
88% of the first cluster, compared with about 98% of the second cluster, and 
nearly 87% of the third cluster, answered "Yes" to the question. 
In other words, the proportion who answered "Yes" to Q. 6 is very similar for the 
three clusters; it is over 86%. 
4. Considering Q. 8: `Could you repay SR 25,000 annually in order to obtain a 
housing loan of SR 500,000? ', the response was as follows: 
a) about 22% of the first cluster said they favoured the loan scheme; 
b) about 94% of the second cluster did so; 
c) about 33% of the third cluster did so. 
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To put it more simply, there is a difference between the second cluster and the 
third cluster with respect to their answers to Q. 8. This finding supports the 
finding of Q. 9 in the two cluster solution. 
5. Considering Q. 9: `Would you prefer the villa option? ', the response was as 
follows: 
a) about 91% of the first and third clusters answered "Yes"; 
b) about 60% of the second cluster answered "Yes". 
Thus, it can also be said that with respect to Q. 9 that there is a clear difference 
between the first and the third clusters and the second cluster. However, the 
proportion who answered "Yes" to Q. 9 from the third cluster (the group of single 
individuals) is larger than that of the second cluster (the married group). This 
finding may be explained by the fact that the individuals of the third cluster did 
not own a plot of land, as suggested previously. 
6. Considering Q. 10: `Which option would you prefer? ', the response was as 
follows: 
a) about 2% of the first cluster preferred the cash option; 
b) about 85% of the second cluster did so; 
c) about 5% of the third cluster did so. 
In other words, Q. 10 is another variable which shows a great deal of difference 
between the second cluster as compared with the other two clusters. The vast 
majority (over 94.7%) of the first and third clusters preferred the villa option. 
The responses to this question are very consistent with the relevant answers to 
Q. 8. In addition, this finding supports the finding in relation to Q. 10 in the two 
cluster solution. 
9.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The Cluster Analysis was found to be useful in identifying groups of individuals. 
9.3.1 THE BORROWERS DATA SET 
First, a three cluster solution was considered (Table 9.1). The first cluster is dominated 
by those who answered "Yes" to questions 4,5,6 and 7. This cluster is the biggest 
cluster as it consists of one hundred and sixty-nine members (see Table 9. IA). In the first 
cluster the pattern of answers to these questions is rather similar to that of the third 
cluster, with the exception of the answers to Q. 4, to which all members (100%) of the 
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third cluster answered "No". The second cluster is generally dominated by those who 
answered "No" to questions 4,5 and 7, while just over 52% of them answered "Yes" to 
Q. 6. 
The four cluster solution (Table 9.2) yields another classification. Generally speaking, the 
first cluster is dominated by respondents who answered "Yes" to all questions 
considered, while the third cluster is dominated by "No" respondents. The second cluster 
is dominated by those who answered "No" to questions 4 and 5, while they answered 
"Yes" to questions 6 and 7. In the fourth cluster, all members (100%) (fifty-five 
individuals) answered "Yes" to questions 5 and 6, and about 56% of them answered 
"Yes" to question 7 while only about 15% of them answered `Yes" to question 4. 
It was concluded from the first data set that: 
1. one way to overcome the problem of repayments being overlooked, would be to 
introduce a system of monthly repayment by direct debit; 
2. the REDF loan should be granted to: 
a) those who want to build one housing unit; 
b) those who want to build more than one housing unit and are capable of 
repaying the annual repayments of SR 9,600 regularly. 
9.3.2 THE LOAN SEEKERS DATA SET 
A two cluster solution (Table 9.3) was able to identify two distinguishable groups. The 
first cluster is comprised mainly of single individuals and the second cluster is made up 
mainly of married individuals. 
The main feature of the singles group is that they are very likely to answer "Yes" 
regarding the preference of a villa option, as indicated by their answers to questions 8,9 
and 10. 
The married group (one hundred and eighty-two members) was found to be more likely 
to: 
1. face housing problems than the single group; 
2. have applied for an REDF loan. 
The rest of the variables (questions 6,8 and 9) involved in this solution were found to be 
less important, as they were unable to reflect a clear difference between the two clusters. 
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On the other hand, the three cluster solution (Table 9.4) tends to give more details about 
smaller sub-groups. The main features of the married group are that they are: 
1. facing more housing problems; 
2. very likely to answer "Yes" regarding preference of a loan option, as indicated by 
their answers to questions 8,9 and 10. 
Finally, it is clear that the method has achieved a sensible grouping using the 
dichotomous variables only. It should be stated that more variables could be transformed 
to a binary form and could then be involved in the cluster solution. However, the loss of 
information which would be involved in the process of transformation for this purpose is 
not easily justifiable. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
The economic boom which began in Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s led to urban 
migration on a large scale, a serious housing shortage and an escalation in the cost of 
rented accommodation. Thus, housing became an urgent priority to be addressed by the 
Saudi government's development plans. 
The REDF provides long-term soft loans for the construction of houses and apartment 
blocks. In addition to alleviating the housing shortage, it is intended to serve capital 
formation and wealth redistribution objectives. The second and the third five-year 
development plans (1975-1985), witnessed considerable progress, exceeding the planned 
targets. However, in later plan periods, the number of housing units built with REDF 
assistance has been below planned levels. Government funding for the REDF has 
declined, the goal of becoming self-financing through loan repayments has not been 
achieved, and there is a long waiting period for loans. Hence, the housing provision in 
the Kingdom has witnessed some notable successes, but there have also been some 
unfortunate failures. The possibility of improving the situation by enhancing the 
effectiveness of the REDF is considered in this study. 
It may be observed that Islamic financing techniques are far more interesting and 
complex than conventional banking. Even in the case of deposit mobilisation, Islamic 
financing techniques have been able to offer various novel kinds of financial products. 
However, it is in the area of assets rather than in liabilities that the practices of Islamic 
banks are more diverse and complex than those of conventional banks. 
It is generally believed that Murabahah is the most widely-used technique and that the 
majority of the financing provided by Islamic banks goes to short-term trade and the 
financing of real estate. 
There is no doubt that Murabahah was the most popular financing technique in the early 
stages of the development of Islamic banks. This was for several reasons, as follows: 
First, Murabahah is simple to apply. In terms of the simplicity of application, the 
Murabahah financing technique may be best placed to compete with conventional 
interest based borrowing. All other Islamic financing techniques require more elaborate 
arrangements for their application. 
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Second, it was possible to get higher returns on depositors' money using this technique, 
and in their initial stages of establishment and development, Islamic banks required 
higher returns in order to build up their confidence (Ahmad, A. 1993). 
However, it should be borne in mind that the dynamics of contemporary Islamic banking 
change at a fast rate under market pressure. Hence, it may be that the composition of the 
financing techniques used by Islamic banks is also undergoing a significant change. 
These techniques offer a number of feasible alternatives to the western-style mortgage 
system, which can be used in the area of housing finance. 
Nevertheless, there are disadvantages as well as advantages with each of these financing 
techniques. For instance, under Murabahah and Bay'ajil the capital provider would be 
wise to adopt extra precautionary measures, such as mortgages, since the client faces no 
penalties for delayed repayment. 
Thus, each of the financing techniques has its own particular profile. This makes it 
possible to see that the capital provider must select his approved mode of financing 
according to the nature of the enterprise, and that the complexity and variety of banking 
techniques that have grown in reponse to Islam ensure him a great flexibility of choice. 
At present, housing finance in Saudi Arabia is provided primarily through the REDF. 
In Chapter Five, the study has revealed that the majority of REDF borrowers are 
married, with moderately large families. They are spread across all income groups, 
though middle and higher income groups appear to have benefited more than the low 
income groups. The majority of the respondents had built more than one housing unit, 
which means the REDF loans are being used to finance investment projects. Those who 
built only one unit were meeting a substantial portion of the cost from their own 
resources, raising the question of whether the loan should be increased (and fewer loans 
made) or whether the REDF should allow its share of construction cost per unit to fall, 
in order to serve more applicants. The majority of the respondents had failed to meet 
repayments on time due to a variety of reasons such as inability to repay, forgetfulness 
and carelessness. Some borrowers felt no responsibility to repay their loans on time, 
which has contributed to the low rate of repayment. Monthly direct debits could solve 
the first two problems, while clear information and warnings of strong action could help 
change the attitudes of borrowers. If these methods are used in combination, it should be 
possible for the waiting period for obtaining a loan to be reduced.. 
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The study also revealed that the vast majority of the loan seekers respondents were 
married. They, too, were spread across all income groups. Most of them were facing 
housing problems and had already applied for an REDF loan. Those who had not, were 
prevented from doing so because they did not own a plot of land. 
Most of the respondents were prepared to repay the annual instalment without discount 
in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining an REDF loan, and would be 
prepared to repay multiple instalments to obtain varying levels of discount. 
Widespread approval was expressed concerning the suggestion to implement strong 
action in order to prevent overdue annual repayments. 
A considerable level of interest was expressed in the proposed alternative schemes, 
whereby borrowers would pay more to gain some advantage. Of the schemes suggested, 
the one which found most favour was the option of a villa. This would obviously be an 
advantage to those who lack land of their own. 
Hardly any of the respondents would be prepared to consider an interest bearing loan, 
for religious reasons. However, all the Islamic alternatives suggested gained support. 
Murabahah is the preferred method of financing among the Islamic purchase methods, 
while the first type of partnership is the preferred technique of financing among the 
Islamic partnership housing finance methods. 
Thus, there is ample evidence from the responses that a more varied and flexible 
approach to housing finance, which would reduce the burden on the REDF, would be 
welcomed by both existing and potential loan applicants. 
The statistical analysis presented in Chapters Seven and Eight revealed that: 
a) SR 300,000 is less than 70% of the construction cost of one housing unit. 
b) Forgetting to repay is a main reason for the delayed repayment of an annual 
instalment. 
c) The borrowers: 
a have not been on time with their annual repayments of SR 9,600; 
" would prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) by monthly direct 
debit; 
0 would prefer to repay the annual instalment (SR 9,600) and the value of one 
instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by monthly direct debit; 
d) The land ownership condition is a main reason for not applying for an REDF loan. 
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e) The policy of reducing the waiting period for obtaining the loan would be more 
advantageous for the REDF than the policy of choosing how much one wishes to 
repay in order to obtain the discount one can afford. 
f) Loan seekers: 
" could repay the annual instalment without discount in order to reduce the waiting 
period for obtaining an REDF loan. 
" agree that strong action should be taken to prevent overdue annual repayments in 
order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining a loan. 
" would prefer to repay SR 20,000 annually in order to obtain a villa. 
" would not take out a loan on which interest is charged in order to build their houses. 
" would prefer Islamic housing financing methods. 
g) The acceptance of the option of a loan of SR 500,000 is less than the acceptance of 
the option of a villa among REDF loan seekers. 
h) The main reason for not taking out a loan on which interest is charged is purely 
religious. 
i) The three purchase methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
j) The three partnership methods are not equally acceptable to REDF loan seekers. 
It was concluded from Chapter Nine that: 
" One way to overcome the problem of repayments being overlooked, would be to 
introduce a system of monthly repayment by direct debit; 
" The REDF loan should be granted to: 
1. those who want to build one housing unit; 
2. those who want to build more than one housing unit and are capable of repaying 
the annual repayments of SR 9,600 regularly. 
" The married group was found to be more likely to: 
1. face housing problems than the single group; 
2. have applied for an REDF loan; 
3. answer "Yes" regarding preference of a loan option. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
Dear REDF Borrower 
Dear REDF loan seeker 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain your opinions towards certain 
financial matters regarding the Real Estate Development Fund. The questionnaire 
responses will be used for my PhD thesis. Your co-operation will be greatly 
appreciated. 
Please indicate your answer with a tick in front of the answer that you consider to 
be the most appropriate for each question. You do not need to write your name on 
this questionnaire. 
Note: Your replies are anonymous and all information will be treated as strictly 
confidential. 
Thank you. 
Hamad Al-Tasan 
Department of Economics 
King Abdulaziz University 
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Questions for Borrowers 
Please indicate your answer with a tick Q. 
Q. 1 Marital status: 
Single. Q 
Married. Q 
Q. 2 Number of dependants: ................ 
Q. 3 Monthly income group (from all sources): 
(please tick the appropriate box) 
Less than SR 3,000. Q 
From SR 3,000 - 6,000. 
Q 
From SR 6,001 - 9,000. 
Q 
More than SR 9,000. Q (please specify) SR .............. 
Q. 4 Did you construct more than one housing unit? 
Yes. Q (proceed to question 5) 
No. Q 
Q. 4A If no, was the construction cost more than SR 429,000? 
Yes. Q 
No. Q 
Q. 5 Did your annual repayment (SR 9,600) ever get delayed? 
Yes. Q 
No. Q (proceed to question 6) 
Q. 5A If yes, why did you delay? (please tick all which apply) 
I could not repay. 
Q 
I forgot to repay. 
Q 
I did not want to repay. 
Q 
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Q. 6 Would you prefer to repay your annual repayment (SR 9,600) by 
monthly direct debit (i. e. SR 800 monthly)? 
Yes. Q 
No. Q 
Q. 7 Would you prefer to repay your annual repayment (SR 9,600) and 
the value of one instalment prior to the due date (SR 8,400) by 
monthly direct debit? 
Yes. Q 
No. Q 
Q. 8 Please indicate your opinion regarding the following statement: 
Your prompt repayment would reduce the waiting period for those 
who seek loans. (please tick the appropriate box). 
Strongly agree. 
Q 
Agree. Q 
Undetermined. Q 
Disagree. Q 
Strongly disagree. Q 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
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Questions for those who seek REDF loans 
Please indicate your answer by a tick 
Q. 
Q. I Your marital status: 
Single. Q 
Married. Q 
Q. 2 Your number of dependants: 
Q. 3 Your monthly income group (from all sources): 
(please tick appropriate box). 
Less than SR 3,000. Q 
From SR 3,000 - SR 6,000. 
Q 
From SR 6,001 - SR 9,000. 
Q 
More than SR 9,000. Q (please specify) SR ............... 
Q. 4 Are you facing a housing problem? 
Yes. 
Q 
No. Q 
Q. 5 Have you applied for an REDF Loan? 
Yes. Q (proceed to question no. 6) 
No. Q 
Q. 5A If no, please state why? (please tick all which apply). 
I do not own a plot of land. 
0 
The waiting period for obtaining the loan is too long. 
Q 
I have insufficient money. 
0 
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Q. 6 Could you repay the annual instalment (SR 12,000) without 
discount in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining the 
loan? 
Yes. Q 
No. Q (proceed to question no. 7) 
Q. 6A If yes, how much could you repay in order to reduce the waiting 
period for obtaining the loan as follows? (please tick 
appropriate box). 
SR 1,000 monthly (the waiting period =9 years). 
Q 
SR 2,000 monthly (the waiting period =7 years). 
Q 
SR 3,000 monthly (the waiting period =5 years). 
Q 
SR 4,000 monthly (the waiting period =3 years). 
Q 
SR 5,000 monthly (the waiting period =1 year). 
Q 
Q. 6B How many instalments could you repay together in order to 
obtain discount as follows? (please tick appropriate box). 
1 instalment = SR 1,000 monthly (i. e. 00% discount). 
Q 
2 instalments = SR 1,900 monthly (i. e. 05% discount) .Q 
3 instalments = SR 2,700 monthly (i. e. 10% discount) .Q 
4 instalments = SR 3,400 monthly (i. e. 15% discount) .Q 
5 instalments = SR 4,000 monthly (i. e. 20% discount). 
Q 
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Q. 7 Please indicate your opinion about the following statement: 
Strong action should be taken to prevent overdue annual 
repayments in order to reduce the waiting period for obtaining a 
loan. (please tick appropriate box). 
Strongly agree. 
Q 
Agree. Q 
Undetermined. Q 
Disagree. Q 
Strongly disagree. Q 
Q. 8 Could you repay SR 25,000 annually in order to obtain a housing 
loan of SR 500,000? 
Yes. Q 
No. Q 
Q. 9 The REDF is considering building estates consisting of villas, each 
having a floor area of 230 square metres, and consisting of six 
large rooms. The villa would be built on a plot of land of 400 
square metres, valued at SR 400,000 repayable over 20 years (i. e. 
SR 20,000 annually). The villa would be available one year after 
the date of the application form. Would you prefer this option? 
Yes. Q 
No. Q 
Q. 10 Which option would you prefer? 
The option of cash (Q. 8). 
Q 
The option of a villa (Q. 9). 
Q 
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Q. 11 If there were no REDF's loan, would you take out a loan on which 
interest is charged in order to build your house? 
Yes. Q (proceed to question no. 12) 
No. Q 
Q. 11A If no, please state why? (please tick all which apply). 
It is prohibited. 
Q 
The repayments would become very heavy. 
Q 
It is difficult to meet the required conditions. 
Q 
Q. 12 If Islamic housing financing methods were available, would you 
prefer them? 
Yes. Q (proceed to question no. 13) 
No. Q 
Q. 12A If no, please state why? (please tick all which apply). 
It takes too long to obtain the loan. 
Q 
Lack of knowledge and awareness. 
Q 
The schemes are not very easy to understand. 
Q 
The instalments would be very great. 
Q 
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13- Here are three options. Please read each carefully. Then, rank them 
according to your own preference: 
A. Murabaha: The financier purchases the house according to 
specifications determined by the beneficiary. The house ownership is 
then transferred to the beneficiary by instalment plan according to a 
pre-agreed schedule. The contract states that the financier is entitled to 
a specific profit margin. As security for the deferred payments, the 
financier is entitled to ask the beneficiary for collateral, such as the 
deeds of the house. 
B. Istisna: The financier provides building materials and constructs the 
property according to specifications determined by the beneficiary. The 
contract specifies price, delivery time and method of payment. After 
construction, the ownership is then transferred to the beneficiary by 
instalment plan according to a pre-agreed schedule. As security for the 
deferred payments, the financier is entitled to ask the beneficiary for 
collateral, such as the deeds of the house. 
C. Lease purchase: Leasing, leading to ownership: The financier 
constructs or purchases the house according to specifications 
determined by the beneficiary. The house will be the property of the 
financier, who leases it to the beneficiary with a promise to transfer the 
ownership when and if all the leases are paid. The contract transfers 
from a leasing agreement to a sale agreement upon payment of the last 
instalment. Normally the financier will compute the total lease value of 
the property on the basis of cost plus profit. 
Please indicate your first and second preferences: 
- My first preference is: () 
- My second preference is: () 
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14- Here are three options. Please read each carefully. Then, rank them 
according to your own preference: 
A. Partnership ending with Sale: The financier constructs or purchases the 
house according to specifications determined by the beneficiary. The 
beneficiary will contribute part of the cost and the house will be jointly 
owned in proportion to their shares. Upon completion of construction, 
the financier sells his share in the property to the beneficiary according to 
an agreed percentage of profit. This is done by instalments according to 
a specific schedule. As security for the deferred payments, the financier 
is entitled to ask the beneficiary for collateral, such as the deeds of the 
house. 
B. Partnership: The financier constructs or purchases the house according 
to specifications determined by the beneficiary. The beneficiary 
contributes part of the cost and the property is jointly owned in 
proportion to their shares. The rent is determined according to the 
prevailing market rates. The beneficiary resides in the property and pays 
a specific amount of rent to the fmancier, representing his share in the 
rent. After an agreed time span, the house is sold at market price and the 
sale price is divided according to the ownership shares. The beneficiary 
has the priority right to purchase the property. 
C. Diminishing Partnership: The financier constructs or purchases the 
house according to specifications determined by the beneficiary. The 
beneficiary contributes part of the cost and the property is jointly owned 
in proportion to their shares. The value and rent of the property are 
determined according to the prevailing market rates. The beneficiary 
resides in the house and pays a specific amount of rent to the financier. 
This consists of his share of the rent and a portion of the sale price of his 
share in the ownership. As this continues, the beneficiary will increase 
his share in the partnership and reduce that of the financier. Accordingly, 
the rent will decrease as the beneficiary continues to pay the instalments. 
When the last instalment of the finance extended by the financier is paid, 
the rent will be zero. 
Please indicate your first and second preferences: 
- My first preference is: () 
- My second preference is: () 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
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APPENDIX B 
GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS 
The meanings given below are for terms which have been used in the text. 
`Ad!: Justice. 
Bay': Sale. 
Bay'ajil: A sale contract on the basis of deferred payment of the price and 
immediate delivery of the goods sold. 
Bay'Al-Salam: A sale contract in which the price is to be paid immediately while the 
goods sold are to be delivered after a specific period of time. The 
goods sold are well defined, though not available when the contract is 
signed. 
Fiqh: Muslim jurisprudence. It covers all aspects of life, religious, political, 
social or economic. In addition to religious observances (prayer, 
fasting, zakat and pilgrimage) it covers family law, inheritance, social 
obligations, commerce, criminal law, constitutional law and 
international relations, including war. The whole corpus of fiqh is 
based primarily on the Qur'an and the Sunnah and secondarily on 
ijma' and t/ithad. 
Fuqaha': (singular, faqih) Jurists who give opinions on various issues in the light 
of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and who thereby contribute to the 
development offiqh. 
Gharar: Uncertainty, hazard, dubious circumstances. The presence of Gharar 
with respect to the price, quality, quantity or time of delivery in a 
contract makes it highly suspect. Hence, such contracts are not 
allowed by Islamic law. For example, a contract to exchange "some" 
fruits for a dollar contains Gharar with respect to quantity as well as 
time. 
Hadith: Traditions or sayings of the Prophet Mohammad (pbuh). 
Halal: Permitted by the Islamic law, legitimate. 
Haram: Prohibited by the Islamic law, forbidden. 
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(le .. 
Ijarah: A contract of rent, hire or lease. 
Ijma: The consensus of competent scholars on an issue of juridical 
importance. It is one of the sources of Islamic Law. 
Istisna': A contractual arrangement whereby one party (purchaser) orders a 
specially defined product to be produced for him by the other party 
(seller) in the future, at a specific price, raw materials to be supplied by 
the producer. 
Mudarabah: An Islamic contract in which one side provides capital and the other 
side provides work (labour). Profits are to be shared in the proportion 
that was agreed before the contract was implemented. In the case of a 
loss, the provider of the capital bears all of the net loss, combined for 
all operations of the working partner (Mudarib), provided that there 
has been no violation of the stipulated contract or intentional neglect 
on the part of the working partner. 
Mudarib: The partners who provide entrepreneurship and management in a 
mudarabah agreement as distinct from the sahib A! -mal who provides 
the finance. 
Muqaradah: Another name for the Mudarabah contract. See Mudarabah. 
Murabahah: Sale at a specified profit margin. The term is, however, now used to 
refer to a sale agreement whereby the seller purchases the goods 
desired by the buyer and sells them at an agreed marked-up price, the 
payment being settled within an agreed time frame, either in 
instalments or by lump sum. The seller undertakes all the management 
needed for the purchase and also bears the risk for the goods until they 
have been delivered to the buyer. 
Musharakah: A contract of partnership in which two or more partners provide 
capital and share profits and losses. In such a contract, losses must be 
shared in the proportion in which the different partners have invested 
their capital, but profits, according to the predominant view in Islamic 
law, are shared in any mutually agreed proportion. 
Mustasni: The purchaser referred to in the Istisna' contract above. 
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Qard Hasan: Benevolent loan. A loan which is extended to the borrower mainly to 
help him and not to benefit from his situation. Necessarily, Qard 
Hasan has to be an interest-free loan. Sometimes, it is also translated 
as "distress loan" or "good loan". The borrower is required to return 
the borrowed amount in frill at his earliest convenience. 
Qur'an: The Holy Book of Muslims which was revealed by Allah to the 
Prophet Mohammad (pbuh). 
Riba: Usury. In the Islamic Shari 'ah, usury is lending money with interest, 
regardless of whether the rate of interest to be paid is high or low. 
Usury/interest is strictly prohibited in Islam. 
Sadaqah: Voluntary charity. 
Sahib Al-Mal: The financier; in the mudarabah form of partnership agreement, the 
sahib Al-mal provides the finance while the mudarib provides the 
entrepreneurship and management. There can be many ashab Al-ma! 
and mudaribs in a given mudarabah agreement. See also mudarabah, 
mudarib. 
Sani: The producer/maker referred to in the Istisna' contract above. 
Shari'ah: Refers to the divine guidance as given by the Qur'an and the Sunnah 
and embodies all aspects of the Islamic faith, including beliefs and 
practices. 
Shirkah: Partnership between two or more persons whereby, unlike mudarabah, 
all of them have a share in finance as well as entrepreneurship and 
management, though not necessarily equally. 
Sunnah: Traditions and practices of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). 
Ulama': Shari 'ah scholars. 
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APPENDIX C 
Test for Proportion 
Test with The Continuity Correction (Binomial Test) 
Z=(n-0.5)-Nn 
JNqp 
n= number with that characteristic in the sample. 
N= sample size. 
p= proportion in null hypothesis. 
q=1-p 
Two-tail test: 
Ho: p0.55 
H1: pý0.55 
Compare Z with 1.96 which is the 95% confidence level. 
One- tail test: 
Ho: p<_0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
Compare Z with 1.64 which is the 95% confidence level. 
Example: 
The sample size is 250 and 159 said `yes' to a certain question. 
Ho: PS0.55 
H1: P>0.55 
Notation 
n= 159 (number with that characteristic in the sample). 
N= 250 (sample size). 
p=0.55 (proportion in the null hypothesis). 
q= 1-p 
q= 1- 0.55 
q=0.45 
Z= (n-0.5)-Np 
JNqp 
Z= (159- 0.5) - 250 * 0.55 
250 * 0.45 * 0.55 
Z= 158.5 - 137.5 
61.875 
Z= 21.00 
61875 
Z= 21.00 
7.86607 
Z= 2.6695 (one-tail test) 
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Z=2.6695 which is greater than 1.64. Therefore, the null hypothesis has been rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis has been accepted. We can say that we are 95% confident 
that the true proportion is greater than 55%. 
(n-0.5) - ND 
JNqp 
n N P q z The null hypothesis 
159 250 0.55 0.45 2.669695 > 1.64 has been rejected 
159 250 0.6 0.4 1.097345 < 1.64 has not been rejected 
See: Clark and Cooke, 1983,251,227. 
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